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ABSTRACT 
 
 Within the psychology of religion, research suggests that religious 
engagement influences self-regulation, i.e., a person’s ability to pursue goals. 
Theoretical explanations for this relationship tend to oversimplify both sides of 
the connection, construing religious engagement narrowly in terms of beliefs and 
interpreting self-regulation as a matter of self-interested restraint. These 
conceptual specifications are challenged by perspectives within religious studies 
that are committed to analyzing religions as ordinary social phenomena and by 
evidence from psychological studies of normative behavior. This dissertation 
employs these insights to broaden the theoretical scope of the study of self-
regulation through a series of interdisciplinary reviews and an empirical study. 
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 To test the relationship between self-regulation and religious engagement, 
the dissertation presents a cross-sectional study of an online sample of 412 
participants. Each participant completed five previously established 
psychological surveys and experiments that index: how conventional they 
consider their religiosity; the degree to which they are embedded in obligatory 
relationships, roughly called “social density”; their endorsement of what Moral 
Foundations Theory calls “binding” moral intuitions; emotional regulatory 
capacity; and delayed discounting rates, a common proxy for impulsivity.  
 A series of hierarchical linear regressions showed that conventional 
religiosity was associated with both emotional regulation and delayed 
discounting. Delayed discounting and emotional regulation, however, were not 
associated. Statistical mediation analyses showed that the relationship between 
conventional religiosity and emotional regulation was fully mediated by social 
density, but the connection between conventional religiosity and delayed 
discounting was not influenced by any of the other variables.  
 Collectively these results support the primary argument of this 
dissertation – that the theoretical focus within psychological research on 
religious engagement and self-regulation has become unduly narrow in its 
construal of both concepts. This dissertation concludes by reflecting on these 
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results in light of what we know about formalized inquiries of this kind from the 
philosophy of science.  
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Chapter 1- Assessing the situation 
 
1.1. Introduction 
How does culture change our behavior? The answer may seem obvious, but that 
is only because the phenomenon is so apparent– social context invariably 
changes what we do. Digging into the psychological dynamics that shape how 
this occurs is the broad purpose of this dissertation. Our inquiry will take us into 
the formation of groups and the norms that give them their distinctive qualities. 
It will also take us deeply into the way these norms are internalized to shape 
how we perceive, think, feel, and ultimately what we do. Rather than tackle this 
overwhelmingly large question outright, this dissertation focuses on the 
relationship between religion and goal-directed behaviors, also known as self-
regulation. The inquiry is driven by the sharper question: how and why does 
engaging in a religious system change the ways people self-regulate?  
Behavior is inherently bio-cultural. The things we do are shaped by our 
brains and our cultures. The things we do also have consequences for our 
biology and our social context. So, in order to answer questions about why we do 
what we do, I have to draw from many different disciplines. Understanding the 
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social dynamics of religious engagement requires listening to scholars from 
religious studies, sociology, and anthropology. Understanding self-regulation 
demands a deep engagement with researchers in psychology and cognitive 
science. At its best, the scientific study of religion, integrates these disparate 
disciplines into a bio-cultural approach that grounds theory in evidence in order 
to make it vulnerable to correction. This is the approach I will be taking in this 
dissertation as I weave these disciplines together in order to understand the 
social and psychological dynamics that shape the ways we regulate our behavior. 
 
1.2. Self-regulation 
For most people, the mention of regulating behavior brings to mind self-control 
and willpower. If you suggest that we need to understand social dynamics in 
order to understand these processes, they will give you a quizzical look. 
Willpower and self-control hold a mythical place in our culture. The two have 
been called "the greatest human strength" (Baumeister & Tierney, 2012), the 
moral muscle (Baumeister & Exline, 1999), and a hallmark virtue (Prelec & 
Bodner, 2003). Such accolades may be well earned. After all, better self-control is 
associated with better grades (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), health, 
wealth (Moffitt et al., 2011), and the capacity to make amends within close 
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relationships (Finkel & Campbell, 2001). When surveys ask individuals why they 
did not make desired life-style changes, lack of willpower was the most common 
response (American Psychological Association, 2011). Research and self-help 
books abound, full of insights and advice on how to remedy this deficit.  If only 
we had more willpower, we are told, then our lives could be everything that we 
imagine. But is that true? 
Part of the mythos of self-control and willpower derives from its scientific 
origin story, the now famous marshmallow experiments (Mischel et al., 2011).1 
Here is how the story is typically told. Psychologists were working with four-
year olds from a nursery at Stanford. In the experiment, kids were individually 
brought from the nursery into a room they were told was the "surprise room." 
Once there, a researcher and the child talked a bit, just to help put the kid at ease. 
Then the researcher told the kid that she has to leave the room briefly, but while 
                                                        
1. While the concept is ancient, the word "willpower" does not start showing up regularly in print 
until the mid-19th  century. Self-control, on the other hand, prominently entered print in 1811 
with Mary Brunton's novel and has remained a relatively common feature since then. Common 
in this sense means that about 5 of every 100,000,000 words was self-control. But, what is striking 
about the Ngram chart of "willpower" (Google Ngram: https://books.google.com/ngrams), is that 
after 1960 its presence leaps by orders of magnitude (in 1940 willpower was used 7 times for 
every 100,000,000 words, by the turn of the millennia it was being used 70 times). This is not a 
book about history. There are too many variables present to even speculate whether these words 
entered our consciousness as a result of the Victorian era, the industrial revolution, the expansion 
of the British empire, or the growing prominence of psychology. Nevertheless, it is striking, and I 
do not intend for it to be anything more than that, that 1960, the inflection point for willpower, is 
also the time that Mischel and colleagues were conducting these famous experiments. 
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she is gone the child has a choice: he can eat the one marshmallow that is on the 
table or he can wait until the researcher returns and then he can have two 
marshmallows. But he only gets the two if he resists eating the one. This basic 
experimental set-up gave psychologists a way to test the impact of variables like 
family structure (Mischel, 1961), attention (Mischel & Ebbeson, 1970; Mischel & 
Moore, 1973), and cognitive appraisal (Mischel & Baker, 1975) on the child's 
capacity to delay gratification. But the compelling part of these early experiments 
came when the researchers followed up with these kids a decade or more later 
and found that those who were able to hold out for the two marshmallows were 
also those that had higher SAT scores, lower BMI, better verbal fluency and 
reasoning skills, and lower incidence of substance abuse to name a few outcomes 
(Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). The list of 
favorable outcomes goes on (Mischel et al., 2011) and each addition amplified the 
perceived importance of self-control for living a good life. 
Clearly self-control was important, but how does one acquire this 
necessary capacity? Around the turn of the 21st century a separate research 
program emerged and brought willpower fully into the mainstream. This 
research program was led by Baumeister and Tice at Case Western and started 
off with another experiment involving tempting food (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
  
 
5 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Students were brought into a room that was full of the 
smell of fresh baked cookies. There were the cookies on the table, alongside other 
chocolaty sweets. Next to the sweets was a bowl of radishes. These students were 
not given a choice– some were allowed to eat the sweets, but another group was 
only allowed to eat the radishes. The participants were then given an impossible 
puzzle to try and solve. The experiment was set up to see whether people's 
persistence in attempting to solve the puzzle was influenced by whether they ate 
satisfying cookies or had to exercise restraint and eat radishes. Those who ate 
radishes gave up much sooner than the cookie group or the people who got no 
treats and just did the puzzle (Baumeister et al., 1998). This result has been 
repeated hundreds of times with a variety of different conditions and the main 
result has largely been borne out (Maranges & Baumeister, 2016)– when people 
exercise self-control, they are using a finite resource. With a nod to Freud's 
energetic model of the psyche, this research team labeled the phenomenon ‘ego-
depletion’ and ‘willpower’ as the energy or resource that is being depleted. 
The connected concepts of willpower and self-control are not only 
prominent in the public imagination; they are also at the center of a large 
research program within psychology (cf. Vohs & Baumeister, 2016). This research 
program is part of a broader sub-field within psychology committed to studying 
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self-regulation, of which self-control is a specific example. To understand self-
regulation it is helpful to remember that all organisms self-regulate to maintain a 
certain level of homeostasis. Our autonomic nervous system regulates our 
bodies' temperature, blood pressure, and blood chemistry for example. These 
processes are examples of self-regulation, but when psychologists talk about self-
regulation, they are referring specifically to a behavioral process. Keeping this 
broad scope of regulation in mind is helpful because the behavioral process of 
regulation follows the same pattern as these autonomic processes (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998). 
This pattern is a feedback loop. In the example of thermoregulation, our 
bodies have a set-temperature– something roughly around 98.6º F. As we begin 
to deviate from that set point, this regulatory system kicks in and we begin 
sweating or shivering in an attempt to bring our internal temperature back to this 
set-point. This is the basic pattern of the feedback loop. There is a standard, in 
this case it is the set-point of somewhere around 98.6º F. The system self-
monitors, to check on its current state in relation to this set-point (e.g., too hot/too 
cold?). If there is a difference, then the system initiates a behavior to try and 
adjust back to that set-point (sweat/shiver). After a while, you check back in, thus 
it being a loop. 
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Behavioral self-regulation follows the same dynamic: we have a goal, we 
check in on our current state, and then we adjust our behavior in an attempt to 
remove any discrepancy between the two. Carver and Scheier (1981) were among 
the first to propose using this model of a cybernetic feedback system to 
understand our goal-directed behaviors. The simplicity of this model is 
beguiling, especially when you begin to consider the range of behaviors that it 
encompasses. This simple process can be used to describe the simple act of 
walking from the study to the kitchen to pour another cup of coffee. But it can 
also describe much more complex behaviors, like sharing emotional states in 
order to meet the goal of being a good partner. This variance in complexity is 
connected to the goal itself: being a good partner is a much more complicated 
goal than getting a cup of coffee. There is also variance surrounding the amount 
of effort required in the process of regulation. Some behaviors are nearly 
effortless, such as driving a car after many years of practice. Other times 
regulation requires an incredible amount of attentive effort, such as if you were 
resisting Baumeister's cookies. 
1.2.1 Problems of willpower 
Those instances in which self-regulation requires deliberate effort are 
called self-control. More formally, self-control is the act of "overriding one action 
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tendency in order to attain another goal" (Carver & Scheier, 2016, p. 3). This act 
of "overriding" is commonly framed in terms of inhibition (Roberts et al., 2014). 
So, while self-regulation encompasses a broad range of simple, complex, 
automatic, and effortful behaviors, self-control is a limited subset which involves 
inhibiting one impulse to pursue a different goal. The range of this subset, 
however, remains unclear in the literature. Some researchers argue that 
inhibition is central to 80-90% of self-regulation (Baumeister, 2014) and others 
suggest that the vast majority of self-regulation is automatic (Papies & Aartes, 
2016). Regardless of where researchers fall within this debate, it is increasingly 
common to include willpower as an essential part of the self-regulatory process 
(Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004). But this is not a neutral decision. Since 
willpower is connected to effort, its inclusion in the process tacitly blurs the 
distinction between self-control and self-regulation and tips the scales towards 
self-regulation as primarily inhibitory. This confusion arises in part from the 
underdetermined nature of the concept willpower. 
Dewey noted nearly a century ago that there is "one superstition current 
among even cultivated persons. They suppose that if one is told what to do, if the 
right end is pointed to them, all that is required in order to bring about the right 
act is will or wish on the part of the one who is to act." (Dewey, 1922/2002, p. 27). 
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As much as we may enjoy thinking that more of this magical resource, 
willpower, would solve our problems, we have likely all experienced the fact 
that changing behavior is not simply a matter of changing goals and applying 
more effort. 
Beyond anecdotal and theoretical critiques, there is also mounting 
empirical evidence that challenges the ego depletion model of willpower. A 
series of experiments have shown that beliefs about willpower may be self-
fulfilling prophecies– if people believe willpower is a limited resource, then they 
act as if it is (Job, Walton, Bernecker, & Dweck, 2013; Job, Dweck, & Walton, 
2010). This nuance does not contradict the ego-depletion model, but more recent 
meta-analyses and replication efforts signal deeper problems with the model. 
Carter and McCullough's (2013) broad meta-analysis of ego-depletion studies 
suggested that the seemingly vast amount of evidence supporting the view that 
willpower is a limited resource is likely the result of publication biases. 
Following this blow, a multi-lab preregistered replication effort (Hagger & 
Chatzisarantis et al., 2016) failed to find reliable evidence of willpower being 
depleted. These recent challenges do not definitively undermine the ego-
depletion model of self-control, but they should make researchers more cautious 
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about extending this metaphor as the primary characteristic of self-regulation 
more broadly (Inzlicht et al., 2014) 
Baumeister and colleagues have responded to these challenges (e.g., 
Baumeister & Vohs, 2016a; 2016b). They argue that people have overextended 
the studies that suggest what we believe about willpower has a larger influence 
on depletion than any actual effort (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016b; Job, Dweck, & 
Walton, 2010). When Vohs and colleagues (2013) replicated this study, they 
found that belief in unlimited willpower only mattered for mild depletion tasks; 
once participants were severely depleted, through multiple self-control tasks, 
then belief did not change the original depletion effects. In an initial response to 
the more challenging large-scale replication effort from Hagger and colleagues 
(2016), Baumeister and Vohs (2016a) argued that the task used was meaningfully 
different from those used in other studies. More specifically, the replication effort 
was conducted entirely on computers, so the depletion task had to be a 
computerized one. One previous study found that this computerized task, which 
involves a blend of crossing out different letters, led to meaningful depletion 
effects (Sripada, Kessler, & Jonides, 2014); but that remains a slender hook on 
which to hang the entire replication effort. In their retort, Baumeister and Vohs 
(2016a) say:  
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We will organize a preregistered, multisite replication project next year, 
using well-tested procedures (ones that actually involve self-regulation). 
We herewith preregister the hypothesis that depleted participants will 
perform worse on subsequent, ostensibly unrelated self-regulation tests 
than will nondepleted participants, as a great many other studies have 
found. (p. 575) 
Two years may not be sufficient time, but the incentive for such a thorough 
empirical response is high, and yet there are still no signs of this confirmatory 
replication effort. Furthermore, within their response, Baumeister and Vohs 
(2016b) only engaged Carter and McCullough’s (2013) meta-analysis in a 
footnote (Baumeister and Vohs, 2016b). This response fails to recognize the 
extent to which publication bias can significantly inflate effect sizes (Franco, 
Malhotra, & Simonovits, 2014). 
Collectively, this host of challenges to the ego-depletion model of self-
regulation is more formidable than Baumeister and colleagues are willing to 
admit (2016b). This does not mean that ego-depletion does not occur, nor that an 
energetic view of mental processes is not helpful. But these challenges do 
radically diminish the likelihood that the majority of self-regulatory behaviors 
are characterized by restraint, which requires willpower, as claimed by 
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Baumeister (2014) and colleagues (Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004), and assumed 
by others (e.g., Laurin & Kay, 2016). If self-regulation is not dependent on how 
much willpower individuals have, then how are we to understand its dynamics? 
There are various alternative models for understanding the cognitive dimensions 
of self-regulation (see Bargh, 1997; Berkman, Hutcherson, Livingston, Kahn, & 
Inzlicht, 2017; Ferguson, 2007). For our purposes, however, understanding the 
social context of self-regulation, also provides an illuminating corrective to the 
prevailing theories that construe regulation primarily in terms of restraint. 
1.2.2 Promise of context 
Centering social context in our model of self-regulation is necessary for 
multiple reasons. By social context, I am referring to the relationships, practices, 
and perceived expectations, norms, and values within a person’s surrounded 
social and physical environment.2 At the most apparent level, social context will 
determine what counts as self-control or not because the expectations and values 
within that context determine the landscape of good and bad behaviors. For 
                                                        
2 As I will unpack within the next chapter, social context is a dynamic and multifaceted space. For 
example, the social context of a classroom will involve the norms and expectations of the school, 
the wider city, state, and nation, along with the histories, commitments, and identities of each 
person in the classroom. Granted this complexity of the social environment, I will attempt to 
focus on the facets of social context that appear to be salient for the individual, as inferred by 
influencing their actions. 
  
 
13 
example, the capacity to restrain the expression of distress may be seen as self-
control in some contexts, but not in others (Butler, Lee, & Gross, 2009). In the 
language of Carver and Scheier's (1998; 2016) framework of self-regulation– 
social context influences the standards that provide the set-points for regulation. 
I will explore this point more fully below and in chapter 2.  
Not only does the relevant social context shape our standards for 
behavior, it can also determine our capacity to act. To appreciate this point, it 
helps to look more closely at the famous marshmallow test. In the earliest 
versions of this experiment, Mischel was not simply testing children's capacity to 
avoid temptation– he was testing the impact of context on how children delayed 
gratification (Mischel, 1958; 1961). The initial runs of the experiment were not in 
a Stanford preschool, they were done with 53 kids in Trinidad. Mischel was 
testing stereotypes about how individuals of African descent and those of Indian 
background would respond to delaying gratification. In this study and 
subsequent follow-ups, he found that it was not an ethnic difference that 
determined who delayed gratification and who did not, it was a familial 
difference; specifically, the children from households where a father was not 
present were much more likely to take the immediate reward (Mischel, 1961). 
More recent research has continued to underscore the ways that family structure 
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and socialization impact regulatory success along with the ways in which 
children go about self-regulating (e.g., Keller et al., 2004). For example, in some 
social contexts self-regulation occurs primarily through effortful inhibition, while 
in other contexts the automatic emotional regulation of temptation precludes the 
need for inhibition (e.g., Lamm et al., 2017). 
Even the studies conducted in the US that gave rise to the mythos of the 
marshmallow test were about how easily contextual factors can change self-
regulatory behaviors. Simple contextual differences, such as whether or not the 
two options were physically present (Mischel & Ebbeson, 1970), or directing kids 
to pay attention in different ways (Mischel & Moore, 1973), or to think about 
different aspects of the treats (Mischel & Baker, 1975), dramatically changed the 
outcomes. In other words, a blend of contextual factors, cognitive capacities, and 
motivational processes coalesce to shape the self-regulation of behavior. 
At this point you might protest: when studies show that the ability of 
children to self-regulate predicts positive outcomes later in life this indicates a 
dispositional ability, not contextual influences. After all, it is the capacity of these 
preschoolers to deploy effective strategies when they were unprompted and 
facing the most tempting conditions that had the strongest predictive value 
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(Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990)3. This tension, between the influence of context 
and the impact of a stable personality evokes a long-standing debate within 
psychology. 
Around the time of Mischel's early experiments, a group of psychologists 
were arguing that what seem to be stable character traits are actually just 
consistent responses to stable situations (Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Drawing from an 
influential set of experiments from Jones and Harris (1967), Ross (1977) labeled 
this tendency to overemphasize dispositions and traits, and thereby elide the 
importance of situational factors, the "fundamental attribution error" (see also 
Gilbert, 1998). On the other side of the debate are those psychologists who argue 
that there are stable dispositions and traits that make up our personality and give 
people a relatively consistent set of responses to different situations (Bowers, 
1973). In support of these stable dispositions, Epstein and O'Brien (1985) showed 
that if the situation specific behaviors were aggregated, then remarkably 
consistent responses emerged. In other words, behavior is influenced by 
situational factors within any particular instance, but when taken at a general 
                                                        
3. Importantly, a large set of these positive outcomes are social skills: the ability to make new 
friends, not to go pieces under stress, express themselves easily, be attentive, curious, not sulky, 
and be unlikely to tease other kids (Mischel et al., 1988). So, social context is important to 
consider as both a causal factor and a consequence of any self-regulatory process. 
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level there are still stable dispositions, which allow researchers to coherently 
study personality as a construct. Decades of research into personality has 
converged on a five-factor model in which personality can examined as variance 
in an individual's disposition towards: openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Costa-McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 
1992). Adding to the statistical support for personality are twin studies 
(Bouchard, 1994) and genetic analysis (Comings et al., 2000; Heck et al., 2009) 
that suggest these dispositional tendencies have a biological basis. 
What are we to make of this debate? Like most divisions around 
interpretation, the truth appears to be somewhere in the middle. A systematic 
review found that the correlation between traits and behavioral responses is not 
statistically different from that between situational factors and behavior; both 
have an average correlation ~.20 (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). In other 
words, as we might suspect, any particular behavior is influenced by a blend of 
situational and dispositional factors. Turning back to the research on self-
regulation, this suggests that individuals will vary in their trait tendency to 
exercise regulation—this tendency is captured within the dimension of 
conscientiousness (Roberts et al., 2014)—and their likelihood of exercising this 
tendency will vary by context. 
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Before adding religiosity to the discussion, it is worth summarizing what 
we have already covered. Self-regulation is the psychological process of 
adjusting behaviors in pursuit of goals. This process can be analyzed in terms of 
a feedback loop that includes standards, self-monitoring, willpower, and 
motivation. While the inclusion of willpower, as necessary for adjusting 
behavior, biases this model of self-regulation towards an overemphasis on 
effortful inhibition, the general process of self-regulation can also be automatic. 
The particular instances in which self-regulation is effortful are called self-
control. Psychologists all agree on these definitions, but there are strong debates 
about the degree to which regulatory behaviors are automatic or effortful. My 
contention is that turning to examine the way social processes influence self-
regulation can help resolve this debate by characterizing some of the features 
that lead to automatic modes regulation. In particular, I will focus on the variety 
of social processes at play within religious engagement and how these social 
dynamics interact with psychological processes. 
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1.3. The relevance of religion 
1.3.1 Defining religion 
Very rarely does adding religion to inquiry help reduce complexity. 
Scholars of religious studies spend an enormous amount of time, energy, and 
paper debating what we even mean by "religion." Classic definitions from 
European enlightenment philosophers tended to emphasize religion as theistic 
belief even while they advanced naturalistic and rational arguments for changing 
this belief (e.g., Hume, 1757; Kant, 1788/2015). Later philosophers and theorists, 
like Feuerbach (1830/1980), Marx (1844/1970), Nietzsche (1887/2009), and Freud 
(1928) advanced a more critical position, which argued that understanding the 
naturalistic origins of supernatural beliefs undermined the legitimacy of those 
beliefs. The common thread is that religion is demarcated as primarily about 
theistic belief. 
The main problem with this position is that it is based on the tacit 
assumption that Protestantism is the norm. This assumption leads to an over-
emphasis on subjective states, such as beliefs and feelings, at the expense of ritual 
behaviors and community. The strong forms of this critique have been pushed by 
anthropologists such as Asad (1993), who argues that not only is this association 
between religion and theistic belief overly influenced by Christian perspectives, 
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but that the very category of religion is fabricated and done so towards malicious 
ends (see Masuzawa, 2005). Religious studies as a discipline has arrived at a 
peculiar place where many scholars resist the use of religion as a viable category.  
Despite this odd irony, the critique from Asad (1993) and others is fair. 
Even if you include scholars such as Durkheim (1912/2008) and Weber 
(1963/1993), whose complex analyses of religions extend well beyond theistic 
belief, there still may be a tacit bias towards emphasizing Christianity-like 
features of religious systems. But, we can grant these points about the ambiguity 
of the category ‘religion’, along with its colonial lineage, and still recognize that 
going to a temple is different than to going to the market. How can we explore 
these differences without repeating past mistakes of bias and reifying harmful 
miscategorizations? 
One way that psychological researchers have tried to parse out what is 
distinct about religious behaviors is by recognizing that some actions are done in 
reference to what one considers sacred (Pargament, Mahoney, Exline, Jones, & 
Shafranske, 2013). This approach to defining religion is helpful because it relies 
on the person's own attributions instead of the researcher's assumptions. The 
difficulty with any definition that rests on a single characteristic, however, is that 
it risks capturing too much and too little. For example, there are evangelical 
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Christians in the US who train themselves to experience most of what they do in 
relation to God (Luhrmann, 2012). Do we want to consider all of their lives 
therefore religious? At the same time, plenty of rituals that may be worth 
considering as religious are undertaken with an everyday practicality that the 
practitioners might not consider to be in relation to the sacred. 
In response to these difficulties, many researchers employ a family 
resemblances definition for understanding religious phenomena (Segal & Smart, 
2012; Wildman, 2010). Drawing from Wittgenstein (1953/2009), family 
resemblance approaches avoid the need to define an essential characteristic and 
instead provide a cluster of similarities which roughly organize things within a 
collection, but any single feature might not be common to the entire group. 
Within this dissertation, therefore, when I talk about religion I am referring to the 
ways people, individually and collectively, relate to that which is considered 
ultimate through symbol systems of ideas and practices that are taken as given 
and often include engaging fundamental problems about origins and mortality, 
suffering and liberation, meaning and purpose, and morality and self-cultivation. 
Just in case that cluster is too cognitive, since it is oriented towards questions and 
solutions, it is important to recognize that engaging these problems often means 
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embodying a way of life that cultivates habitual practices, orders values, embeds 
one in a community, and infuses experience with a transcendent significance.4 
Throughout this dissertation, I will refer to both religious systems and to 
religious engagement. When I say “religious systems” this is a way to refer to 
those systems of symbols and practices as they exist on their own. Of course, 
these systems are never purely “on their own”– if they were not being carried in 
the minds, actions, and artifacts of a community, then they would not exist at all. 
But, insofar as they are encountered as external to any particular individual, then 
religious systems do seem to have an independent status. This use of the term is 
similar to saying religious traditions, but I prefer systems as they imply a more 
dynamic and multi-faceted nature than tradition, which may imply a static and 
monolithic entity. When I say “religious engagement” I am referring to the 
various ways that an individual interacts with and embodies their religious 
system. Religious engagement is thus very similar to religious practice, but 
“practice” may unwittingly imply a narrow focus on ritual behaviors. I therefore 
                                                        
4. My definition draws primarily from three sources: Geertz' famous definition: "(1) a system of 
symbols (2) which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations 
in men (3) by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these 
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely 
realistic" (Geertz, 1993, p. 90). Neville's definition: "human engagement of ultimacy expressed in 
cognitive articulations, existential responses to ultimacy that give ultimate definition to the 
individual and community, and patterns of life and ritual in the face of ultimacy" (2014, p. 4). 
And Wildman's emphasis on fallibilistic, loose criteria for vague categories (2010, p. 37). 
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use “engagement” to also include the relational dimensions of belonging and the 
fact that holding religious beliefs is an active behavior as well. Turning back to 
the current project, religious systems may include elements that foster self-
regulation, such as particular beliefs about the supernatural or particular ritual 
practices that cultivate the capacity to restrain. Religious engagement, on the 
other hand, focuses our attention on the way that people engage these particular 
elements of the given system. Since my primary question is psychological, 
religious engagement is my main concept of interest, but this engagement cannot 
be separated from the religious systems that offer the symbols or practices with 
which to engage. Both religious engagement and religious systems are vaguely 
construed using the family resemblances approach. 
Part of the usefulness of this approach is that it changes the question from 
whether or not something fits within our category and instead looks at the ways 
in which it might be religious and the points at which it diverges from other 
religious phenomena. For example, consider a courtroom. This is a space rich 
with symbolic practices that are taken as given. It involves special clothing, a 
specific order of action, particular emotions you are unlikely to encounter 
elsewhere, a solemnity, and an orientation towards the ideal of Justice, which 
could be taken as ultimate. In these ways the courtroom is a very religious space. 
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At the same time, the courtroom does not necessarily embed one in a community 
that infuses experience with a transcendent significance while engaging 
fundamental problems of origins, liberation, meaning, or self-cultivation. 
Scholars could argue that actually it does do these things by ruling on education, 
health, and what actions are right and wrong. The point of the family 
resemblances definition, however, is that we do not need to settle some debate 
about whether or not the legal system "counts" as religion. Instead we can focus 
on the specific features that tip the scales one way or the other. This approach, 
which Taves (2009) describes as the "building block approach," is particularly 
important for attempts to study religious phenomena scientifically. The broad 
category of religion is too general and vague to give you any empirical traction. 
But, parsing religion into particular features, whether social or psychological, 
that give rise to the effects of interest allows researchers to employ methods that 
are testable, replicable, and can be synthesized into a broader understanding of 
religious phenomena as a whole. 
For example, if you are interested in self-regulation, this approach allows 
you to ask how are particular features of religious systems are likely to influence 
the standards, self-monitoring, willpower, and motivation necessary for 
regulation. We are approaching the point at which we can begin to answer those 
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questions, but first it is necessary to situate the scientific study of religion within 
religious studies more broadly. Doing so will help highlight the methods, 
sensitivities, and modes of explanation that this approach employs. 
1.3.2 The scientific study of religion 
In the broad sense that scientific inquiry pursues naturalistic explanations 
for phenomena, the scientific study of religion is not a new mode of inquiry. 
Philosophers dating back to Xunzi (Campany, 1992; Kline & Tiwald, 2014) have 
theorized about the naturalistic origins and functions of religious practices. Many 
of the theorists mentioned above, Hume (1757), Feuerbach (1830/1980), Marx 
(1844/1970), and Freud (1928) also sought to ground religious phenomena within 
a naturalistic understanding of the world. These theorists do not use a strong 
mode of empirical falsification, which led Popper (1962) to highlight Marx and 
Freud as representative of pseudoscience; but they nevertheless set the stage for 
thinking about the origins and functions of religious systems without appealing 
to a supernatural realm. At the turn of the 20th century philosophers and 
psychologists like James (1902) and Leuba (1909) began incorporating more 
directly testable theories and empirical methods into their understanding of 
religion, founding the field of the psychology of religion. There are various ways 
to organize the field, but for our purposes, there are two main streams of 
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research that will help us understand the relationship between religious 
engagement and self-regulation. 
One stream of research within the psychological study of religion is 
oriented towards understanding individual differences in the way that people 
engage their religiosity. For example, Allport (1950) and colleagues (Allport & 
Ross, 1967) studied the way that individuals are either intrinsically or 
extrinsically motivated to engage their religious traditions, though this 
distinction may founder when applied to non-Protestant traditions (e.g., Cohen 
et al., 2017) . The study of variance within individual religious orientations has 
differentiated to include other ways of being religious, such as questing (Darley 
& Batson, 1973), authoritarianism, and religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 1992) to name a few. Not only does this branch within the 
psychology of religion examine individual differences in religiosity, it also 
studies the consequences of these differences for peoples' minds and behavior. 
For example, researchers in this field examine the consequences of various 
modes of religiosity for mental health (Koenig, 2009), prejudice (Rowatt, Shen, 
LaBouff, & Gonzalez, 2013), and various virtuous qualities like social justice 
(Sandage & Jankowski, 2013), hope (Sandage & Morgan, 2014), gratitude (Koenig 
et al., 2014), and forgiveness (Worthington et al., 2014) to name a few.  
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Relevant to the task at hand, one branch within this stream of research 
also looks at the way various modes of religiosity relate to self-regulatory 
capacities (Jankowski & Vaughn, 2009). For example, while much of the evidence 
suggests that religious engagement has a positive impact on self-regulatory 
capacity (Laurin & Kay, 2016, McCullough & Willoughby, 2009; Zell & 
Baumeister, 2013), this research on individual differences shows that some ways 
of being religiosity, such as those characterized by spiritual instability (Sandage 
& Jankowski, 2010; 2013) or authoritarian images of god (Johnson, Li, Cohen, & 
Okun, 2013) are actually dysregulating. While most of this dissertation will focus 
on the general ways in which social processes and religious engagement are 
likely to influence self-regulation, it is necessary to keep this variance at the 
individual level in mind. 
A separate stream of research, growing out of cognitive science, is 
oriented towards understanding the origins and functions of religious beliefs and 
behaviors. While this stream draws from earlier work in anthropology, the turn 
to apply cognitive approaches in order to explain religious phenomena traces 
most clearly to Guthrie's (1980) seminal paper A cognitive theory of religion. In his 
later book, Guthrie (1993) argues that religious beliefs are a form of pareidolia, or 
the tendency to see patterns in random stimuli. This is one explanation among 
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many. Our predispositions towards teleological explanations (Kelemen, 2004), 
dualism (Bloom, 2007), or theory of mind (Bering, 2006) are also taken to help 
explain why people would be inclined to hold religious beliefs (Boyer, 2002). 
Other researchers that engage with the cognitive science of religion are less 
inclined to ask about the origins of religious beliefs and practices and more 
attuned to the functions of religious phenomena. Researchers within this 
functional approach argue that religious rituals help with healing (McClenon, 
1997), group cohesion (Sosis, 2000; Whitehouse & Lanman, 2014), and other 
prosocial process (Norenzayan et al., 2016)5. Research within the cognitive 
science of religion is flourishing and diverse, but this diversity is united by the 
effort to incorporate our understanding of religion within the overarching 
framework of any life science– evolution. In order to situate the relevance of this 
stream of research for understanding the relationship between religious 
engagement and self-regulation, it is necessary to review a few points about 
studying religious systems from an evolutionary perspective. 
                                                        
5 While this functional stream of research may seem decidedly less cognitive than the one focused 
on beliefs, these researchers are predominately cognitive anthropologists. So, while they may be 
studying the functional outcome of group cohesion or ritual healing, their analysis is 
predominately in terms of cognitive variables, such as costly signaling (Sosis, 2000), identity 
fusion (Whitehouse & Lanman, 2014) or dissociation (McClenon, 1997). 
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1.3.3 Religion and evolution 
Attempting to ground religion in evolution is not entirely novel. The 
paradigmatic example that scholars love to hate is Frazer's (1890/1963) 
progressivist account that magical beliefs evolve into religions and religions will 
ultimately be supplanted by science. The primary problem with such 
approaches, besides the fact that they are wrong, is summarized by Smith's 
(1982) critique that they allow the scholar "to draw his data without regard to 
time and place and then, locate them in a series from the simplest to the more 
complex, adding the assumption that the former was chronologically as well as 
logically prior" (p. 24). In other words, the absence of the necessary phylogenetic 
data allowed theorists to import a misguided progressive view of evolution that 
culminated in their own ethnocentric ideal. 
More recent attempts at understanding religion through the perspective of 
evolution are more sensitive to these pitfalls. They are also aided by a wealth of 
data that allows the construction of phylogenetic lineages in order to answer 
questions about the sorts of social and ecological pressures that lead religious 
systems to change over time (e.g., Watts et al., 2015). Where data does not allow 
historical reconstruction, researchers can still study the way cross-cultural 
variance in religious practices correspond to different environmental pressures 
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(e.g., Sosis, Kress, & Boster, 2007). Cross-cultural experiments, especially among 
children and other primates, allow researchers to hone in on psychological 
tendencies that appear to be species wide, suggesting an evolutionary origin 
(e.g., Tomasello, 2016). These data-driven lines of inquiry are also grounded in a 
more robust understanding of evolutionary theory. In short, many of the 
lingering concerns about studying religion in the context of evolution are largely 
directed at issues that have been abandoned, though this does not imply that 
there are not many technical issues still to resolve. As Strausberg (2014) said: 
“there is a long way from stating the meta-theoretical fact that anything, even 
religion, is ultimately subject to evolutionary processes to showing that cultural 
evolution is a fruitful research program “ (p. 604). Throughout this dissertation I 
will highlight research that fruitfully uses evolutionary theory to help 
understand culture in general and the relationship between religion and self-
regulation in particular.  
A key part of evolutionary theory is Tinbergen's (1963) distinction 
between the levels of explanation for any form of animal behavior. Ultimate 
explanations use evolutionary dynamics over a long range of time. In other 
words, they describe why the process of natural selection on hereditary variation 
would lead to a certain behavior being present within an ecosystem (Bateson & 
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Laland, 2013). In contrast, proximate explanations describe how this behavior 
functionally operates– what are the actual processes that make it work (Scott-
Phillips, Dickens, & West, 2011)6.  
As we turn now to the relationship between religion and self-regulation, it 
is essential to keep these different levels of explanation in mind. For example, at 
the ultimate level, McCullough and Carter (2011) describe the ways that effective 
self-regulation would be an adaptive psychological capacity in the evolutionary 
landscape. Therefore, those religious beliefs, rituals, and social structures that 
fostered self-regulation would be selected for in the process of evolutionary 
change (Norenzayan et al., 2016). This ultimate perspective is necessary, but 
within this dissertation I will focus primarily on the proximate mechanisms 
through which religious systems influence regulatory behavior. Without a clear 
picture at the proximate level, we will have a much harder time constraining our 
ultimate explanations. But once we have the proximate level clear, then we know 
                                                        
6 The classic example of this distinction is the peppered moth, which varies in relation to 
pollution in their environment (Kettlewell, 1958). Dark moths thrive in industrial environments, 
while light moths thrive in the forest. The ultimate explanation for this variance is differential 
reproduction; moths that blend in are less likely to be eaten and more likely to reproduce (Cook 
et al., 2012). The proximate explanation appeals to molecular biology to describe how specific 
alleles give rise to differing degrees of melanisation (Cook & Saccheri, 2013).  
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more specifically what facets of a religious system should be the specific target of 
ultimate explanations. So, if we zoom in to the proximate level, what do we see? 
 
1.4. Evidence connecting religion and self-regulation 
When researchers began to study the relationship between religiosity and self-
regulation, it was not done with evolution in mind. Instead, it was part of a 
psychological study on the ethical behavior of kids, the Character Education 
Inquiry (Hartshorne, May, & Maller, 1929). This was one of the first studies of 
moral behavior, as the psychologists sought to understand what it was that made 
some kids more likely to be deceitful, altruistic, or persistent in their actions.  
Within this study they found a small positive relationship between the amount of 
time kids spent at Sunday school and their persistence on a difficult task, though 
this varied enough by religious community to make the results unreliable. 
Interestingly, there was no relationship between Sunday school attendance and 
the inhibition task (Hartshorne et al., 1929). The more lasting impact of this study 
was that they found no generalizable ethical traits; instead, all of the kids acted 
honestly sometimes and deceitfully other times. Sometimes they persisted and 
other times they gave-in. This study was part of the research that gave rise to the 
situationalist positions described above.  
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Fifty years later another set of studies suggested a more consistent 
positive relationship between religiosity and self-control. Where Hartshorne et 
al. (1929) used behavioral tasks, these new studies worked with novel self-report 
measures of trait self-control, such as the California Psychological Inventory 
(Gough, 1956). In an early study from this period, McClain (1978), showed that 
religiosity was related to self-control, but only among those US students for 
whom religion was an intrinsic motivation; this means they were religious for its 
own sake, not for the sake of social connections or familial obligations (Allport & 
Ross, 1967). More recent studies found similar positive associations between 
religiosity, in this case self-reports of religious involvement, and self-control 
among students in Indonesia (French, Eisenberg, Vaughan, Purwono, & 
Suryanti, 2008) and Pakistan (Aziz & Rehman, 1996). By 2009, McCullough and 
Willoughby found that 11 of the 12 existing studies supported a positive 
association between self-control and religiosity. Since then, more studies have 
emerged which help solidify this relationship, while also providing some 
nuance. 
Part of that nuance and clarification has come from body of research using 
delayed discounting tasks, which measure an individual's willingness to forego 
immediate rewards in order to wait for larger rewards later (Madden & Johnson, 
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2010). Since they involve competing neural systems (McClure, Laibson, 
Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004) and are strong predictors of impulsivity (Odum, 
2011), these behavioral tasks are taken to be a measure of the direct inhibition 
described above. Initial research suggested that religiosity predicted an 
individual's willingness to wait for the larger later rewards (Carter, McCullough, 
Kim-Spoon, Corrales, & Blake, 2012b). This positive relationship between 
religiosity and delayed discounting was mediated by future time orientation—an 
individual's propensity to think about the future and feel as if it is approaching 
quickly (Gjesme, 1979)—which other studies have shown is associated with 
intrinsic religiosity (Carter et al., 2012b; Öner-Özkan, 2007). A second project 
from this research team (Carter, McCullough, & Carver, 2012a) also found that 
self-monitoring of goals and values mediated the relationship between religiosity 
and self-control. Importantly, religious involvement also predicted reports of 
feeling monitored by God, which was significantly related to self-monitoring, but 
in the statistical models this feeling of supernatural monitoring was not related 
to self-control (Carter et al., 2012a, p. 693). 
Other empirical projects use different behavioral tasks to support the 
association between religious cognition and self-regulatory behaviors. Rounding 
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et al. (2012) found that implicitly priming individuals with religious concepts7 
led them to endure more discomfort, delay gratification, and persist longer on a 
depleting task. Following Baumeister's ego-depletion model of self-control, 
Rounding and colleagues (2012) argue that religious thoughts may help 
individuals replenish their self-control resources. Friese and Wänke's (2014) 
recent work on prayer and self-control also explicitly frames this influence in 
terms of ego-depletion (see also Friese, Schweizer, Arnoux, Sutter, & Wänke, 
2014). Their study had participants engage in either a brief period of prayer or 
free thought prior to an emotion suppression task and a Stroop task, which 
involves overriding prepotent—i.e., powerful and intuitive—responses. Those 
individuals who engaged in prayer did not show ego-depletion effects on the 
Stroop task (Friese & Wänke, 2014).  
While these various studies focus on different facets of religious 
engagement, such as holding particular beliefs or attending religious rituals 
frequently, they are collectively taken to support a general association between 
religiosity and self-regulation (Laurin & Kay, 2016; McCullough & Willoughby, 
                                                        
7 This implicit priming procedure was developed by Shariff and Norenzayan (2007). It involves 
unscrambling sentences that include religiously associated words such as, god, divine, or spirit. 
In these experiments, half of the sample is given these sentences with religious words, while the 
other half is given sentences which do not have any religious associations. 
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2009; Zell & Baumeister, 2013). Fishbach and colleagues (2003) found that 
priming individuals with relevant temptations activated religious thoughts or 
other higher order goals, and religious thoughts reciprocally inhibited 
temptation recognition (p. 305). In a series of studies, Colzato and Hommel have 
demonstrated the relationship between religion and various self-regulatory 
processes including attention regulation (Colzato, Hommel, & Shapiro, 2010; 
Colzato et al., 2010; Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & Hommel, 2008) and action 
inhibition (Hommel, Colzato, Scorolli, Borghi, & van den Wildenberg, 2011). 
Their research program has been especially careful about showing how different 
religious contexts lead to different, and often opposing, relationships between 
religion and self-regulation. 
 For example, Paglieri et al. (2013) found that a positive association 
between religion and delayed discounting behaviors held in the Netherlands, but 
was reversed in Italy where less religious participants were the most likely to 
hold out for the larger later reward. In this case they interpret the salient 
difference as rooted within the varying beliefs that Dutch Calvinists and Italian 
Catholics hold about ascetism and salvation. These differences in belief, 
however, may shroud other salient contextual differences. In a large online 
sample, Shenhav, Rand, & Greene (2017) also recently found that religious belief 
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was associated with greater likelihood of taking the smaller sooner option within 
a delayed discounting task, which corroborates results from Morgan et al.’s 
(2016) study among older Americans, the most religious of whom were also the 
most likely to not wait for the larger later reward.  
 Morgan et al.’s (2016) work was part of the psychological study of religion 
that uses neuroimaging techniques to study religious cognition. Within this 
study, Morgan et al. (2016) found that connectivity between systems associated 
with valuation processes8 was especially implicated in the relationship between 
religious cognition and delayed discounting (Morgan et al., 2016). In other 
words, even though the religious participants were more likely to choose the 
smaller sooner option, this relationship was still likely occurring through the 
impact that religious cognitions have within the processes of assessing value. 
Taken alongside Shenhav et al. (2017) and Paglieri et al. (2013), these studies, 
which show religiosity in a negative relationship to self-regulation, can help 
constrain theoretical explanations for how religious engagement is related to self-
regulation. But, most of the explanations focus on a positive relationship between 
the two. 
                                                        
8 In particular, higher levels of connectivity between the nucleus accumbens and the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and the caudal anterior cingulate cortex predicted a higher likelihood of being 
influenced by the religious primes. 
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 The emphasis on a positive relationship between religious engagement 
and self-regulation is not unfounded; at a general level, studies tend to support 
this interpretation. For example, in addition to the experimental and survey tasks 
mentioned above, there is a related and larger body of research showing that 
religiosity is associated with a range of behavioral outcomes thought to involve 
self-regulation, such as substance use (e.g., DeWall et al., 2014; Kim-Spoon, 
Farley, Holmes, Longo, & McCullough, 2014), sexual behavior (Vazsonyi & 
Jenkins, 2010) or social deviance (e.g., Klanjšek et al., 2012; Laird, Marks, & 
Marrero, 2011). These studies collectively support the association between 
religiosity and less delinquency, better health outcomes, and a wide range of 
other prosocial behaviors (e.g., Wallace & Forman, 1998). While most of these 
relationships are only suggestive of self-regulation as a mediator, some 
longitudinal studies have tested this directly (e.g., Desmond, Ulmer, & Bader, 
2013). For example, Kim-Spoon and colleagues (2015) found that personal 
religiosity—the reported importance of religion to the individual, which is 
contrasted with organizational religiosity, representing “involvement in formal 
religious institutions” (Kim-Spoon et al., 2015)—in early adolescence predicted 
lower levels of substance abuse 2.4 years later. Importantly, self-regulatory skills 
mediated this association between personal religiosity and less substance use. 
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Similarly, Pirutinsky (2014) conducted a longitudinal study on the relationship 
between religiosity, impulse control, and criminal behavior among adolescents 
with prior serious criminal offenses. He also found that increases in personal 
religiosity predicted lower incidence of later criminal behavior and that this 
association was partially mediated by increases in self-control (Pirutinsky, 2014, 
p. 1300). Collectively this research on religiosity and behavioral outcomes lends 
substantial support to the generally positive relationship between religiosity and 
self-regulation. 
The nature of this relationship is nuanced by studies like the longitudinal 
ones just mentioned (Kim-Spoon et al., 2015; Pirutinsky, 2014), which distinguish 
between personal religiosity and organizational religiosity. Other studies, like 
McClain's (1978), make a similar point by showing that the association between 
religiosity and self-regulation holds for the intrinsically religious individual, but 
not those who are motivated to be religious by extrinsic factors. This salient 
difference in religious motivation is corroborated by other studies as well that 
show intrinsic, but not extrinsic, religiosity to predict self-regulatory skills (e.g., 
Bergin et al., 1987; Bouchard et al., 1999; Hosseinkhanzadel, Yeganeh, & Mojallal, 
2013; Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Klanjšek et al., 2012). Drawing an even larger 
contrast, Sandage and Jankowski (2010; 2013) found that religiosity characterized 
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by spiritual instability—a form of relational spirituality in which theists relate to 
god in a fearful and mistrusting way (see Hall & Edwards, 2002; Sandage & 
Jankowski, 2010)—was negatively associated with regulatory capacity. Like the 
contextual differences mentioned above (e.g., Morgan et al., 2016; Paglieri et al., 
2013), these individual differences will help constrain our explanations for how 
different facets of religiosity relate to self-regulation.   
 Before moving on to these explanations, we need to discuss the way 
personality enters this research. As mentioned above, the trait conscientiousness 
describes an individual's tendency to be organized, persistent, and motivated in 
pursuit of goals (Costa & McCrae, 1992; McCrae & John, 1992), so it is not 
surprising that this trait relates positively to self-regulation (McCrae & 
Löckenhoff, 2010). Research also consistently suggests that conscientiousness is 
related to religiosity (Piedmont & Wilkins, 2013), with some studies showing it 
predicts later levels of religiosity (McCullough, Tsang, & Brion, 2003; Regnerus & 
Smith, 2005; Wink, Ciciolla, Dillon, & Tracy, 2007). Collectively, this could 
suggest that it is not religion that causes better self-regulation, but rather the 
better self-regulators who become religious. While this possibility is not strictly 
ruled out, the longitudinal studies mentioned above did not find this to be the 
case (Kim-Spoon et al., 2015; Pirutinsky, 2014); a result supported by the priming 
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studies (e.g. Rounding et al., 2012). A more complex, but potentially satisfying 
interpretation is that there is a reciprocal dynamic between religiosity, 
conscientiousness, and self-regulation, in which none are necessarily prior to the 
others. 
Notwithstanding the conflicting evidence at the general level—from 
Paglieri et al., (2013), Morgan et al., (2016), and Shenhav et al. (2017)—and the 
nuances at the level of individual differences (e.g. Hosseinkhanzadel et al., 2013; 
Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Klanjšek et al., 2012; Sandage & Jankowski, 2010; 2013), 
these various strands of research support a reliable association between religion 
and self-regulation and provide the foundation for explaining how the two are 
related. In the next section I will review the currently prevailing explanations for 
the relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation. 
 
1.5. Theories linking religion and self-regulation 
As described above, Carver and Scheier (1998; 2016) parsed self-regulatory 
processes into a feedback loop that relies on standards, self-monitoring, and 
motivation. Later researchers added willpower as the necessary fuel to enact this 
feedback loop (Baumeister, 2014; Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004). Given these 
four components of self-regulation, when researchers move to explain its 
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relationship with religion, each part of the feedback loop acts as a focal point to 
organize theory. While practical for an exposition, it is important to keep in mind 
that this feedback process is deeply interconnected so that often the boundary 
between processes of goal activation, motivation, and self-monitoring become 
blurred. Parsing the process into distinct components has more to do with 
efficiently organizing inquiry than any actual and distinct joints in nature. With 
this disclaimer in mind, if we look at religious engagement in relation to each of 
these facets of regulation, what do we see? 
The clearest distillation of these explanations occurs in three literature 
reviews for disciplinary handbooks: McCullough and Carter's (2013) chapter for 
the American Psychological Association's Handbook of Psychology, Religion, and 
Spirituality; Zell and Baumeister's (2013) chapter for the Handbook of the 
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality; and Laurin and Kay's (2016) chapter for the 
Handbook of Self-Regulation. Throughout the next section I will draw extensively 
from each of these in order to articulate the current explanations for the 
relationship between religion and self-regulation. 
1.5.1 Standards 
Zell and Baumeister (2013) begin their explanation of religion and self-
regulation with standards. As noted above, these standards can exist at broad 
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abstract levels, such as "be humble," but also include direct goals encompassing 
everyday behaviors– such as prohibitions on drinking or lying. Regardless of the 
level of abstraction, the relevant functional aspect of standards is their capacity to 
guide self-regulatory efforts. Zell and Baumeister along with others (e.g., 
Baumeister & Exline, 2000) suggest that religion’s impact on standards is 
relatively straightforward: religious systems carry clear and explicit standards 
for behavior. These standards may be direct rules and ritual prescriptions, such 
as the Ten Commandments or the Five Pillars of Islam (Zell & Baumeister, 2013), 
but they can also be carried tacitly by moral exemplars (Oman & Thoresen, 2003).   
Laurin and Kay (2016) offer a similar explanation:  
A strict moral code that offers clear guidelines for determining right and 
wrong can serve as a useful heuristic for choosing one's course of action. 
Making choices can be depleting (e.g., Vohs et al., 2008); to the extent that 
a religion has a strict moral code, it might alleviate some of that burden. 
(p. 312) 
Here, Laurin and Kay (2016) helpfully articulate the reason having such clear 
standards would aid in regulation– by alleviating ego-depletion effects. 
Furthermore, they are careful to acknowledge that not all religious systems will 
include strict moral standards– instead, they suggest, this can act as a predictive 
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variable. Both of these accounts emphasize the role of explicit beliefs about moral 
behavior within religious systems and the way these influence ego-depletion 
processes. 
McCullough and Carter (2013) take a different route. Instead of focusing 
on the direct moral codes within religious systems, they argue instead that 
religions tend to encourage norms that are based in the overarching values of 
tradition and conformity. Here they are drawing from the Schwartz Value 
Survey (Schwartz, 2006; 2012), which attempts to distill a set of ten basic values 
that are apparent cross-culturally. Within this schema, tradition describes the 
acceptance and respect for customs, while conformity describes acting in 
accordance with social expectations and norms (Schwartz, 2012). McCullough 
and Carter's (2013) argument is based on empirical research showing that 
religious people in the US, Turkey, and Israel tend to endorse these values and 
that religiosity in all contexts is negatively related to the values of hedonism, 
stimulation, and self-direction (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004). In other 
words, the moral goals that religious systems tend to endorse are not arbitrary– 
they are precisely the type of values that demand self-regulation. This association 
acts as an ultimate explanation for why particular religious standards foster self-
regulation. But McCullough and Carter (2013) also offer a proximate explanation 
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by suggesting that religious systems have the capacity to sanctify particular goals 
(Emmons, 1999). This process increases the goal's importance and evidence 
suggests that sanctification has a significant impact on the way individuals 
regulate in relation to those goals (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005).   
In chapters 2 and 3, I will challenge and extend these explanations by 
situating them more clearly within the dynamics of social processes. In 
particular, the explanations that depend on explicit moral codes directing 
behavior and preserving willpower likely overemphasize this pathway of 
influence. Psychologically there is substantial evidence that most of our moral 
behaviors are not guided by explicit moral codes (e.g., Ariely, 2010; Haidt, 2001; 
Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015). And socially, a long tradition in 
anthropology has analyzed the ways that moral codes have communal functions 
which extend beyond explicit prohibitions and have a much greater influence on 
our behavioral patterns (e.g., Turner, 1969; Rappaport, 1999). In other words, the 
explicit moral dictates of any religious system are just the tip of the iceberg; most 
of standards carried within religious systems are operating tacitly beneath the 
surface.  
McCullough and Carter's (2013) explanation gets us further in this 
direction by suggesting that religious standards may function to preserve social 
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conformity and traditions. This insight, along with their point about 
sanctification, will be a launching point for situating religious standards within 
their broader social context. This broad perspective is necessary to understand 
the deeply social character of standards and how they are developed and persist. 
Attending to social context provides a novel perspective on the way religious 
systems foster self-regulation through standards, which does not rely on their 
capacity to preserve willpower.  
1.5.2 Self-monitoring 
 Within the process of self-regulation, self-monitoring9 refers to the 
capacity of individuals to be aware of their current state in relation to their goal 
state (Carver & Scheier, 1998; 2016). Zell and Baumeister (2013) argue that many 
religious practices nurture an individual's tendency towards self-awareness or 
self-examination. Prayer, meditation, and confession all stand out as examples. 
Furthermore, many religious calendars have seasons set aside for self-
examination: for example, Lent in the Christian calendar or the month of 
                                                        
9 This definition of self-monitoring as a cognitive capacity is distinct from Synder’s (1974) use of 
the term as a personality trait describing the extent to which people watch and restrain their 
actions in response to situational cues about the appropriateness of that behavior (see also, 
Fuglestad & Snyder, 2010; Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). While Snyder’s use is similar to dynamics 
I will describe, functionally separating the capacity of self-monitoring from sensitivity to social 
cues and willingness to abide provides a more conceptually clear framework for explanation. 
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Ramadan in Islam (Zell & Baumeister, 2013). These associative explanations 
suggest that religious practices could develop the habit of self-monitoring. As 
Laurin and Kay put it: "Those who self-monitor regularly are more apt to notice 
discrepancies between their current and desired states, which is what prompts 
them to act" (2016, p. 307). This practice based explanation is complemented by 
other explanations suggesting that believing in watchful supernatural agents will 
also increase an individual's tendency to self-monitor. 
This explanation is prominent within the cognitive science of religion, 
where Norenzayan (2013) and others (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007) have argued 
that supernatural surveillance fosters the self-monitoring necessary for prosocial 
behaviors. This association draws heavily on experiments which reliably show 
that people's behavior changes if they believe they are being watched (e.g., 
Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006; Bering, McLeod, & Shackelford, 2005; Haley & 
Fessler, 2005). This explanation is also supported by Carter et al.'s (2012a) study 
which found that religiosity was significantly related to self-monitoring 
tendencies and that this relationship was partially mediated by the perception 
that one was also being monitored by God. Carter and colleagues (2012a) found 
that the perception of being monitored by other people also mediated this 
pathway between religiosity and self-monitoring, but importantly: "monitoring 
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by God and monitoring by others only partially mediated the relationship 
between religiosity and self-monitoring. Thus, there remains a substantial 
amount of variance left to explain regarding the association between religiosity 
and self-monitoring" (2012a, p. 694). The variance that is left unexplained could 
be accounted for by those religious practices of self-awareness, or there could be 
other mediating influences. As McCullough and Carter (2013) note, this 
theoretical relationship remains largely unconstrained by empirical evidence and 
therefore a fruitful ground for future research.  
Throughout this dissertation, I will expand on these explanations by 
arguing that what matters is less that an individual is being watched and more 
who is doing the watching. Different watchers belong to different communities 
and each of these communities will carry their own norms and standards. 
Therefore, it is not simply that being watched causes us to self-regulate, instead 
being watched causes us to act more normally in relation to that group. 
Recognizing the social contexts within which self-monitoring occurs also helps 
us attend to the type of relationship that an individual has with these 
communities. The quality of these relationships will largely determine whether 
an individual self-regulates towards conformity or towards an individualized 
rejection of the collective standards. Focusing on the quality of one's relationship 
  
 
48 
with their religious community's symbols will help to clarify why individual 
differences in religiosity have different predictive value for self-regulation. 
Other aspects of who is watching will also likely be salient for regulation. 
For example, Johnson and colleagues (2013; 2016) show that different 
conceptions of god, as either authoritarian or benevolent, lead to divergent 
behavioral outcomes. This research is part of an ongoing debate within the 
psychology of religion concerning the relatively efficacy of punishing versus 
benevolent conceptions of deities for different types of behavior (see Johnson, 
2005; Johnson & Cohen, 2016; Norenzayan et al., 2016; Shariff & Norenzayan, 
2011; Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016). Regardless of how this debate resolves, this 
research highlights that holding a belief in supernatural deities may be less 
important than the ways people relate to the content of that belief. The relational 
content of belief and the social context endorsing those beliefs will both help to 
nuance our understanding of the ways religious engagement impacts regulation 
via self-monitoring. 
1.5.3 Motivation 
Rather than being another self-regulatory capacity, motivation is an 
overall disposition or willingness to exercise these other capacities or not. Most 
often this willingness is expressed in terms of an individual's cost/benefit 
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analysis. Laurin and Kay (2016) draw from Bandura's (1991; 1997) model of 
motivation to express this analysis in terms of three questions: Can I do it? Will 
there be a reward? Do I care? In chapter 4 we will engage this model in more 
depth. For now it is worth noting to appreciate the way Laurin and Kay (2016) 
build their theory around each of these questions. Drawing from their work on 
compensatory control (Laurin, Kay, & Fitzsimons, 2012), Laurin and Kay (2016) 
describe the complex ways that religious beliefs can lead people to be both 
overconfident in their ability to regulate —by fostering a sense of protection 
(Holbrook, Fessler, & Pollack, 2016)— and less confident in these abilities—by 
encouraging people to relinquish their control (Laurin et al., 2012). 
While an individual's perceived ability to exercise regulation clearly 
impacts their willingness to regulate, the heart of motivation within this model is 
whether people perceive a reward and whether they care. Laurin and Kay (2016) 
suggest that "religion provides more or less clear ideas about what kinds of 
behaviors will receive divine reward. As a result, religion may motivate people 
to engage their self-regulatory efforts in moral domains, or domains that they 
believe God will reward" (p. 316).10 Similarly, Zell and Baumeister (2013) suggest 
                                                        
10. This focus on moral domains helps explain some seemingly contradictory findings associated 
with religiosity. While most research shows religiosity is related to norm conforming behaviors, 
other studies have shown that reminders of religious deities also increases risky behaviors 
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that religious beliefs about the afterlife, salvation, and enlightenment are among 
the strongest incentives for following moral standards (p. 507-508). Within a 
strict cost/benefit analysis, the promises of ultimate fulfillment or punishment 
are powerful motivators.  
Whether or not individuals care about these rewards is interwoven with 
this analysis– belief in divine rewards or punishments would imply a sense of 
their value. Zell and Baumeister (2013) extend this element of motivation to note 
that religions provide overarching principles that imbue behaviors with a larger 
purpose (e.g., Sansone, Weir, Harpster, & Morgan, 1992). This overarching sense 
of purpose, a high level goal, illustrates the ways standards and motivation are 
interconnected, while also providing an example of the way rewards may not 
always be postponed into an afterlife. Many of these explanations highlight the 
ways in which religious systems provide positive incentives, so it is also 
important to note that motivation can also work through feelings of guilt, which 
may be fostered by religious involvement (Albertsen, O'Connor, & Berry, 2006; 
Zell & Baumeister, 2013). 
                                                        
(Kupor, Laurin, & Levav, 2105). Here Laurin and Kay (2016) argue that this difference depends 
on whether a particular domain of behavior is viable for receiving divine rewards or not. 
  
 
51 
 Using divine rewards and punishments to explain the relationship 
between religion and motivation depends heavily on a form of rational choice 
theory. There are abundant critiques of rational choice theory as an explanation 
for individual behavior (Ingold, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), although the 
theory is quite useful at describing aggregate behaviors across a group (Becker, 
1993). The strongest critique, at least for our current inquiry, is that rational 
choice theory assumes that human action is thoroughly instrumental (Boudon, 
1998). As Weber (1922/1978) noted almost a century ago, some action is clearly 
pursued as a means towards a desired end, but other actions are value-rational– 
"determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, 
aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of 
success" (p. 25). In other words, analyzing religiously motivated behaviors as 
directed towards an instrumental reward may miss the way that these behaviors 
are valued fundamentally in and of themselves. For example, when Laurin and 
Kay (2016) describe the self-control required by religious standards they suggest 
that “dietary rules require Jews to resist the delicious smell of pepperoni pizza” 
(p. 317). I too love pepperoni pizza, but this description may fundamentally miss 
the social dimensions of motivation in which keeping kosher is an end unto 
itself, not a means to compel rewards from one’s god. This theoretical point is 
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supported by empirical work showing that religiosity is highly related to 
deontological moral reasoning, which is resistant to manipulation by 
instrumental ends (e.g., Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007; Sheikh, Ginges, 
Coman, & Atran, 2012). If we should not frame religiosity's relationship to 
motivation in terms of shifting incentives, then how are we to model this 
influence? 
 In chapters 3 and 4 I will provide an alternative account to the current 
model's overemphasis on cost/benefit analysis. Rather than suggesting that 
religious beliefs shift incentives within an objectively given value-landscape, this 
chapter argues that religious engagement can change the contours of those value-
landscapes. This argument hinges on the relationship between religiosity and 
moral reasoning, paying specific attention to the role of moral emotions. A 
growing research program in psychology suggests that most moral behavior is 
driven by various combinations of emotional inclinations (Haidt, 2012). These 
moral emotions are evolutionarily rooted (Curry, 2016; Tomasello, 2016) and 
deeply social (Greene, 2013). Understanding these emotions and the way they are 
shaped by religious practices and beliefs will provide a model connecting 
religiosity and motivation that recognizes the way moral actions are socially 
endorsed ends unto themselves. 
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Given the salience of moral emotions, an essential part of this perspective 
on motivation is emotional regulation. Emotional regulation is commonly 
portrayed as the strategies that people employ to deal with positive and negative 
emotions (Gross, 2014). But the perception of different emotional experiences as 
positive or negative depends largely on prior evaluative processes that are 
guided by socialization (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 
2010). In other words, the best way to avoid temptation is not to effectively 
restrain the tempting impulse, but to emotionally regulate such that you do not 
experience temptation in the first-place (e.g., Lamm et al., 2017). In chapter 4 I 
will argue that religion’s relationship to motivation is determined in part by 
these socialized and implicit emotional regulatory processes that can shape an 
individual’s experience of their moral world. 
1.5.4 Willpower 
 Willpower plays a pivotal role in the current explanations for this 
relationship. While we have looked at willpower primarily as a resource within 
the ego-depletion model of self-control (Baumeister, 2014), it is also considered to 
work like a muscle insofar as it can be exercised and strengthened (Muraven, 
Baumeister, & Tice., 1999). With this capacity for change in mind, some 
explanations suggest that religious engagement may boost self-regulation 
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through rituals that demand the exercise and presumed strengthening of 
willpower (Zell & Baumeister, 2013). Evidence for this strengthening effect 
comes from studies suggesting that people consider religious environments to be 
high-constraint settings where only very specific behaviors are appropriate 
(Kenrick, McCreath, Govern, King, & Bordin, 1990; McCullough & Willoughby, 
2009; Price & Bouffard, 1974). Furthermore, various religious practices explicitly 
involve restraint, whether sitting in long periods of meditation, fasting during 
Ramadan, or undergoing dysphoric experiences (e.g., Xygalatas et al., 2013).  
Despite the validity of objections that we cannot assume religious 
practices require subjective experiences of restraint (e.g., Koenig, 2016), there 
nevertheless does appear to be a positive relationship between religious 
engagement and effortful inhibition. Laurin and Kay (2016) make this argument 
by reviewing the set of experimental studies outlined above (Friese et al., 2014; 
Friese & Wänke, 2014; Rounding et al., 2010; Watterson & Gieseler, 2012), which 
explicitly depend on the ego-depletion model and support this positive 
relationship. The question, however, is not whether religiosity is related to 
willpower, but the extent to which this relationship helps explain the broader 
association between religious engagement and self-regulation. 
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Within Laurin and Kay's (2016) explanation, ego-depletion and willpower 
play an essential role: "recent controversy notwithstanding (e.g., Job et al., 2010; 
Molden et al., 2012), it is undeniable that exerting self-control relies on some 
forms of limited resources" (p. 313). Insofar as they are restricting themselves to 
instances of self-control, this is a fair point because self-control is defined in 
terms of this limited resource (Baumeister et al., 2007). But throughout their 
review, Laurin and Kay (2016) use self-control and self-regulation 
interchangeably. Similarly, Zell and Baumeister (2013) use self-control as the 
overarching framework for all regulatory processes. The problem with blurring 
these concepts is that it is quite deniable that self-regulation relies on a limited 
resource. An entire branch of psychological researchers and thinkers explicitly 
argue against this dependence (Bargh, 1997; Carter, Kofler, Forster, & 
McCullough, 2015; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014; Papies & Aartes, 2016). 
If religion's influence on willpower is taken to explain its relationship to self-
regulation, then it is crucial to understand the extent to which willpower is 
necessary for regulation. 
Fortunately, McCullough and Carter's (2013) review suggests that 
religion's relationship to self-regulation may occur through implicit or automatic 
processes, not simply through effortful inhibition. This suggestion draws from an 
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earlier theoretical review from Koole and colleagues (2010). The basic argument 
is that rather than fostering an effortful inhibition of impulses, religion may lead 
to a mode of efficient and flexible implicit self-regulation. These theorists are 
using Kuhl's (2000; Kuhl & Fuhrmann,1998) framework of regulation, which 
distinguishes implicit regulation as akin to an inner democracy that organizes 
and integrates various automatic psychological processes, from explicit control, 
which is like an internal dictatorship consciously and effortfully inhibiting other 
processes. Koole and colleagues (2010) draw from this distinction to suggest that 
such implicit modes of regulation would allow religious individuals to act in 
accord with high standards while maintaining a high emotional well-being that 
would otherwise be taxed by inhibitory efforts. Theoretically this association 
between religious engagement and implicit regulation is well motivated, but 
how might this influence occur? 
 As an explanation, Koole and colleagues note how religion is oriented 
towards the whole person, not just specific thoughts or behaviors (2010, p. 97). 
This suggests that religious values are holistic and thorough in their range, 
thereby influencing all domains of an individual's life, not just 
compartmentalized behaviors. Building on this first point, Koole et al. (2010) also 
argue that religious growth often occurs through integrating processes– bringing 
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past experiences into a unified network of meaning.  Finally, religion also 
involves embodied practices that may intermesh symbolic meaning with 
postures, actions, and the body. These three characteristics, holistic, integrating, 
and embodied, are central to Kuhl's (2000) model of implicit regulation. 
Koole et al. (2010) and McCullough and Carter (2013) support this positive 
association by reviewing the relevant research. In particular, the association 
between intrinsic, but not extrinsic, religiosity and regulation reviewed above 
(e.g., Bergin et al., 1987; Bouchard et al., 1999; Hosseinkhanzadel et al., 2013; 
Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Klanjšek et al., 2012) lends support to the theory that 
religious engagement influences self-regulation through implicit processes. 
Other experiments, such as implicit religious primes influencing reactions to 
temptation (Fishbach et al., 2003) or prosocial behavior (Gervais & Norenzayan, 
2012), also provide strong support for the relationship. 
 The case for religion's influence on implicit self-regulation is strong and 
challenges an undefended reliance on willpower and ego-depletion to explain 
the overall relationship. More critically, however, the actual psychological 
dynamics are left largely unexplored; instead, these explanations work primarily 
by suggesting similarities between religion and implicit regulation. McCullough 
and Carter (2013) offer a more functional account:  
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religion might help people to form appropriate intentions that can then be 
translated into effective action (also known as volitional efficiency). Second, 
religion might facilitate emotion regulation. Third, religion might help 
people reconcile new experiences with what has come previously, thereby 
helping to create and preserve meaning in life. (p. 130) 
While I largely agree with this explanation as fruitful routes for future research, 
McCullough and Carter's (2013) review does not allow them to expand on the 
dynamics of these pathways. And unfortunately, research since then has left this 
relationship between religious engagement and implicit modes of regulation 
largely unexamined. While I cannot provide a thorough explication of religion’s 
impact on these implicit modes of regulation, taking a social perspective on the 
relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation helps to articulate 
the way various forms of regulation may become more fluid and automatic.11 
1.5.5 Theoretical summary 
 The prevailing explanations for how religious engagement impacts self-
regulation provide a helpful starting point for understanding this relationship. 
                                                        
11 Importantly, implicit modes of regulation not necessarily at odds with the ego-depletion model. 
Indeed, it is likely that various aspects of being religious foster both forms of self-regulation. The 
debate is the degree to which either account should be the primary model for connecting religion 
and self-regulation. 
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But, as I have argued above, these explanations have tended to oversimplify both 
sides of the connection, construing religious engagement narrowly in terms of 
beliefs and interpreting self-regulation primarily as a matter of self-interested 
restraint. As I will argue throughout this dissertation, these conceptual 
specifications are challenged by perspectives within religious studies that are 
committed to analyzing religions as ordinary social phenomena (e.g. Durkheim, 
1912/2008) and by evidence from psychological studies of normative behavior, 
which I will engage in chapter 3. The main goal of this dissertation, therefore, is 
to advance an alternative explanation for this relationship by taking account of 
the social context within which it occurs. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
While there is a long tradition in religious studies that is attentive to the 
social dimensions of religiosity, I am also not alone in arguing for the importance 
of social context in understanding self-regulation. For example, feeling that you 
belong to a group with shared goals has a significant positive impact on the 
capacity to fulfill those goals, whether they are health related (e.g., Gere et al., 
2014; Leahey, Kumar, Weinberg, & Wing, 2012) academic (Walton & Cohen, 
2011) or more general goals (see Fitzsimons & Finkel, 2010; 2011)  
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Fitzsimons and colleagues (2015) developed the theory of Transactive 
Goal Dynamics in order to articulate the reasons that being in relationship would 
impact an individual’s self-regulation: “we suggest that relationship partners are 
best conceptualized not as mostly independent goal-pursuers who occasionally 
influence each other, but instead, as interdependent subparts of one self-
regulating system” (Fitzsimons et al., 2015, p. 648). Analyzing the dynamics 
within this self-regulating system quickly becomes complex. For example, 
Fitzsimons and colleagues (2015) argue that the degree to which groups share 
goals, what they call “transactive density,” determines how social relationships 
constrain effective self-regulation. This occurs because goals can conflict with 
each other: for example, if Tim holds the goal of eating less carbs, but his partner 
Robert holds the goal of becoming a baker, then each will run into difficulty with 
their personal goals and in pursuing their shared goal of supporting each other.  
Throughout their account of TGD, Fitzsimons et al. (2015) maintain this 
practical approach to unpacking these complex dynamics that can occur within 
dyadic relationships. Transactive density depends largely on the opportunities 
for interaction within the relationship and each individual’s motivation for 
interdependence. The degree to which transactive density influences successful 
goal pursuit also depends on the ability to coordinate goals, each member’s 
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orientation to the relationship, and previous successful attainment of goals 
(Fitzsimons et al., 2015). By carefully examining the way partners in a 
relationship can become a self-regulating system, along with the challenges that 
system can face, transactive goal dynamics provides a helpful microcosm on the 
way social dynamics can influence individual regulatory pursuits. 
While TGD provides a strong foundation for understanding the social 
dimensions of self-regulation, in chapter 3 I will argue that these dynamics 
become significantly more complex within larger groups, such as religious 
communities. Once an individual’s sense of identity is interwoven with 
belonging to a particular group, then transactive density is no longer a simple 
matter of coordinating and compromising different goals within a dyadic 
relationship. Fortunately, work on social identity theory and the psychology of 
social norms will provide a way to understand the impact these complex social 
dynamics will have on regulatory behavior. Nevertheless, by highlighting the 
importance of shared standards and each person’s attachment to the relationship 
that holds those standards, Fitzsimons et al. (2015) point our attention in the 
right direction as I begin to construct a more social explanation for the 
relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation.  
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 One possible critique of my aim to develop an alternative theoretical 
model for the relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation is 
that it will inescapably be too vague to be vulnerable to correction. Philosophers 
of science have a long history of tracing the ways that unexamined assumptions 
shape theoretical commitments, which in turn influence interpretations of data. 
While the influence of assumptions on modeling and interpretation is 
unavoidable, it can be adjusted by making the theory's entailments testable. 
Therefore, as I develop the alternative theoretical model through chapters 2-4, I 
will highlight some of the model's key predictions. In chapter 5, I will present 
results from a cross-sectional study empirically testing some of these predictions. 
The result will be two levels of argument within this dissertation– one that 
argues at the theoretical level for inadequacy of current explanations and the 
plausibility alternative social explanation and a second empirical test. Given the 
complexity of this mode of inquiry, chapter 6 will conclude by reflecting on the 
relationship between these two levels of argument in light of what we know 
about formalized inquiries of this kind from the philosophy of science. 
What is at stake within this inquiry? Our understanding of the 
relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation also guides how 
religion is framed in relation to other domains, such as cooperation. This 
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dynamic between religion and cooperation is especially important to attend to, 
because it is a crucial component of emerging theories about cultural evolution 
(e.g., Gray & Watts, 2017). If self-regulation is primarily a process of inhibition, 
then the relationship between religious systems and cooperation is tacitly framed 
in terms of such restraint (Ainsworth & Baumeister, 2013). On the other hand, if 
self-regulation is deeply social and largely automatic, then religion's impact on 
cooperation must be framed in radically different terms. How we theoretically 
construe the relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation, has 
significant effects on how we understand the role of religion and large-scale, 
complex sociality within the context of evolution (Norenzayan et al., 2016). 
Similarly, self-regulation also plays an important explanatory role in 
research on the relationship between religion and mental health. In the first 
review of the religion and self-regulation relationship, one of McCullough and 
Willoughby’s (2009) key propositions is that “religion affects health, well-being, 
and social behavior through self-regulation and self-control” (p. 71). How we 
understand this mediating role will vary significantly depending on whether we 
conceptual self-regulation as a deeply social process or as primarily an 
individual’s capacity to exercise restraint.  
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 Within the context of this project, I will not be able to fully unpack these 
entailments for cooperation and mental health. But they are important to keep in 
mind. How we understand the relationship between religion and self-regulation 
is not an isolated and esoteric debate. It has implications for religious studies 
scholars interested in the social construction of reality and for public health 
advocates who are trying to understand the social determinants of health. I will 
not pretend to satisfy all, or even a portion, of the needs of these other 
stakeholders. But I will attempt to present an example of interdisciplinary work 
that can serve as an initial step towards better biocultural understandings of the 
complex exchanges between the social and the personal.  
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Chapter 2– The social construction of self-regulation 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the first chapter I covered the basic model of self-regulation and how theorists 
currently conceptualize its relationship with religious systems. In summary, self-
regulation occurs through a motivated feedback process of standards, self-
monitoring, and the adjustment of behaviors to reduce any discrepancy between 
the two (Carver & Scheier, 2016). Part of my argument within that initial chapter 
was that often self-regulation is narrowly construed as primarily a process of 
self-interested restraint. While these characteristics may accurately apply to the 
subset of self-regulation designated as self-control (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 
2007), there is not strong evidence that they extend to the broader set of 
regulatory behaviors (Carter & McCullough, 2013; 2014). This narrow construal 
of self-regulation as synonymous with self-control limits explanations for the 
relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation.  
Interpreting the relevance of religious engagement for self-interested 
restraint risks miscasting the deeply social features of religious systems as if they 
were means to individual ends. In order to gain an appreciation of the social 
dimensions germane to this relationship, religious studies is a key stakeholder 
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that needs to be brought into the conversation. For over a century, scholars of 
this discipline and their forebears have analyzed the complex dynamics between 
individual religious engagement, social processes, and broader religious 
traditions. While these scholars bring a helpful depth to our current inquiry, they 
are not solely attuned to the social dimensions of this dynamic. As I will argue 
throughout this chapter, self-regulation has played an important, though largely 
subterranean, role within this discipline, though, most of this influence occurs as 
an auxiliary, but necessary, facet of the more prominent focus given to social 
regulation. A key part of my argument, however, is that the line between social 
regulation and self-regulation is quite porous. 
We will begin our engagement with religious studies by reviewing Émile 
Durkheim's work on religion, morality, and social constraint. Durkheim remains 
a foundational theorist for work within religious studies and provides a 
persistently relevant analysis of the way religious and moral systems are 
interwoven with the formation and cohesion of social groups. Expanding from 
Durkheim, we will briefly review the functionalists that expanded on his insights 
before engaging the post-modern theorists who offer strong critiques of 
Durkheim's program. By engaging Durkheim alongside his critics we gain a clear 
image of his most robust theoretical commitments, which will help shape our 
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understanding of the social processes relevant for the relationship between 
religious engagement and self-regulation. 
There are a number of arguments that I will advance throughout this 
review. First, these theorists help us appreciate the way that the standards 
necessary for self-regulation are socially given. Even the most deeply personal 
and internal goals are shaped by one's social context to some degree. Pushing 
this point further, these standards will not always be propositional. Customs and 
norms that are internalized as goals for regulation are rarely explicit– instead 
they often emerge intuitively as people conform to the social habits surrounding 
them. These initial arguments focus on the ways social context shapes self-
regulation, but another crucial insight from these social theorists is that the 
inverse dynamic is just as important. Acts of self-regulation are also acts of social 
regulation, the constraint of individual behaviors by tacit and explicit social 
guidelines.  
Beyond their directly instrumental purposes, our behaviors unavoidably 
endorse and sustain (or oppose) particular social realities. This point helps 
illustrate how acts of self-regulation indexical signal an individual's affiliative 
social identity, which adds a new dimension to our understanding of self-
monitoring and motivation. Nuancing these arguments, post-modern theorists 
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are quick to point out that within any group there are multiple, overlapping, and 
often contested, identities being enacted. Therefore, it is not a given which 
identity and associated norms an individual will be regulating or rebelling in 
relation to. Nor can we take for granted that this relationship with a group is 
uncomplicated. This critique encourages us to consider both the place of one's 
affiliated group within the larger social context (i.e., marginalized or prominent) 
and the quality of the relationship one experiences with this group (e.g., securely 
vs. insecurely attached). Collectively these perspectives from religious studies 
point to the deeply social character of self-regulation.  
While these perspective help to correct the overly narrow construal of self-
regulation, for our present inquiry there are two problems with relying too 
heavily on these social theorists. First, the social processes they articulate do not 
uniquely apply to religious systems. While Durkheim emphasized the intrinsic 
interdependence between religious, moral, and social orders, later theorists 
generalized his work to describe the way social and moral processes are 
constituted and maintained in ways that do not necessitate any religious 
dimension. Throughout the review I will therefore reflect on whether or not 
religious engagement brings a unique dimension to these broader processes. The 
second shortcoming of these social theories is that they all necessarily 
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presuppose a social psychology. Reflecting on the tacit psychological theories 
guiding their interpretation will take us into the next chapter, where 
psychological research reenters the conversation. 
 
2.2 The social construction of reality 
Before plunging into Durkheim's work, it is worth noting the core theoretical 
framework common across these various theorists: the social construction of 
reality. The phrase traces back to the seminal work of sociologists like Schutz 
(1932/1967), Luckmann (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973), and Berger (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967), but the philosophical commitments of this idea draw from 
older schools of thought, such as Husserl's (1901/2001) phenomenology (see also 
Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012) and the American pragmatic tradition. The 
fundamental idea of social constructivism is expressed by Berger (1967): "Every 
human society is an enterprise of world-building… Society is a dialectic 
phenomenon in that it is a human product, and nothing but a human product, 
that yet continually acts back upon its producer" (p. 3). This dialectic can be 
modeled as a process of externalization, objectification, and internalization 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Externalization refers to the way that society is a 
human product– it is built from the collective actions of each individual member. 
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Objectification describes the way in which the social order is taken for granted by 
its members– through collective habits it transcends any individual’s actions and 
comes to have an objective status. Internalization describes the way that this 
social reality reflexively becomes a part of each individual's psyche, tacitly 
influencing their ideas, emotions, and actions. We can analyze each of these 
processes distinctly, but within this theoretical framework it is important to 
remember that they occur in mutually interdependent and reinforcing ways. 
While this description is exceedingly abstract, it is meant to capture the 
social dynamics present in the most common situations and behaviors. Drawing 
from Collins (2004) and Goffman (1959) for example, consider what is involved 
in the most basic greeting between two friends: "Hi Ann! How are you?" "Hey 
Felicia, good to see you! I'm good, how about you?" "Great to hear! Yea, I'm good too." 
Within this interaction the two friends are externalizing a tacit set of etiquette, 
customs, and norms that guide how people of a certain degree of familiarity in a 
particular setting initiate an interaction. The same exchange can also be seen as 
objectifying those customs by following and reinforcing their practice. 
Simultaneously, the enactment of these norms is itself an instance of 
internalization, more deeply seeding the individual habit. The social theorists we 
will encounter below debate about the character of each aspect of this dialectic. 
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For example, is objectification best described as a symbolic moral order (e.g., 
Douglas, 1970) or a set of habitual social practices (Bourdieu, 1972/1977)? 
Regardless of this disagreement, all agree on the basic dialectic and the point that 
there is a massive amount of information conveyed within such a simple and 
short exchange. Consider, for example, how the exchange would vary if Felicia 
was Ann's boss, or if one was arriving late to a meeting, or if this was happening 
at a party, or after years of no contact. Since the argument I am building is 
occurring through the written words in this chapter, our focus naturally moves 
to the verbal utterances of this exchange, but there is also a deeper, and arguably 
more influential, level of information exchanged through tone, postures, 
embraces, glances, and an amazing array of facial expressions. This stream of 
information and the varying sets of norms and conditions that guide its 
enactment and interpretation is of primary concern for most of the social 
theorists below. For the sake of our inquiry, I argue that this stream of 
information and the social forces that shape it, strongly influence the seemingly 
individual and internal processes of self-regulation. To make that argument 
clear, we will start with Durkheim. 
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2.3 Durkheim 
Before Schutz, Berger, and Luckmann explicitly articulated the social 
construction of reality, Durkheim was keenly attuned to the dialectic between the 
individual and the social. Within religious studies in particular he is noted for 
articulating a complex dynamic in which religious systems, morality, and social 
cohesion are deeply interwoven. From this perspective, religious systems 
undeniably contain written codes of conduct, such as the standards emphasized 
by Zell and Baumeister (2013), but this explicit moral code is predicated on the 
more pervasive and influential way that religious systems bind individuals 
together in a moral community infused with unwritten customs, norms, and 
obligations. To appreciate the nuance within his perspective, it is worth 
beginning with the way Durkheim conceives of religion. 
2.3.1 Durkheim on religion 
Durkheim argues that religion is deeply interwoven with society itself, as 
he states in his famous quote: "If religion generated everything that is essential in 
society, this is because the idea of society is the soul of religion" (Durkheim, 
1912/2008, p. 314). To gain perspective on this claim that “society is the soul of 
religion,” it is worth backing up to Durkheim's theory of collective effervescence. 
In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (EFR) Durkheim (1912/2008) argues that 
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experiences of group identity emerge out of shared ecstatic experiences during 
collective rituals. This experience of being part of a group provides the basis for 
the idea of the sacred: "it is in these effervescent social settings, and from this 
very effervescence, that the religious idea seems to be born" (Durkheim, 
1912/2008, p. 164). Durkheim elaborates on how these extraordinary group 
experiences develop into the distinction between the sacred and profane, and 
how the religious force generated during collective action becomes fixed on 
material symbols, such as the totem. But for our purposes, the key insight is that 
the idea of sacred is generated through this social process. 
This insight is part of Durkheim's broader argument within EFR: ideas, 
beliefs, and morality all trace back to social origins. For example, contrary to 
other theorists (Tylor, 1881) who argued that the idea of the soul emerges from 
our experience of dreaming, Durkheim argues that "the individual soul is 
therefore only a fragment of the group's collective soul; it is the anonymous force 
at the basis of the cult, but incarnate in the individual and wedded to his 
personality" (1912/2008, p. 194). In other words, the idea of the soul emerges 
from our split experience as individual and social beings (see also Durkheim, 
1914/1975). Religious beliefs are not the only concepts that emerge from social 
processes. Among Durkheim's more radical claims is that our concepts of time, 
  
 
74 
space, causality, force, hierarchy, all originate from social dynamics. In short, 
"society has provided the canvas on which logical thought has operated" 
(Durkheim, 1912/2008, p. 115). In many ways this idea anticipates the 
externalization process that later social constructive theorists will articulate.  
We do not have to follow Durkheim in such a complete social grounding 
of thought in order to appreciate his more basic point about the intrinsically 
social origins of religion. Importantly, within this social process of 
externalization, rituals and the larger social organization of the group play an 
essential role. For example, the emotional effervescence of these collective rituals 
is undeniably central within Durkheim's analysis– but the importance of this 
emotional quality comes primarily from the way it contrasts with the more 
normal, mundane, and often solitary activities of the Australian tribespeople he 
is discussing (1912/2008, pp. 157-160). In other words, it is not the behavior of the 
ritual per se that gives rise to the idea of the sacred, instead it is the way that 
activity is situated within the broader social context. This broadens Durkheim's 
analysis of externalization to not just examine the origins of specific ideas within 
particular social practices, but to more generally seek the structure of the social 
order itself. 
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2.3.2 Durkheim, social cohesion, and the moral order 
This broader concern brings us to the social constructive process of 
objectification. Not only are religious ideas emergent from social processes, but 
these ideas are also essential for maintaining social cohesion. Throughout 
Durkheim's broader work, social cohesion was a primary concern. In The Division 
of Labor in Society (1893/1984) he works to envision the way social solidarity is 
maintained through the changing social conditions of industrialization. In his 
later research on suicide (1897/1997), Durkheim explores the tragic consequences 
when the processes necessary for social stability are disrupted. Throughout his 
work, religious communities are emblematic of social cohesion in large part 
because of their connection with morality. This is not because religious systems 
provide explicit codes for moral behavior, but because they bind individuals into 
moral communities (Durkheim, 1912/2008, p. 46).  
At this point in our inquiry morality has cropped up a number of times. It 
will remain an integral part of our discussion, so it is worth pausing briefly to 
clarify what I mean by morality. This is no easy task– for as long as people have 
been writing they have been debating the nature and scope of moral behaviors 
and judgments (cf. Golob & Timmerman, 2017). We will have more to say about 
these debates, especially in the next chapter when we turn to research in moral 
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psychology, but for our present purposes at the social level of analysis we can 
lean on a vague understanding of morality as what people consider good or bad. 
Here it is important to not construe “consider” in overly rational terms because 
there is an ongoing debate about the degree to which morality is primarily 
rational, emotional, or simply a set of social habits (see Graham et al., 2011). 
There are other lively disagreements about the degree to which morality shifts 
across cultures (Curry, 2016) and whence it emerges (Tomasello, 2016). Given 
this contested terrain, we can add to our vague definition of morality as what 
people consider good or bad the expectation that you can recognize moral 
behaviors within a group by observing those actions that are sanctioned. By 
"sanctioned" I do not mean that these actions are explicitly punished or 
rewarded– approval can be as subtle as an uninterrupted flow of interaction and 
disapproval can be the smallest shift in posture or a flinch. Adding this 
expectation helps to sidestep the rational versus emotional debates about 
morality and instead focus our attention on the social origins and consequences 
of moral behaviors.  
This definition of morality remains intentionally vague because rather 
than sharply delineate moral from non-moral behaviors, we want to remain 
attuned to how other theorists conceptualize morality. By holding the concept 
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lightly we can develop a better approximation of the various ways scholars 
picture morality as embedded within religious systems and society at large. With 
this in mind, for Durkheim (1893/1975) morality and social cohesion are 
intrinsically connected:  
Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything which 
forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything which forces 
him to regulate his conduct through something other than the striving of 
his ego is moral. (p. 136)  
To be part of a group, for Durkheim, is to be bound by the obligations of 
participation and belonging, which are the essential form of morality. These 
expectations extend beyond explicit rules about right and wrong into a more 
pervasive moral order that is woven within the unspoken customs and norms of 
the group. Importantly these obligations of social cohesion inherently serve 
regulatory functions, bringing individual action into alignment with the social 
order. We will return to this point about social regulation below. 
 When Douglas (1966) broadens Durkheim's conception of the moral order, 
she illustrates its pervasiveness by pointing to the events that people experience 
as transgressions of that order. By engaging basic notions of hygiene and 
dangerousness, Douglas (1966) argues how thoroughly our sense of good and 
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bad extend through social reality. This extension is pervasive enough to 
encompass even the ground under our feet: "we are left with the old definition of 
dirt as matter out of place . .. [This] implies two conditions: a set of ordered 
relations and a contravention of that order" (p. 44). In other words, for Douglas 
(1966) and Durkheim (1893/1975) before her, the moral order pervades social 
reality.  
When Durkheim turns to religion, he sees the moral authority exerted by 
the group as dependent on the same social dynamics that generate the sense of 
the sacred: "religious force is nothing but the collective and anonymous force of 
the clan" (1912/2008, p. 166). A few pages later he elaborates: "[Religious forces] 
are moral powers since they are wholly constructed from the feelings the 
collective moral being arouses in those other moral beings, the individuals" 
(1912/2008, p. 168). The pervasive morality embedded within religious systems 
emerges from the collective force of participating in the group and helps to 
maintain the group itself. 
This relationship between morality, social cohesion, and religious 
authority is crucial for understanding the social dimensions of self-regulation. 
We will engage other entailments below, but for now, this relationship points to 
a set of tacit, pervasive, and influential standards that actively demand 
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regulation. Durkheim is arguing that this set of social norms is infused with 
moral force because abiding by these norms is essential for social cohesion. 
Transgression poses a threat to the group itself. This moral dimension 
illuminates not only the social origin of these tacit standards, but also the social 
force that motivates individuals to abide by them. 
Contrast this Durkheimian view of the origin and efficacy of regulatory 
standards with Zell and Baumeister's (2013) account of how religious systems 
influence standards: 
The first way religion can facilitate self-control is by providing clear 
standards about right and wrong. Religious traditions provide direct 
commands about what people ought to do and instructions on how 
people ought to live, such as the Ten Commandments in the Judeo-
Christian tradition, the Eightfold Path of Buddhism, or the Five Pillars in 
Islam. Religious traditions also include moral exemplars for people to 
emulate, such as Muhammed, Sri Krishna, Jesus, the Buddha, or Mother 
Theresa. (pp. 502-503)12  
                                                        
12. It is worth remembering that Zell and Baumeister (2013) use self-control as indicative of self-
regulation more generally, so they would take this explanation to be relevant for all regulatory 
processes. 
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While the two accounts have clear differences, they are not incompatible. Zell 
and Baumeister (2013) do not rule out the influence of tacit moral standards 
embedded within religious traditions any more than Durkheim (1893/1984) 
denies the presence and importance of explicit laws for maintaining social 
cohesion. But the two accounts do provide sharply different emphases: in one, 
religious systems carry a set of explicit representations about moral behavior, 
which are transmitted to adherents and then abidance is motivated by a 
corresponding set of representations about rewards and punishments; in the 
other, the moral force of religious systems is tacitly carried by the individual’s 
attachment to the group and motivated by the need to maintain the group. In 
part these different emphases emerge from the different disciplinary concerns of 
psychology and sociology, respectively. But, both are discussing the same 
phenomenon—the influence that religious engagement has on regulatory 
behavior—and as I will argue in the next chapter, Durkheim’s theory is not 
antithetical to psychological description. Therefore it remains a fruitful exercise 
to draw out the differences between the two interpretations in order to help 
motivate my alternative explanation. In the next chapter I will engage 
psychological research to help weigh the plausibility of each. 
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2.3.3 Durkheim’s dialectic 
Returning to Durkheim, we just sketched out the ways that religious and 
moral forces emerge as a result of social processes and reflexively help to 
maintain those social processes. Part of the complexity within Durkheim's 
thought springs from the fact that there is no linear causal relationship between 
the collective, the religious, and the moral. Each of these social domains 
simultaneously maintains and is dependent on the others. To make matters more 
complicated, Durkheim is somewhat ambiguous about the relationship between 
these social forces and individual psychological processes. I quote his Rules of 
Sociological Method (Durkheim, 1895/1982) at length because it portrays the 
various sides of this interdependence: 
If social life were no more than an extension of the individual, we would 
not see it return to its origin and invade the individual consciousness so 
precipitately. The authority to which the individual bows when he [sic] 
acts, thinks or feels socially dominates him to such a degree because it is a 
product of forces which transcend him and for which he consequently 
cannot account. It is not from within himself that can come the external 
pressure which he undergoes; it is therefore not what is happening within 
himself which can explain it. It is true that we are not incapable of placing 
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constraints upon ourselves; we can restrain our tendencies, our habits, 
even our instincts, and halt their development by an act of inhibition. But 
inhibitive movements must not be confused with those which make up 
social constraint. The process of inhibitive movements is centrifugal; but 
the latter are centripetal. The former are worked out in the individual 
consciousness and then tend to manifest themselves externally; the latter 
are at first external to the individual, whom they tend afterwards to shape 
from the outside in their own image. Inhibition is, if one likes, the means 
by which social constraint produces its psychical effects, but is not itself 
that constraint." (pp. 127-128) 
At first glance, this quote is not ambiguous at all– Durkheim is drawing a sharp 
distinction and giving a clear priority to the social over and above the 
psychological. If we take Durkheim seriously, then any analysis of self-regulation 
and inhibitory control should be distinct from analyses of social constraints. Part 
of his motivation for drawing this sharp theoretical line springs from his goal to 
establish sociology as a discipline distinct from psychology. As he says later: "the 
determining cause of a social fact must be sought among antecedent social facts 
and not among the states of the individual consciousness" (Durkheim, 1895/1982, 
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p. 134). Methodologically this is a critical move for maintaining the clarity of 
sociological inquiry.  
Nevertheless, within the rest of his work Durkheim continually 
emphasizes the continuity between the individual and the collective. For 
example, earlier in the same book he argues that socialization is a process of 
constraining individual impulses, but "if this constraint in time ceases to be felt it 
is because it gradually gives rise to habits, to inner tendencies which render it 
superfluous" (1895/1982, p. 54). Social forces shape psychological habits. Even in 
the passage above the line is blurred– psychological inhibition is the means by 
which social constraint is influential. Within the dialectic he draws, internal 
restraint and external constraint are necessarily interwoven— the moral order 
may come from the outside, but it is necessarily held within each individual's 
mind, and only by their abidance is it maintained and perpetuated to be given, 
externally, to the next generation. Given this dialectic, any effort to sharply 
separate the two is more likely to distort each than clarify either.13  
                                                        
13. The necessity of holding social context and individual psychology in the same analytical 
frame is one of the primary arguments of this book. Drawing from the pragmatists, Dewey 
(1922/2002) and Mead (1934/2015), along with the tradition in psychology exemplified by 
Vygotsky (1930/1980), I maintain that the psychological and the social are too interwoven for 
either to be studied without the other in view. 
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In other words, from Durkheim's perspective, social regulation and self-
regulation are deeply interdependent. The standards necessary for self-
regulation are often internalized from the socially grounded moral order. The 
social sanctioning and approval of behaviors also becomes internalized as 
monitors of self-regulation. But it is not only through internalization that self-
regulation is deeply social. The dialectic works in both directions. Therefore, we 
also expect that when a person is regulating in relation to seemingly personal 
goals, they are simultaneously fulfilling the social goal of maintaining a 
particular moral order. In the words of the social constructivists, self-regulation 
that involves a social goal is also an act of objectification and externalization; the 
unavoidable consequence of individual action is the reification of some collective 
order. In short, any act of self-regulation is also an act of social regulation. 
Remaining attuned to this continuity between the individual and society helps us 
see the way social customs, norms, and values are both established by and mold 
the processes of self-regulation. 
Turning our attention to the social entailments of self-regulatory behavior 
also casts self-monitoring and motivation in a new light. If Durkheim and the 
social theorists are correct about the indexical function of regulatory behavior, 
then we should expect that self-monitoring processes will shift dramatically 
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depending on the social context. There is already solid evidence suggesting that 
people change their behaviors to be more prosocial/conforming if they believe 
they are being watched (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006; Haley & Fessler, 2005). 
As I argued in the previous chapter, this new interpretative framework suggests 
that it not only matters if you are being watched, but who is doing the watching. 
As we will see below, society is not monolithic, it is a mosaic of overlapping and 
opposing groups; therefore it matters a great deal whether an in-group affiliate, a 
member of an aspired to group, an out-group member, or an anonymous other is 
watching. In other words, self-monitoring processes are going to be sensitive to 
discrepancies between the individual’s current state and their goal state along 
with the relational demands of the social context.  
Similarly, if self-regulatory acts signal social affiliation, then this changes 
the motivational landscape in which they occur. Beyond the direct instrumental 
payoffs of self-regulating, such as foregoing a small reward to reap large benefits 
later, these acts may also serve to solidify social bonds or forge new alliances. As 
humans are deeply social animals, we should expect that such social payoffs will 
often outweigh directly instrumental costs. The literature on parochial altruism 
largely supports this broad prediction as it demonstrates the widespread 
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willingness to incur personal costs in order to benefit an ally14 (Bernhard, 
Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2016). In chapter 4, when we 
turn directly to psychological research on motivational differences between self-
interested and socially-centered actions, we will engage this evidence more fully. 
For now, the main point is to highlight how attention to the social context of self-
regulation changes our conception of the salient pathways between religious 
systems and self-regulation. 
2.3.4 The relevance of religion 
At this point in the review we have largely shifted away from talking 
about religious systems. Instead we are discussing social processes in a way that 
does not distinguish between a religious community, a bowling league, a nation 
state, a tribal army, a business, or any other group. This shift in focus raises the 
question of whether these social dynamics are relevant to our primary concern: 
explaining the relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation. If 
these processes occur within any social group, then what is unique about 
religious systems that should lead us to expect them to influence self-regulation 
                                                        
14 In this sense, these socially motivated actions are still self-interested, but this is from an 
ultimate perspective. At the proximate level, the altruistic action is done for the other as an end 
unto itself. In chapter 4 we will discuss this distinction and its implications for motivation in 
more depth. 
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over and above any other social organization? The different theoretical 
approaches frame their answers in different ways. 
This framing depends on another key difference between Zell and 
Baumeister's (2013) account and that of Durkheim– the relative importance given 
to beliefs versus behaviors. Within Zell and Baumeister's (2013) account of how 
religious systems influence the motivation necessary to exercise self-regulation, 
they suggest: 
Religion provides an array of compelling reasons for moral conduct. The 
belief that God wants you to behave in a certain way is the ultimate reason 
to do so (Baumeister, 1991; Emmons, 1999). Particularly motivating may 
be religious beliefs about salvation or enlightenment (Baumeister, 1991)." 
(pp. 507-508) 
They do go on to discuss how guilt can also operate as a powerful motivator for 
moral behavior, but this engagement with emotional processes circles back to 
guilt in relation to transgressing the clear moral standards mentioned above. 
They are not arguing against the importance of religious emotions or practices, 
but within Zell and Baumeister's (2013) interpretative framework, beliefs are 
central. In other words, the defining characteristic of a religious system, that 
which distinguishes it from other social groups and the factor we should 
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anticipate as most relevant for its influence on self-regulation, is the content of a 
religion’s particular beliefs.  
In contrast, for Durkheim these beliefs depend on particular collective 
actions amidst the broader social organization. Within this theoretical 
framework, behaviors provide the crucial object of focus for navigating the 
complex dialectic between the individual and the social. But this focus on 
behavior and social organization is also part of what extends this framework 
beyond religious systems. This extension is not necessarily a problem, but it does 
raise the question of what, if anything, is distinct about religious behaviors 
compared to those of any other social group. 
In his work on religion, we saw how Durkheim highlights ecstatic, 
effervescent, rituals as the progenitor of collective identity, religious force, and 
moral authority (1912/2008, p. 164). Later in EFR, he moves beyond these 
prototypical rituals to consider religious ceremonies and rites more broadly. He 
is still clear that these rites serve social, religious, and moral functions: "when a 
rite functions only as entertainment, it is no longer a rite. The moral forces that 
religious symbols express are real forces to be reckoned with" (1912/2008, p. 284) 
and later, "rites are, above all, the means by which the social group periodically 
reaffirms itself" (1912/2008, p. 287). In other words, even when broadened to 
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include more general forms of ritual, Durkheim still suggests that these ritual 
behaviors function to instill a sense of group identity with its concomitant moral 
obligations and religious force. 
Later theorists continued this generalizing trajectory. Mauss (1925/2016), 
extended Durkheim's basic principles of group formation and coherence to 
analyze how ritual reciprocity can extend relationships beyond group 
boundaries. Other generations, like that of Douglas (1966; 1970), developed 
sophisticated analyses about the way conventional taboos reveal the moral order 
established through social practices, and how this order thoroughly structures 
our perceptions of reality and each other (see also Bernstein, 1971). Goffman's 
(1959) analysis of mundane routinized exchanges as interaction rituals that form 
the substance of the social order, is perhaps the best example of how far this 
trajectory has traveled from Durkheim's initial focus on rituals of collective 
effervescence. No matter how basic the ritual, Durkheim's essential point 
remains–social behaviors bind us together into groups and underwrite (while 
also depending on) a sense of moral order that forcefully guides our behavior as 
individuals in relation to that group. One uniting characteristic throughout these 
accounts is the emphasis on conventional behaviors– acts that follow what is 
normally done. 
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The generalizing trajectory of these social theorists was further amplified 
by the functionalists, who shared the analytical focus on conventional behaviors 
and the processes that maintained social cohesion. At this point in the 
movement, however, Durkheim is no longer the primary forebear of the method. 
Some theorists, such as Parsons (1937/1949), whose influential social action 
theory provided a separate stream of thought oriented towards the symbolic 
construction of value systems, drew more explicitly from Weber (1920/2011) and 
Malinowski (1922/2014). While there were sharp debates among the 
functionalists, especially regarding the character of objectified social reality, they 
were largely united in agreement about the foundational importance of social 
behaviors for maintaining a stable social structure. 
In the 1960s and 70s, Geertz (1973) and Turner (1967; 1969) represent the 
tail end of this legacy.15 Geertz (1973), whose definition of religion remains a 
                                                        
15. This narrative about functionalism is woefully incomplete in many ways. I did not mention 
Radcliffe-Brown (1952) who drew from one of the first functionally inclined theorists, Xunzi 
(Kline & Tiwald, 2014; Watson, 1996), to give a concise definition of the basic functionalist 
insight: "Orderly social life amongst human beings depends upon the presence in the minds of 
the members of a society of certain sentiments, which control the behavior of the individual in his 
relation to others… Rites can therefore be shown to have a specific social function when, and to 
the extent that, they have for their effect to regulate, maintain and transmit from one generation 
to another sentiments on which the constitution of the society depends" (1952, p. 157).Again we 
see the emphasis on how the regulatory functions of ritual action is necessary for preserving the 
social order of society.  
I also neglect Malinowski's (1922/2014) work on the way rituals serve direct 
psychological functions for individuals, such as assuaging anxiety prior to dangerous endeavors.  
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prominent feature of any introduction to religious studies course, brought a shift 
in this movement towards analyzing the symbolic meaning of actions and 
cultural elements, especially as that meaning is conceived of within the cultural 
system itself. Turner (1967; 1969) was more actively concerned with the way 
rituals served as active mechanisms of change and transformation within 
societies. While Geertz and Turner had their differences (see Ortner, 1984), I 
mention them together because they both represent the way functionalism 
shifted towards a view that symbolic action within the organization of a group 
served as a means of maintaining that group by embodying and manipulating a 
structure of meanings that guides an individual's experience of herself. As such, 
standing at the tail end of the early functionalist project16, these theorists and 
those before them carried Durkheim's initial insights into a deeper and more 
                                                        
This limited survey should also not give the impression that functionalism was the only 
school of thought interested in religion. As Stausberg's (2007; 2008; 2009) definitive surveys 
show– there were a plurality of methods and modes at work under the broad umbrella of 
religious studies throughout the 20th century. 
16. Functionalism is still alive today, but in a strange turn of events it is mostly carried forward 
by behavioral ecologists. In the 1960s, cultural ecologists such as Sahlins and Service (1960) or 
Steward (1953), would have resisted the label of functionalist. Their primary concern was with 
the way particular social or cultural elements served as adaptive responses to environmental 
pressures, not social cohesion. For example, Rappaport's (1967) work on Maring rituals showed 
how the kaiko ritual in particular helped preserve the local ecosystem. But, as cultural ecologists 
incorporated the emerging insights of cultural evolution, problems of cooperation became one of 
the field's primary concerns. How a society overcomes problems of cooperation is both an 
evolutionary and a functionalist question, and as we will see later– morality is a key part of the 
answer (Curry, 2016; Haidt, 2012). 
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general analysis of the interpenetration of individual action and social meaning. 
Even with this later turn to behavior's symbolic dimensions, conventional action 
remained the essential analytical focus. It provided the way to understand how 
groups hang together and become collectively committed to a set of norms and 
moral expectations, which provide a sense of order to social reality and 
reflexively guide what people in these groups do. 
By this point we have extended once more beyond religious systems. But 
this narrative highlights the aspects of a religious system that we should expect 
to distinguish its salience for self-regulation. Rather than emphasizing the unique 
beliefs of religious systems, this theoretical perspective shifts our attention to the 
conventionalized practices and rituals of religious groups, along with their 
networks of relationships. This approach asks whether there is something 
distinct about ritualized action within the social network of a religious group that 
would impact the self-regulation of individuals embedded within this network. 
Put differently– do ritual practices instill a particular orientation towards broader 
moral orders that more mundane practices do not foster? In chapter 3 and 4 I will 
explore these questions more systematically. For now, the point is that this social 
perspective, informed by Durkheim and the broader school of functionalists, 
leads us to expect that the most influential route from religious systems to self-
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regulation will be through particular conventionalized behaviors, relationships, 
and the way they orient the individual towards a social sense of morality.   
While I have positioned Zell and Baumeister's (2013) perspective in sharp 
contrast to that of Durkheim and the functionalists, it is worth noting that the 
two are not necessarily at odds. Even if one places a primary emphasis on 
religious beliefs17 and explicit codes of behavior, there is still space for practices 
and community to be highly influential in the way people relate to those 
particular beliefs. Likewise, placing our explanatory emphasis on behaviors and 
social structure should not obscure the potential importance that beliefs might 
have for underwriting or amplifying the moral order established through 
practices18. Ultimately, the relative influence of each pathway will be an 
empirical question and will likely shift from one context to the next. The 
important point for our inquiry here is to not close off these possibilities.  
                                                        
17 Drawing from W.C. Smith’s classic work (1964; 1979), it is worth noting that it is a relative 
recent, and largely Protestant, phenomenon for religious “belief” to mean cognitive assent to 
propositions about the world. More often “belief” meant one’s allegiance to something.  
18 Within this inquiry I am largely bracketing the potential role of religious narratives within 
these dynamics. This is not because they are unlikely relevant– if anything, religious narratives 
may provide an especially salient form of behavioral modeling and a potent way for individuals 
to understand their own religiosity. Studying the role of religious narratives within the 
construction of religious identities and the commitment to religious standards would be very 
fruitful for understanding the impact that religious engagement has on self-regulation. But, 
within the current project, adding this dimension to the discussion would overburden a project 
that is already conceptually stretched. 
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2.3.5 Social constraint and individual restraint 
Before moving to the theoretical school within religious studies that 
swamped functionalism, it is worth staying with Durkheim's theory of the moral 
order for one more point. In the first chapter I discussed the differences between 
effortful inhibition and automatic modes of self-regulation. This raises the 
question of whether or not social norms and the attendant moral order demand 
deliberate self-control or whether they guide behavior automatically. 
Throughout his work, Durkheim argues that social force is a form of 
constraint that shapes the actions, thoughts, and feelings of individuals in such a 
way that they experience it as coming from something external and transcendent. 
In the passage above from Sociological Rules (1895/1982, p. 127-128), Durkheim 
discusses social forces as things we bow to, suggesting that they dominate us. We 
should be careful, though, to temper our interpretation of this concept. In 
cultures that value individual liberty as highly as the US, for example, it can be 
easy to confuse social constraint with oppression and assume that individuals 
should be liberated from this moral order. To import this view onto Durkheim's 
framework, however, risks distorting his perspective and conflating him with 
thinkers that he was explicitly arguing against:  
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For some, such as Hobbes and Rousseau, there is a break in continuity 
between the individual and society. Man is therefore obdurate to the 
common life and can only resign himself to it if forced to do so. Social 
ends are not simply the meeting point for individual ends; they are more 
likely to run counter to them. (Durkheim, 1895/1982, p. 142)  
For Durkheim, this interplay of social regulation and self-regulation is not 
necessarily a dynamic where society utterly restrains individuals from pursuing 
their own ends. Social reality in a very real way exceeds and thereby constrains 
the individual. Nevertheless, Durkheim (1912/2008) argues that this process also 
ambiguously has the potential to elevate the individual:  
social action is not limited to demanding our sacrifices, privations, and 
efforts. For collective force is not wholly external to us; it does not move 
us entirely from the outside. Indeed, since society can exist only in 
individual minds and through them, it must penetrate and become 
organized inside us; it becomes an integral part of our being, and in so 
doing it elevates and enlarges that being. (p. 157) 
Or as he states in the Division of Labor and Society (1893/1984): "a group is not only 
a moral authority which dominates the life of its members; it is also a source of 
life sui generis. From it comes a warmth which animates its members, making 
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them intensely human" (p. 26). Given Durkheim's commitment to maintaining 
the continuity between the individual and society, social forces are an ambiguous 
but necessary feature for the growth of the individual. By participating in society, 
by engaging with its norms and regulating our behavior in relation to those 
around us, we become part of something that transcends our individual self.  
Within these passages Durkheim begins with the recognition that social 
forces do constrain the individual. In this regard it is likely that individuals must 
exercise an effortful form of inhibition—i.e., self-control—in order to not 
transgress the established norms. Through an unavoidable process of 
socialization, these social norms are also internalized as individual standards, 
which implies a habituation that would largely be automatic. And if Durkheim's 
more radical point, about the importance of social norms in the humanization 
and elevation of individuals, is believed, then the motivation to abide by these 
standards does not require an effortful restraint of our “obdurate” personal 
selves, instead it may be an end unto itself, motivated by the satisfaction of 
belonging to something bigger than one’s self. 
I have spent so much time on the relevance of Durkheim's work for the 
relationship between social constraint and self-regulation because his theoretical 
framework is one of the primary foundations for the alternative explanation 
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being mounted in this dissertation. Throughout his writing, Durkheim was 
attuned to the dialectic between the individual and society and provided a 
nuanced glimpse of the way moral orders emerge in the interconnection between 
the two. This dialectic turns our attention from the explicit moral codes carried 
by religious systems to the way a more tacit, permeating, and persuasive set of 
customs, norms, and values are interwoven with a sense of moral and religious 
significance. His basic question—how do societies achieve and maintain 
cohesion?—remains a core question of functionalist approaches and keeps 
inquiry tuned to the social consequences of seemingly individualistic self-
regulation. His answer —that society persists through a collective identity woven 
with a moral fabric of social habits that each individual encounters as external 
and transcendent to themselves but gradually internalizes and perpetuates— 
remains an overarching explanation for understanding how self-regulation is 
shaped by social context while simultaneously reifying that same context. In 
short, I am arguing that the social-individual dialectic is the context in which the 
relationship between religion and self-regulation is forged. 
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2.4. The critical turn 
If we were to stop the review here, then it might seem that we already 
have a fully developed theory to help us frame self-regulation within the social 
context of religious systems. But these theorists wrote 60 years ago. What 
happened since then? Why am I not discussing more contemporary scholars 
within religious studies that have carried this inquiry further and helped fill in 
the details that are lacking in the functionalists' general level accounts of how 
social structures are established, maintained, and transformed? 
The short answer is post-modernism. This label has come to mean a wide 
variety of things in academic and cultural discourse. Rather than sharply define 
this intellectual trend, it helps to think about the social climate in which it 
emerged. During the 1960s and 70s, the beginnings of the Cold War were 
stirring, making the colonial ties of European, US, Soviet, and Japanese powers 
increasingly apparent and disturbing. Amidst these political events, the civil 
rights movement, the women's movement, and various countercultural trends 
were making dramatic strides challenging entrenched social norms and bringing 
the voices of the marginalized into the forefront of public consciousness. With 
these pressing social concerns rising to the forefront of intellectual thought, it is 
no surprise that a large portion of the functionalist agenda was jettisoned. Social 
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cohesion and stability were largely recast as problematic processes underwriting 
hegemony rather than necessities of the social system. 
As Ortner (1984) notes in her definitive and thorough reflection on 
anthropology, this shift in thought was largely characterized by a return to Marx 
(see also Ortner, 2016). Where functionalists analyzed culture in terms of rituals, 
symbols, expectations of action, and/or moral orders, Marxist theorists analyzed 
the process of social formation in terms of ideology and the organization of 
production (Friedman, 1974). This may seem like a minor shift– even if our focus 
is economic we are still talking about social actions and relationships after all. 
But it is important to recognize that Marxist theorists often thought the social 
structure that functionalists studied was concealing the asymmetrical 
organization of production that was the more fundamental basis for the social 
system (e.g., Bloch, 1971; 1974). Alongside this shift in methodological focus was 
an evaluative change in which the normative and moral dimensions of culture 
came to be construed as ideological expressions of a hegemony bent on 
domination rather than stabilizing forces. 
Within his review of religious studies through the 20th century, Stausberg 
(2008) argues that this trajectory towards post-modern thought was much more 
pervasive within anthropology than religious studies as a whole:  
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Since the late 1960s, anthropology has been accused of being static, 
colonial, androcentric, and elitist. Similar criticism has later also targeted 
the study of religion(s), but post-colonial, post-modernist and post-
structuralist critiques have affected anthropology much more than they 
have the study of religion. The so-called 'crisis of representation' 
experienced by anthropology since the 1980s was not perceived as a 
similar challenge in the study of religion(s), at least in Western Europe. (p. 
312) 
This is true when one regards religious studies from a comprehensive 
perspective that includes textual analysis, history, and other approaches that are 
not social sciences. But, if you focus particularly on the social scientific 
approaches, the aspect of religious studies most relevant for our current inquiry, 
then the influence of post-modern thought is profound, even if a bit delayed 
relative to cultural anthropology. This influence is especially apparent in the 
North American academy, where the overarching institution (the American 
Academy of Religion) is structured into geographic and traditional particulars, 
but also with distinct foci on issues of race, class, gender, sexuality, ableism and 
similar issues of critical concern for post-modernists. Each of these categories 
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offers a framework for analyzing and critiquing the various ways oppressive 
forces are enacted within groups.  
 As we will see below, this turn towards analyzing social dynamics in 
terms of ideology and oppression can provide an important corrective to the 
Durkheimian perspective that generally fosters a supportive view of the social 
order. There are times when maintaining the social order results in radically 
limited possibilities for people at the margins of that order. Religious 
engagement may foster self-regulation through a moralized social order, but 
what are the ethical consequences of this social constraint? Beyond the ethical 
concerns raised by post-modern theorists, there are also important 
epistemological issues with my question as currently framed– why suppose that 
there are general pathways between religious engagement and self-regulation? 
The post-modern concern for particularity would suggest that this relationship 
will be different for each context and individual. There are also important 
methodological critiques that follow as a consequence of these ethical and 
epistemological concerns. A full review of this movement and its influence on 
religious studies is well beyond the scope of this chapter or dissertation, but 
these three critiques from post-modernists can help sharpen and nuance the 
framework developed above. 
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2.4.1 The ethical critique 
An ethical concern over power differentials embodied and reified in the 
structures of social relations provides one of the core motivations for this school 
of thought (e.g., Asad, 1973, Taussig, 1980). Especially within colonial contexts, 
this concern provided a powerful lens for understanding dynamics that had 
previously been obscured by a mode of inquiry focused on stability while 
ignoring those marginalized by the stable center. This method of analysis was 
also deeply self-reflective as scholars came to see the history of their own 
disciplines as a reiteration of colonial patterns (Said, 1979). In other words, 
inquiry itself became portrayed as a potential mode of coercion. For example, 
Asad (1993) argued that attempts to define religion are part of a historical, 
discursive process aimed at legitimating western European modes of rational 
religion, aka Protestantism, and delegitimizing others as superstitious and 
irrational. In other words, Asad (1993) argued that the work of defining and 
studying religion in other contexts is a power-laden enterprise that mimics 
colonial endeavors (see also Masuzawa, 2005). This worry about the 
misapplication of categories and the potential for social structures to act 
oppressively made the functionalists' interest in social cohesion seem misplaced. 
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Since the act of inquiry was an act of legitimation, studying the very structures 
that could be oppressive became equated with endorsing the oppression.  
The ethical concern of these critical theorists can inform our current 
inquiry in two important ways. First, it helps draw our attention to a salient 
dynamic within the social processes described by Durkheim and the 
functionalists– unequal power distributions. From the functionalists we saw the 
ways that social forces, such as religion, shape individual regulatory dynamics. 
Added to that, we now see that these social forces are not neutral– they will 
constrain and elevate different members of a group in different ways. These 
social forces are also not homogenous. While an individual may be marginalized 
within one group, she may be central within another. Just as it becomes 
important to consider her relative position within each group, it is also important 
to consider the broader relationship between the groups at the social level.  
This adds a complex but needed nuance to our previous understanding of 
how social forces influence self-regulation. Part of what this perspective 
highlights is that the definition of regulatory “success” will depend on the social 
context. In one group, success may look like inhibiting the desire to drink 
alcohol, while in another, overriding the desire to stop drinking may be the 
regulatory feat. The ethical critique also helps to highlight tensions that are 
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forced on people and the various tactics for navigating those tensions. For 
example, consider a Christian woman who is attracted to other women. If her 
religious community is conservative, then they may wield the moral force of the 
tradition and her identity as a Christian to tacitly threaten her with exclusion and 
shame her for these desires in such a way that she learns to interpret those 
desires as individual failings of self-control. But, imagine that she is also working 
at a place where homosexuality is welcomed and celebrated. The multiplicity of 
social groups and our mosaic affiliations can lead to tension, but this complexity 
can also lessen the threat of exclusion by affording alternatives. From this 
perspective, the moral force of social groups that Durkheim highlights may be 
real, but it is a highly ambiguous power. 
Second, this ethical concern should inspire self-reflection on the 
consequences of our current inquiry for broader ideological positions. There are 
clear ethical consequences to properly understanding the relationship between 
religious systems and self-regulation. Portraying self-regulation as an 
individual's capacity to exercise restraint has consequences for how we interpret 
a person's failure to meet goals. Just recall the APA study (2011) in which the 
most cited reason for not making lifestyle changes was a lack of willpower. By 
blaming the individual’s lack of this personal resource as the cause of health, 
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economic, or environmental problems, we risk obscuring the social dimensions 
of these problems and abdicate the collective’s responsibility to create social 
changes. No doubt, assessing the ethical dimensions of individualistic narratives 
about willpower is complicated terrain (see Laidlaw, 2014 for an initial foray). 
My point is not to resolve these narratives, but to highlight the ethical 
consequences of continuing to portray self-regulation as individualistic strength. 
Just as we should keep these consequences in mind about our portrayal of self-
regulation, this ethical reflection should also make us wary of misrepresenting 
religious systems in ways that perpetuate the pejorative biases Asad (1993) 
highlighted above. While we will address some of these ethical dimensions in the 
final chapter, throughout the dissertation this critique should encourage extra 
care around interpretations along with a vulnerable fallibilism that remains open 
to correction. 
2.4.2 The epistemological critique 
The connection between ethics and interpretation is further apparent in 
the way post-modern theorists construe epistemological concerns. One of the 
primary critiques post-modernists give of functionalist accounts of culture was 
the overemphasis on central and stable norms within the group. By focusing on 
the center, such theorists risked obscuring marginalized groups and the 
  
 
106 
possibility of social change. As above, this critique has a sharp ethical edge, but 
the epistemological problem is more significant in its consequences for what 
constitutes viable subject matter and methods.  
The core concern is best expressed through Lyotard's (1979/1993) 
definition for post-modernism as "incredulity towards metanarratives" (p. xxiii). 
Insofar as they provide broad and unifying explanations for the dynamics of 
society, the general theories of Durkheim and Weber are metanarratives par 
excellence. Lyotard (1979/1993) and others' suspicion of these general narratives 
builds from Wittgenstein's (1953/2009) philosophical argument about language 
games as constitutive of forms of life. The concept, "forms of life" is under-
determined within Wittgenstein's philosophy (it is only mentioned 5 times in The 
Investigations 1953/2009), especially in light of the importance it has come to hold. 
But roughly it refers to the general patterns and habits of interaction within any 
particular context or relationship, which Wittgenstein (1953/2009) argues provide 
the fundamental source of meaning for language. 
Within the context of post-modern theory, the concept of forms of life 
undergirds the larger suspicion that Lyotard (1979/1993) refers to: meanings 
across different cultural groups vary significantly enough to make them 
potentially incommensurable. In other words, attempting to generalize about a 
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relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation that is descriptive 
of various diverse cultural systems is epistemologically suspect. This critique 
cuts two ways for the functionalist agenda. First it suggests that the social 
dynamics at work in one situation are not necessarily applicable to other 
contexts. This side of the critique has radically challenged attempts at cross-
cultural comparisons as a confusion of categories (see Smith, 1982). The second 
side of the critique is that even within what may appear a united society, there 
still is no meta-narrative. Instead, there are various groups with contested 
interests whose forms of life might be distorted if studied solely in reference to 
the center or norm. 
I will linger on this point because it is crucial to our argument. What is 
being contested is the cohesiveness and homogeneity of any social group. Since I 
am arguing that tacit social norms of a group constitute a large and influential set 
of standards relevant for self-regulation, this critique raises the question: how do 
we know which group’s norms are influential for a person? We cannot 
presuppose that there is only one set of norms within a group and that everyone 
relates to these norms in the same way.  
From the perspective of this critique, functionalists rely on an overly 
homogenous view of society. After all, cohesion is the very characteristic studied 
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by functionalism. For example, Shils (1961) characterizes the cohesion of society 
in relation to a central authority, as he begins his essay: "Society has a centre… 
Membership in the society…is constituted by relationship to this central zone" (p. 
117). He goes on to characterize this center in terms of symbolic value and 
authoritative governance over expected actions. Despite his emphasis on the 
center, Shils (1961) is not implying that society is mono-vocal or homogenous. 
Instead he argues that society is made of many sub-systems, such as kinship, the 
economy, status, etc., each of which will have its own authoritative center. He is 
also not suggesting that everyone within a group will endorse the same centers: 
"there are variants of the central value system running from hyper-affirmation of 
some of the components of the major, central value system to an extreme denial 
of some of these major elements" (Shils, 1961, p. 118). While he recognizes 
diverse value systems and multiple ways of interacting with these value systems, 
critics would argue that Shils nevertheless organizes his sociological analysis 
primarily in reference to an orderly center. Society becomes a rose window– 
there are many different parts, but they all radiate around and orient towards 
one center.  
Compare Shils' account with Eisenstadt's (2000) description of society: "the 
idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the 
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contemporary world —indeed to explain the history of modernity— is to see it as 
a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural 
programs" (p. 2). Eisenstadt is not even a thorough-going post-modern theorist, 
but within his analysis we see a shift from focusing on the center of society to 
analyzing the various competing interests within a group. There is no center. 
Instead of a rose window, society is a mosaic. Any meta-narrative will give 
preferential treatment to some specific cultural program thereby eliding or more 
actively obscuring others. 
This epistemological legitimation of marginalized modes of knowledge 
has been deeply helpful and illuminating. Not only does it recognize the 
presence of diverse groups within a society, but it also works to elevate the 
distinct perspectives within this plurality. Within religious studies this method 
has spurred the recognition of how previously demeaned traditions or practices, 
such as speaking in tongues, may actually be novel modes of resistance (e.g., 
Fields, 1982). This epistemological move also set the stage for scholars beyond 
the European or US context to raise their own voices within post-colonial and 
anti-colonial studies (e.g. King, 1999; Kwok & Donaldson, 2001; Viswanathan, 
2001), which continue to recognize the ethical within the epistemological.  
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When this recognition of plurality is paired with Lyotard's (1979/1993) 
point about the incommensurability of different social worlds, however, it can 
risk splintering a heterogeneous group. For example, a set of scholars within this 
lineage, such as Said (1979), question whether anyone can truly understand the 
"other." The same suspicion undergirds the broader wariness about cross-
cultural comparisons mentioned above.19 The differences between forms of life 
become unbridgeable gulfs. If this extreme version of incommensurability is true, 
then it undermines the present inquiry: we cannot understand the social world 
and norms that shape someone else's regulatory processes. From this 
perspective, my very question presumes a generality of both religion and 
psychological processes that is suspect. While I believe this epistemological claim 
within post-modernism carries relativism too far, a point I will elaborate on 
below, it nevertheless helpfully flags an important point– we may not know the 
norms or standards towards which someone else is regulating. 
Returning to the psychological level of analysis offers a fruitful common 
ground between the functionalist's cohesive society and the post-modernist's 
fractured groups. From the functionalist perspective we saw how standards are 
                                                        
19 This wariness of comparison is related to the way that Kuhn (1962) discusses 
incommensurability among different scientific paradigms, as discussed in the last chapter. See 
Lindbeck (1984) for a similar phenomenon in theology. 
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internalized from the social context and how regulating in relation to those 
standards is an act of affiliation that indexes the shared social reality. We can 
conceptualize the psychological dimensions of this dialectic in terms of an 
individual's social identity– i.e., their sense of who they are in terms of their 
relationships or affiliations with particular groups (Brewer, 1991; Roccas & 
Brewer, 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986).20 For example, you likely have various 
social identities, such as parent, scholar, coder, gardener, friend, citizen, artist, 
etc. The post-modern critique about plurality at a social level makes us attuned 
to the way that these various social identities may not be easily parsed into Shils’ 
(1961) center and periphery. Instead we should expect an internalized version of 
Eisenstadt's (2000) multiplicity of cultural programs. One person might have a 
clear, overarching social identity around which the rest are organized. Another 
might have various prominent self-concepts that coexist distinctly but 
harmoniously. And yet another person might experience tension between 
various identities.  
The functionalist insight that we internalize standards and demonstrate 
our affiliation can be nuanced and complicated so that we are attuned to the 
                                                        
20. Tajfel and Turner (1979; 1986) developed this concept to help understand the psychology of 
intergroup conflict. In the next chapter I will describe social identity theory and its relevance for 
self-regulation in more depth. 
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degree of integration within this internalized framework and the degree of 
conflict. For now we will leave this as a hypothetical suggestion to help clarify 
the salience of the epistemological critique for our present inquiry, but in the 
next chapter I will draw from psychological work on social identities (e.g., 
Brewer, 1991; Browman, Destin, & Molden, 2018; Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Tajfel & 
Turner 1979; 1986) to flesh out this theory more fully. Here the point is that 
envisioning a plurality of social identities which are integrated and conflicting to 
different degrees offers a way to accommodate the post-modern insight about 
the absence of a center while preserving the relevance and accessibility of social 
processes for self-regulation. 
2.4.3 The methodological critique 
The third uniting concern for post-modern scholars is practice and 
performance.21 As we described above, Durkheim and the functionalists were 
also clearly interested in action and behavior; so this critique may seem ill-
founded. But from the post-modern perspective, functionalists overemphasize 
the way that actions establish abstract rules or norms, which then guide 
behavior. In contrast, these theorists articulate the way social practices are 
                                                        
21. Methodologically this also emerges as a new playfulness with language, seeking not just to 
describe, but through the very act of description to deconstruct the implicit categories and 
assumptions of language. 
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influential in and of themselves. This shift is most apparent in the work of 
Bourdieu (1990): "I can say that all of my thinking started from this point: how 
can behaviour be regulated without being the product of obedience to rules?" 
(1990, p. 65). For Bourdieu, the idea of habitus reflexively answers this question. 
As Swartz (2012) notes, habitus is meant to conceptually transcend that space 
between individuals and society where both social construction and behavioral 
regulation occur. Instead, Bourdieu (1972/1977) views habitus as an embodied set 
of strategic practices molded by the social context but having no reality external 
to their enactment. 
For example, in his ethnographic work among the Kabyle people in 
Algeria, Bourdieu argues that the social order is founded on each individual's 
sense of sentiment and honor (Bourdieu, 1979). Instead of portraying action as 
compliant to norms, he emphasizes the strategic nature of practice occurring in 
relation to felt dispositions that carry their own tempo and motivations. As 
Swartz summarizes Bourdieu's position on practice:  
Choices do not derive directly from the objective situations in which they 
occur or from transcending rules, norms, patterns, and constraints that 
govern social life; rather, they stem from practical dispositions that 
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incorporate ambiguities and uncertainties that emerge from acting 
through time and space. (p. 100) 
In other words, Bourdieu (1972/1977) is working to disengage our concepts of 
behavior and action from the idea that they occur primarily in relation to an 
abstracted cognitive realm of representation. This stands in contrast to the 
functionalists' discussions of moral order, values, and even norms. 
While the conceptual contrast intended by this emphasis on practice is 
clear, we can remain largely agnostic about the actual existence of these norms 
and moral orders. If people are regulating their own behaviors in relation to the 
patterns of action within their social context, then it does not necessarily matter 
whether they are doing so in relation to an abstracted moral order or through 
ambiguous practical dispositions. As others have argued (e.g., Giddens, 1979), an 
orientation towards practice does not require opposition to the functionalist 
emphasis on structures. The two can complement each other. The helpful aspect 
of this shift in focus is that it reinforces the ways we may not need an abstract, 
disembodied, moral order to guide behavior. Instead, the moral order with its 
embedded standards may be deeply embodied within emotions and habitual 
dispositions such as those that Bourdieu (1979) describes. The standards that 
guide self-regulation may not be abstract cognitive representations as much as 
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they are habits of practice and sentiment embodied in the situations in which we 
act. 
2.4.4 Responding to the critiques 
The three concerns of post-modern social theorists are well-founded. 
Inquiry does have ethical ramifications and a critical self-reflective stance is a 
reliable method for keeping some of those entailments in check. 
Epistemologically, generalizations are very difficult to justify and meta-
narratives often do distort the particular narratives from which they are built. 
Society is more like a bricolage than a neatly radiating rose window. Given the 
complexity of social groups, practice is an informative object of study, especially 
when it is not restricted to the exceptional, ecstatic, or orthodox practices of a 
religious tradition. And examining the everyday interactions of individuals 
allows inquiry to work from the ground up towards understanding what social 
process are relevant in shaping behavior. These critiques of functionalism in 
particular and enlightenment (i.e., modern) inquiry in general, do more to help 
correct and advance the functionalist project than undermine it. They decenter 
the object of focus, allowing us to envision the multiple overlapping social arenas 
in which any individual is engaged, and provide a method of examining the 
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everyday actions that allow us to parse the complexity of these social spheres in a 
way that is relevant for individuals. 
For some scholars of religion, the three concerns outlined above motivate 
a turn towards "lived religion" (McGuire, 2008). Rooted in Bourdieu and 
phenomenology (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012) scholars of lived religion follow 
the models of Orsi (1985) and Hall (1997) by focusing on the everyday, seemingly 
inconsequential, relationships and practices of people within religious 
communities. As McGuire (2008) describes:  
Lived religion is constituted by the practices people use to remember, share, 
enact, adapt, create, and combine the stories out of which they live. And it 
comes into being through the often-mundane practices people use to 
transform these meaningful interpretations into everyday action. Human 
bodies matter, because those practices —even interior ones, such as 
contemplation— involve people's bodies, as well as their minds and 
spirits" (p. 98, emphasis in the original).  
The emphasis on practice is interwoven with the ethical and epistemological 
skepticism of meta-narratives mentioned above. Given the complexity of society 
as overlapping fields of different strategies and expectations, this emphasis on 
the mundane action of individuals helps to focus inquiry on the social structures 
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that actually matter for people rather than bringing a priori judgments about the 
relevant aspects of religious systems or society at large. Ethically this focused 
inquiry helps to ensure that voices which might otherwise be marginalized are 
heard. And by focusing on the actual and mundane practices of individuals, 
these scholars avoid reference to an abstract system or structure. As a response to 
the post-modern critiques, the study of lived religion is a welcome adjustment 
within religious studies.  
Given the virtue of this response, one may ask why not simply adopt this 
approach of lived religion? Surely it could help shed light on the ways a religious 
group establishes a set of norms, or pattern of practices that become salient 
guides for self-regulation. The problem is that such a study would not tell us 
about the more general connection between religious systems and self-
regulation. While I appreciate the sensitivities of lived religion, I nevertheless 
find its resistance to generalization to be a troubling limitation.   
This reaction is not simply because of my own fondness towards 
systematizing, though that probably plays a role. Instead, there is a 
deceptiveness to post-modern scholars’ resistance to meta-narratives because 
their theoretical position itself is necessarily committed to particular meta-
narratives. For example, it is deeply committed to a Marxist interpretation of 
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social dynamics as fundamentally rooted in power differentials. That is a meta-
narrative. More pertinent for the inquiry at hand, these theorists are also tacitly 
committed to a general psychological narrative that disavows any innate 
predispositions or structures in the mind.  
Consider the way that psychological processes figure into McGuire's 
(2008) account of lived religion. At first glance, they play an essential role. 
Emotions, memory, and perception all comprise a large part of her explanation 
for how religious practices influence an individual's sense of the world, their 
form of life. For example, she argues: 
Bourdieu suggests that all our senses —not just our physical senses but 
also our social senses— are involved in remembering practices and 
embodying practices. Thus our bodies have embedded in them certain 
learned senses… For instance, our sense of disgust is learned; it is clearly 
not the same in all cultures, and babies have not yet acquired it (McGuire, 
2008, pp. 99-100). 
The significance of this quote is the fact that it does not include any references for 
McGuire's statements about memory, sensation, or disgust. Take disgust in 
particular, the lack of references is surprising because by 2008 psychologists like 
Rozin had already spent nearly three decades studying disgust, its cross-cultural 
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manifestations and similarities, its ontogeny, and the way it influences cultural 
beliefs, morals, and values (e.g., Rozin & Fallon, 1987). In other words, at the 
time of McGuire's (2008) writing, there was a respectable pile of psychological 
evidence contradicting her claim. This is not an isolated instance either. For all of 
McGuire's discussion about sensation, emotions, and memory, her only reference 
to psychological or biological research is a Bill Moyer's TV special (McGuire, 
2008, p. 234).  
My intention is not to lampoon McGuire (2008) or this school of thought. 
Her achievement within Lived Religion and its importance for addressing some of 
the problems within religious studies are laudable. Instead, this example 
illustrates how social theorists are unavoidably assuming a general psychological 
meta-narrative. In particular they are committed to the position that our minds 
are formed primarily, if not entirely, by the cultures within which we are born. 
This is the perspective that our minds are blank slates, and since they are formed 
by social inputs, culture remains the relevant level of analysis for understanding 
them. The problem with this position is that it is wrong– all evidence suggests a 
middle ground between biological inheritance, psychological structure, and 
social processes (see Pinker, 2002). In other words, while outwardly eschewing 
meta-narratives, post-modern social theorists are nevertheless committed to 
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generalized positions without making those positions explicit and thereby 
vulnerable to correction.  
Part of the resistance to engaging psychology may be explained 
sociologically from scholars being educated when the blank slate was a viable 
psychological position. But, this socialization explanation obscures deeper 
differences. To engage with psychology and biology would also mean becoming 
involved in inquiry that is explicitly committed to meta-narratives. Evolution is 
as general of a narrative as possible within the life sciences, and while the 
humanities are pushing towards particularity, psychology is urging researchers 
to engage in cross-cultural studies in order to generalize more effectively 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Given the blend of ethical and 
epistemological concerns outlined above, along with some egregious events in 
psychology’s history, one can understand the social theorists' wariness to 
engage.  
But part of my contention within this dissertation is that these 
interdisciplinary bridges must be built if we are to understand the relationship 
between religious engagement and self-regulation. Religious studies scholars are 
clear stakeholders in this project and as the preceding discussion shows, they 
have much to contribute. The commitment within religious studies to analyze 
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religion as a social behavior (e.g., McCutcheon, 2012) provides a helpful 
corrective to perspectives within the psychology of religion that overemphasize 
the importance of particular beliefs and construe self-regulation as self-interested 
restraint. But as the preceding critiques show, this interdisciplinary exchange is 
also potentially fraught with tension as it engages competing metanarratives and 
concerns. While the critiques of post-modernism are a helpful balance to 
functionalist perspectives, they are one voice of many. Recognizing that plurality 
within religious studies and keeping my own position vulnerable to correction, 
we can continue to engage across disciplinary boundaries, as we must: the space 
between the individual and society is necessarily an interdisciplinary space. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
As an interdisciplinary space, it is necessary for the bridge to be built from both 
sides. Throughout this section I have drawn from religious studies to argue for 
the importance of social construction within our understanding of self-regulation 
and religious systems. While the post-modern critiques challenge the 
functionalists' emphasis on cohesion and stability, it nevertheless remains quite 
close to Durkheim's basic insights about the individual-social dialectic. As Ortner 
(1984) summarizes in her review:  
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The modern versions of practice theory, on the other hand, appear unique 
in accepting all three sides of the Berger and Luckmann triangle: that 
society is a system, that the system is powerfully constraining, and yet 
that the system can be made and unmade through human action and 
interaction. (p. 159) 
For our inquiry, each of the three sides within this dialectic inform the way social 
context shapes the dynamic between religious systems and self-regulation.  
Durkheim and the functionalists helped us recognize that the standards 
relevant for self-regulation are internalized from our social context. Not only are 
these standards socially given, a large portion of them are embedded within a 
tacit moral order underwriting the customs, norms, and values of a group. 
Abiding by these norms is crucial for the group’s stability, so there is often a 
strong social pressure motivating the individual to conform. Given the social 
individual dialectic, regulating in relation to these social norms is also an act of 
externalization and objectification. Beyond the instrumental purposes of self-
regulation, our actions signal particular social affiliations and realities. This social 
dimension of self-regulatory behavior helps us recognize how the dynamics of 
self-monitoring and motivation will be highly attuned to situational cues, such as 
who is present. Post-modern theorists help nuance these insights by pointing to 
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the plurality within any group. This diversity is also not necessarily harmonious– 
instead it is often fraught with tension over power differentials. Therefore we 
should expect individuals to have internalized a diversity of social identities 
which may be integrated or conflicted to varying degrees. Since each of these 
social identities will have an associated set of motivations and standards, we 
should also anticipate that the degree of conflict within their social context and 
the degree of integration amidst their social identities will both have direct 
ramifications on self-regulation processes.  
In order to flesh that theory out more fully, in the next chapter I will turn 
to research that helps us understand the contours of these social dynamics at the 
psychological level. The post-modern theorists are not the only social theorists 
that tacitly assume psychological theories. Durkheim and the functionalists also 
depend on assumptions about how the process of internalization occurs and how 
people behave in relation to these objectified moral orders. In the next chapter 
we will engage research that helps pull these assumptions into the light and 
constrain them so that we can gain a clearer picture of the ways that the 
relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation is formed in the 
perpetual dialectic between the self and the social. 
  
  
 
124 
Chapter 3– The milieu of moralization 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I surveyed the social constructivists' perspective on the 
relationship between religion and self-regulation. A series of insights emerged 
from that review that situate this relationship within a more complex social 
context. We first noted that the standards for self-regulation are internalized 
from and shaped by a person's network of social relationships. This is not to say 
that people do not regulate towards highly personal standards as well, but from 
the social constructivists’ perspective, even these standards are absorbed during 
socialization and shaped by context. Beyond these personal standards, the 
groups to which a person belongs have customs, norms, taboos, and values, 
which constitute a set of social standards that exert a significant influence on 
regulatory behaviors. In short, I argued that action taken in accord with social 
norms are an overlooked but crucial set of self-regulatory behaviors. 
By emphasizing the social origins of standards, theorists from religious 
studies also helped us recognize that these norms are effective in part because of 
their affiliative functions. By regulating towards or away from a particular set of 
social standards, people enact their connection to groups that endorse those 
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standards. This social function of self-regulation implies that the motivation to 
regulate is often an end unto itself rather than a self-interested means to another 
reward. This affiliative signaling also highlights the ways that self-regulation and 
self-monitoring will be highly sensitive to situational cues, such as who is 
watching and where the behavior is occurring.  
 Critically, the previous review also emphasized how complex one's social 
context can be. Rather than a homogenous society with a central set of norms, 
societies are mosaics of overlapping and often contesting groups. Since self-
regulation is sensitive to group affiliations, I argued that this social complexity 
implies a degree of internal complexity as each person will have multiple 
affiliative identities along with their associated standards and motivations. The 
relative degree of integration and conflict within this internalized network of 
self-concepts will have consequences for self-regulation. 
 While these perspectives from religious studies help contextualize self-
regulation within a social perspective, they also tend to take psychology for 
granted. The theorists I engaged are social theorists, so it is appropriate that they 
work at the level of social behaviors and analyze the consequences of these 
behaviors for the group. However, there is necessarily a psychological dimension 
to these social dynamics and understanding the contours of that dimension is 
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crucial if we are going to say anything about how participation in a group, such 
as a religious community, shapes an individual’s self-regulatory capacity. The 
task of this chapter is to surface the psychological contours of these social 
processes. 
 This chapter begins with a review of social identity theory, which 
highlights the way people establish a sense of self through affiliation with 
particular groups. As such, social identity theory highlights one of the crucial 
motivations for abiding by social standards and will help us articulate why self-
regulatory behaviors will vary across different social contexts. Research in this 
field also suggests that people have multiple social identities, the salience and 
persistence of which depend on the person’s relationship to the associated group. 
Social identity theory, therefore, suggests that the influence religious engagement 
bears on self-regulation will largely depend on the nature of the individual’s 
attachment to their religious group, which influences her/his internalization of 
the group’s norms.  
 Paired with social identity theory, research on the psychology of social 
norms will highlight some of the basic processes that shape an individual’s 
awareness of and adherence to the social standards of any given group. In 
particular, the capacity for intersubjectivity and the tendency towards imitation 
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help to explain why social contexts bear such a powerful influence on self-
regulation, while also specifying when this influence is more likely to occur and 
for whom. A subset of research on social norms focuses on conventional 
behaviors and the way these behaviors are crucial aspects of social identity. I will 
review initial evidence that participating in these types of behaviors has 
downstream effects for other regulatory actions, such as delaying gratification 
(Rybanska et al., 2018). I suggest that one reason engaging in conventional 
behaviors may influence self-regulation more broadly is because it leads people 
to more broadly moralize their standards. 
In order to explain why moralization would foster better self-regulation, 
this chapter will conclude with a section on the psychological differences 
between descriptive and injunctive norms. In this review, we will see how 
moralization processes can lead the descriptive regularities within a group to 
become perceived as injunctive oughts about the way things should be. In short, 
when standards are imbued with the weight of moralization, they will exert a 
strong and pervasive influence on self-regulatory behaviors. Furthermore, I will 
review evidence suggesting that religious engagement tends to foster these 
moralization processes.  
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 The picture that emerges from this review of social identity theory and the 
psychology of social norms contrasts with the current explanations for how 
religious engagement impacts self-regulation. Instead of particular beliefs 
fostering self-interested restraint, this review motivates my alternative 
hypothesis: religious engagement influences self-regulation by imbuing 
conventional behaviors with a morally injunctive weight that makes these norms 
persistent and persuasive guides for behavior. While each of these research fields 
is large and complex, they are necessary to hold together in order to fully 
recognize the psycho-social processes that shape and constrain the relationship 
between religious systems and self-regulatory behaviors. 
 
3.2 Social identity 
"Internalization occurs only as identification occurs" 
     (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 131) 
In the last chapter I briefly introduced the concept of social identity to help 
articulate the ways different affiliations influence an individual's self-regulatory 
behaviors. There are various important aspects to the connection between social 
identity and self-regulation. First, an individual's social identity will carry a set of 
standards; for example someone's identity as a student will contain a different set 
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of standards from her/his identity as a carpenter or parent or artist. These 
collections of standards will overlap or compete to different degrees, which leads 
to the second point. Individuals will have varying degrees of conflict or 
integration amidst their different social identities and this will depend largely on 
the way they relate to these different groups. Third, intergroup dynamics, such 
as perceived threat or status within the wider milieu, determine the extent to 
which one's social identity is relevant for their regulatory behaviors. 
While I argue for the relevance of social identity within self-regulation, 
this is not the primary reason that the concept was developed. During the 1960s 
and 70s, social psychology was working to overcome a crisis of confidence 
rooted in how psychology approached group processes (Elms, 1975). The overall 
approach during this time was to regard social dynamics as amplifications of 
individual psychological processes (Hogg & Williams, 2000). For example, 
prejudice was construed as the manifestation of internal conflicts with overly 
authoritative parents (Adorno, Fenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Stanford, 1950) or 
other unresolved frustrations (Dollard et al., 1939). Tajfel and colleagues 
developed social identity theory as a way to foreground intergroup dynamics as 
psychologically relevant in and of themselves (e.g., Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Their experiments showed 
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how intergroup processes, such as prejudice, emerged as a result of situational 
contexts and behavioral tendencies when people experience themselves as 
connected with one group and not another. 
For example, in these experiments, participants were split into groups on 
the basis of arbitrary criteria, such as the flip of a coin (Billig & Tajfel, 1973) or 
whether they over- or under-estimated the number of dots on a sheet of paper 
(Tajfel et al., 1971). While these group assignments were ostensibly meaningless, 
participants nevertheless favored their in-group members at the expense of the 
out-group. These results held, even when their in-group favoritism did not 
provide any individual benefit to themselves. To explain these responses, Tajfel 
and Turner (1979) argued that people's self-esteem is interwoven with their 
affiliation to particular groups so that supporting the group becomes a way to 
affirm one's self. While current theorists have moved away from the emphasis on 
self-esteem (see Hornsey, 2008; Turner & Onorato, 1999), they retain the basic 
insight that group affiliations constitute a significant aspect of a person's self-
concept. If something as arbitrary as the flip of a coin is sufficient to evoke these 
processes, then how much more salient would someone’s religious identity be? 
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3.2.1 Self-concepts 
 Stepping back from the social dimension for a moment, it is important to 
pin down what I mean by self-concept. There are various interpretative 
frameworks for understanding self-concepts; they can be described as structures, 
systems, schemas, processes, or sets of representations. Drawing from Markus' 
(1977) work, I understand a person's self-concept to be a dynamic knowledge 
structure with information about past experiences, hoped for goals, values, 
heuristics, action plans, relationships, and characteristic traits. This vague 
portrayal of self-concept helps maintain the complexity embedded in our tacit 
and explicit understandings of who we are.  
While intrinsically elaborate, an individual's self-concept plays a crucial 
role in her regulatory behaviors. As Markus and Wurf (1987) note: 
The unifying premise of the last decade's research on the self is that the 
self-concept does not just reflect on-going behavior but instead mediates 
and regulates this behavior. In this sense the self-concept has been viewed 
as dynamic– as active, forceful, and capable of change. It interprets and 
organizes self-relevant actions and experiences; it has motivational 
consequences, providing the incentives, standards, plans, rules, and 
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scripts for behavior; and it adjusts in response to challenges from the 
social environment. (pp. 299-300) 
In other words, a person's self-concepts are tightly interwoven with the 
standards, motivation, self-monitoring, and behavioral changes involved in self-
regulation and self-control (e.g., Molden, Lee, & Higgins, 2013). 
I also follow those researchers who argue that rather than a singular self-
concept we have multiple knowledge structures that comprise our sense of who 
we are (McConnell, Shoda, & Skulborstad, 2012; Oyserman, Elmore, Smith, 
Leary, & Tangney, 2012). Evidence in support of this position comes from a 
growing body of research showing that different social identities have distinct 
goals, motivations, and action tendencies (Browman, Destin, & Molden, 2018; 
Brown & McConnell, 2009; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004; McConnell, Rydell, 
& Brown, 2009). While this multiplicity could be interpreted as distinct contexts 
eliciting different responses from a single executive self (Baumeister & Vohs, 
2014), evidence suggests that these standards, motivations, and habits exist in 
associative clusters (Klein & Gangi, 2010; Kurzban & Aktipis, 2007) indicative of 
distinct self-concepts rather than unique responses from a single self. While it is 
still unclear where debates about multiplicity versus singularity of the self will 
ultimately land, these studies render plausible the idea that functionally 
  
 
133 
independent self-concepts are relevant to regulatory processes. As James 
(1890/1950) argued over a century ago, the plurality within our sense of self is 
intimately connected with our various social roles. 
3.2.2 Social identities 
 Social identity refers to the way someone's self-concepts are formed in 
relation to the groups to which they belong. The relevance of social relationships 
for identity led researchers to initially posit a spectrum along which some self-
concepts were primarily individualistic and others were entirely social (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). This original contrast between personal and social identities led 
Turner and colleagues (1987) to propose a functional antagonism in which the 
salient identity suppresses the other in a hydraulic-like effect. More recent 
theorists, however, have contested this principle of antagonism (e.g., Baray, 
Postmes, & Jetten, 2009; Brewer, 1991; Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002; Roccas & 
Brewer, 2002). Instead, the prevalent position echoes earlier theorists (e.g., 
Markus & Wurf, 1987; Stryker, 1980) who argued that the influence of social 
interactions on all self-concepts blurs the idealized spectrum beyond 
usefulness22.  
                                                        
22. This is largely the position I argued for in the previous chapter. For many of these 
psychologists, the foundation for this position comes from the symbolic interactionists who draw 
  
 
134 
The significant difference, therefore, is not personal versus social identity, 
but which self-concepts are salient in any given situation. This leads to a vision of 
the self as a dynamic process in which different social identities arise and fade 
with every milieu through which the person passes (Turner, 1968). Some of these 
identities are more stable and become persistent across contexts, while others 
will be quite situational23 (Higgins et al., 1982). The various factors that 
determine when and how a person's social identity is salient are complicated, 
and addressing them all is beyond the scope of the current review (Bruner, 1957; 
Oakes, 1987). Amidst this complexity, however, a key determinant is how readily 
accessible the self-concept is within the individual's memory (Hogg & Reid, 
2006). Regular contextual cues are one way that some identities can become more 
accessible than others, but another way that social identities become persistently 
salient is if they are given heightened importance (Oakes, 1987). Through 
habituation, some social identities can become chronically accessible across 
contexts that may contain no overt cues. As we will see below, the heightened 
importance granted to some identities is directly related to the self-assurance 
                                                        
from the pragmatist Mead (1934/2015) to argue that we rehearse and calibrate our various self-
concepts in tune to the reactions of people around us. 
23. This point alludes to the situationism/personality debate we discussed in chapter 1, which 
landed on middle ground allowing for both the importance of stable traits and the influence of 
situational cues. 
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gained through affiliation with that group. For now, the important point is that 
individuals have multiple social identities, some of those identities will be more 
constant across contexts, and when these identities are salient they are deeply 
influential on regulatory processes. 
 Since religious engagement is deeply social, this theoretical perspective 
suggests that religious individuals will have religiously tinged social identities. 
Depending on variables like those mentioned above—e.g., frequency, 
importance—religious identities will vary in the degree to which they are 
persistent and persuasive for individuals. And given the relevance of self-
concepts for self-regulation, these religious identities provide a helpful way to 
reframe the relationship between religious systems and self-regulation. For 
example, one would predict that higher frequency of ritual participation would 
increase the accessibility and salience of a person's religious identity, thereby 
leading the religious groups' norms to be more influential across a broader range 
of contexts. While this is a plausible hypothesis, a lingering question remains: 
since a person's religious self-concept is just one among many social identities, 
why should we expect it to exert a special influence? 
 The most direct answer to that question will come further below, when I 
take up moralization processes. Before we get there, however, we need to 
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contextualize these processes by considering the salient features of a situation 
that draw forth different social identities and the psycho-social processes that can 
make social identities particularly important. 
3.2.3 Intergroup processes 
 An essential part of the dynamic that makes social identities persistent 
and salient is the cognitive process of categorization, which was Tajfel's primary 
research focus before his work on social identity (e.g., Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). 
When we create categories, we tend to amplify the similarities between group 
members and exaggerate the differences between groups. This contrasting 
process occurs in abstract categorizations (e.g., vegetables versus fruits), but is 
especially apparent when the categories are social. This is the psychological root 
of the pervasive tendency to draw us-them divisions (Tajfel 1982; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). At the social level, these distinctions lead 
beyond simple contrasting and are amplified behaviorally into the favoritism 
and denigration effects in the experiments mentioned above.  
Social identity theory argues that drawing and enacting these social 
comparisons is a way of affirming and validating one's own self-concept while 
also gaining a sense of stability and meaning (Hogg, 2016; Hogg & Grieve, 1999). 
In other words, in-group/out-group contrasts are not just a cognitive side effect 
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of the way we create categories, they are motivated processes that are deeply 
interwoven with our sense of who we are. With the goal of maintaining a stable 
and meaningful self-concept, we amplify the positive characteristics of our 
affiliated groups and exaggerate the negative aspects of those groups to which 
we do not belong. It is important to note that these processes are sensitive to 
individual differences– not everyone will experience involvement in a group in 
the same way. For example, Mikulincer and colleagues (2007)  have developed a 
robust research program showing how individual differences in attachment 
styles influence various social processes (e.g., Rom & Mikulincer, 2003). Such 
variance will undoubtedly moderate the relationship between one’s identity as a 
group member, their sense of self as a result, and their enactment of that group’s 
standards, but the overall relationship between social identity as processes of 
self-affirmation is robust enough to be a salient factor within our understanding 
of these dynamics. 
Evidence for this connection between social identity and self-affirmation 
comes from research in terror management theory (TMT). Building off the work 
of Becker (1973), TMT researchers argue that anxiety about death, the ultimate 
form of self-negation, leads people to attach themselves to something that will 
survive beyond them, such as a social group (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & 
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Solomon, 1986). In support of this claim, various studies have found that death 
salience leads people to become more committed to their groups, express more 
prejudice, and become more stringent towards norm violations (see Burke, 
Martens, & Faucher, 2010). These studies suggest that when a person's sense of 
self is threatened, their social comparison processes become amplified in order to 
compensate. Personal existential threats are not the only thing that leads to this 
magnification of social identity; perceived threats at the group level also lead 
individuals to enhance these processes of social comparison (Hogg, 2016). In 
other words, the psycho-social dynamics between perceived threats and 
compensatory self-affirmation undergird many of the social identity processes 
described above.  
 These dynamics highlight how deeply social the process of identify 
formation can be. Not only do we create self-concepts on the basis of our various 
relationships, but the salience and influence of these social identities will 
fluctuate in response to the hierarchies, status, and power differentials present 
within any given social milieu (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For example, the 
enactment of group norms can be a way to solidify social hierarchies that are 
perceived as being threatened, such as when men interrupt women at higher 
rates as power differentials begin to equalize (Jacobi & Schweers, 2017; 
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Zimmerman & West, 1975). The enactment of new norms can also challenge the 
status quo, as exemplified by the adoption of non-violent techniques within the 
civil rights movement (Tajfel, 1974). For the purposes of our inquiry social 
identity theory highlights the psycho-social processes that can powerfully 
motivate regulatory behavior in relation to social standards.  
3.2.4 Religious identities 
 The psycho-social dynamics that influence the salience of social identities 
also shed light on variance in the relationship between religiosity and self-
regulation. If the social milieu elicits an individual's religious identity, then 
she/he will be more likely to embody the prototype of that identity, which acts as 
a heuristic for the group's norms, values, and behavioral tendencies (Hogg & 
Reid, 2006). If the setting ignores or denigrates that identity, then she/he may 
react defensively through a stereotyped enactment of expected religious norms, 
or may acquiesce and shift into the norms of the opposing group. These differing 
responses will depend on the broader social context and the individual's own 
relationship with her/his religious community and tradition. At a social level the 
crucial questions concern power differentials: is the religious group an oppressed 
minority, a dominant majority, or an accepted plurality? At a psychological level, 
the important questions concern an individual's affiliation with her/his group: is 
  
 
140 
she/he securely attached to the group or is she/he ambivalent about that 
affiliation? These differences will determine the degree to which she/he has 
internalized her/his religious identity which will affect the accessibility of that 
identity, its impact on other self-concepts, and its persistence across situations.  
While each of these dynamics will shape the way that religiosity 
influences self-regulation, they are not unique to religious identities. In-group 
favoritism, out-group denigration, and other processes of social contrasting occur 
even in the minimal groups of Tajfel et al.’s (1971) early experiments. Before 
reviewing moralization processes, which I argue are of primary importance to 
the influence of religious engagement on these dynamics, we have to ask 
whether social identity theory reveals a distinct facet of religious identity that 
would account for its influence on self-regulation? 
One promising place to look is TMT. Many researchers within TMT have 
examined the impact of existential threats on religiosity, with most showing that 
reminders of such threats lead to a marked increase in religiosity (Vail et al., 
2010). Reflecting on the blend of religious social support and beliefs in 
supernatural realms, Vail and colleagues (2010) suggest that "religious 
worldviews provide a uniquely powerful form of existential security" (p. 85). 
More generally, there is strong evidence that broad threats, such as natural 
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disasters (Sibley & Bulbulia, 2012) or social turmoil (Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & 
Nash, 2010; Sosis & Handwerker, 2011) lead to increases in religiosity. These 
studies suggest that religious identity may be an especially meaningful way to 
preserve a sense of self in the face of threat. But a recent meta-analysis by Jong 
and colleagues (2018) found heterogenous and weak effects in this association 
between religious identity and existential threats. In other words, Vail et al.'s 
(2010) claim about religion's unique status as a form of worldview defense, 
though intuitive, does not appear to be on firm ground empirically. 
Another place to look for the special salience of religiosity within these 
dynamics is Whitehouse and Lanman's (2014) work on ritual and identity fusion. 
Identity fusion is an extension of social identity theory developed by Swann and 
colleagues (2012) in order to highlight those situations in which an individual's 
personal identity is thoroughly enmeshed or fused with the group. Swann and 
Burhmeister (2015) describe identity fusion as "a visceral sense of 'oneness' with 
the group" in which "strongly fused persons retain their sense of personal agency 
and channel it into pro-group action… [they] regard other group members as 
‘family’ and derive a sense of invulnerability from them" (p. 52). In other words, 
identity fusion describes an extreme form of social identification in which the 
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boundary between the individual and the group collapses, with significant 
consequences for group cohesion and cooperative behavior.24  
Whitehouse and Lanman (2014) argue that religious rituals, particularly 
dysphoric rituals, tend to foster identity fusion. This theory helps to explain the 
prevalence of painful rituals which instill a persisting sense of kinship among 
participants (e.g., Whitehouse et al., 2017). Where religious systems do foster 
identity fusion through dysphoric rituals, we should certainly expect that these 
religious identities would exert a special influence on self-regulation over and 
above other social identities. The problem with this explanation is that most of 
the studies reporting the relationship between religion and self-regulation 
examine WEIRD populations, composed of people who do not typically undergo 
such rituals.25 Nevertheless, this extreme form of social identification raises the 
possibility that other religious rituals, such as those involving synchrony (e.g., 
Fischer, Callander, Reddish, & Bulbulia, 2013; Wen, Herrmann, & Legare, 2016), 
and kinship symbols (Nielbo, 2015), may evoke a particularly strong 
                                                        
24. Cooperative in this sense does not imply "morally good." Indeed, as these researchers show, 
identity fusion can lead people to extreme forms of violence towards out-groups. 
25. Dysphoric is a euphemism for incredibly painful. As Whitehouse and Lanman (2014) share: 
"In Melanesian initiation cults, for example, boys undergoing initiation rites may be extensively 
burned, permanently scarred and mutilated, dehydrated, beaten, and have objects inserted in 
sensitive areas such as the nasal septum, the base of the spine, the tongue, and the penis" (p. 679). 
It is doubtful whether sitting through a long sermon would have comparable effects. 
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identification that can become more persistent and influential than other social 
identities. Though speculative, this unique status for religious identities is 
plausible and generates a series of testable hypotheses, such as: contextual 
religious cues will strengthen the effect that religiosity has on self-regulatory 
behaviors by making the individual’s religious identity, with associated 
standards, more salient; frequency of participation in religious rituals will 
increase the persistence of an individual’s religious identity across a variety of 
domains, predicting a more consistent adherence to religious norms in seemingly 
unrelated social milieus; or experiences of ideological threat will lead to a more 
strict regulation in relation to religious norms. In short, social identity theory 
provides a helpful, though not definitive, framework for explaining how 
religious engagement may impact self-regulation without relying on beliefs 
leading to self-interested restraint. In the discussion so far I have yet to clarify 
what I mean by social norms and why they are particularly relevant within these 
processes—that is the aim of the next section. 
 
3.3 Social norms 
Within social psychology there is a long tradition devoted to studying social 
norms and their influence on behavior. Much of this research derives from a set 
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of psychologists in the 1930s who found that when people make judgments 
about ambiguous stimuli, such as optical illusions, they tend to shift their 
personal opinions to match the group's norm (e.g., Jenness, 1932; Sherif, 1935). 
Since the 1930s, this research flourished and now illuminates the various ways 
norms take root and spread within a group and how these norms become 
effective at shaping the thoughts, emotions, and behaviors of people within that 
group (see Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, 2015). I draw my understanding of norms 
from Kashima (2014; 2015) who defines a norm as "a psychological structure that 
is widespread in a group and predisposes a person to exhibit a regular pattern of 
ideation, emotion, and action" (2015, p. 1307). This definition remains close to the 
way I discussed norms as social habits of expectation and behavior in the last 
chapter, though it helpfully gestures towards the psychological processes 
supporting this tendency towards social habituation. 
 Amidst the complexity of research on social norms, I will focus on those 
aspects that are especially relevant for the relationship between religious systems 
and self-regulation and enjoy broad consensus, such as the research on 
intersubjectivity and imitation. These deep psychological tendencies appear to 
undergird the prevalent social tendency to develop conventional behaviors in 
even the most minimal groups. Because of their integral role within establishing 
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and maintaining norms, the processes of imitation and intersubjectivity are also 
important for constraining, and potentially amplifying, the capacity of religious 
systems to establish patterns of behavior oriented towards social standards.  
 Recalling the section on social identity, we should bear in mind that the 
tendency to create and maintain norms will also be sensitive to the psycho-social 
dynamics spelled out above. An individual's relationship with their group will 
change their tendency to either enact or react against that group's norms. 
Perceptions of threat, either social or existential, will also change an individual’s 
engagement with these norms. Social identity and the enactment of social norms 
are deeply interdependent– for conceptual clarity I focus on each individually, 
but in action they cannot be so easily parsed. Considering the psycho-social 
dimensions of norms alongside the dynamics of social identity sets the stage for 
understanding the moralization processes that I will argue are crucial for the 
relationship between religion and self-regulation.  
3.3.1 Ultimate explanations for norms 
 Before engaging the proximate mechanisms undergirding social norms, it 
is necessary to briefly attend to the ultimate context that shapes these norms. 
Remember that the distinction between these levels of analysis hinges on the 
type of explanations they give (Tinbergen, 1963). Ultimate explanations will 
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describe why social norms would have persisted amidst the processes of 
evolution. Proximate explanations appeal to the mechanisms, psychological or 
biological, that give rise to a particular feature, in this case norms (Bateson & 
Laland, 2013). Most of this section will focus on these proximate mechanisms, but 
it is important to have the ultimate context in mind since it helps highlight the 
intrinsic importance of norms within any group. 
 Gelfand and colleagues (2011) have developed a robust research program 
demonstrating the way social norms correspond to environmental pressures. 
Their strategy is to track variance in the normative "tightness" of different 
groups– the degree to which different cultures expect adherence to social norms 
and punish deviance. For example, what are the range of expected behaviors on 
a public bus? How about in a park or in a market? How severely will you be 
sanctioned if you deviate? Across 33 nations, and across the different US states, 
this research team found that levels of normative tightness increased in response 
to threats faced by these groups (Gelfand et al., 2011; Harrington & Gelfand, 
2014). In other words, the social development of norms and peoples' attitude 
toward those norms appears to be adaptively responsive to ecological and social 
pressures, such as natural disaster vulnerability, numbers of life lost to 
communicable diseases, food deprivation, access to safe water, and population 
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density (Gelfand, 2018). This research stands in contrast to theories suggesting 
that social norms are arbitrary social constructions (Ladd, 2002). 
 These studies advance the research program developed by behavioral 
ecologists over the past 50 years. These are the anthropologists who eschewed 
the post-modern route and continued the legacy of Boas (1887), to a degree26, and 
Steward (1953) more directly. The general strategy within this line of 
anthropology is to study the ways that cultural systems are responsive to local 
ecosystems. For example, turning to religious systems in particular, Sosis (2000; 
Sosis & Bressler, 2003) examined historical evidence showing that religious 
communes that enforced stricter norms were also those communes most likely to 
persist. Sociologists studying religion noted a similar dynamic underpinning the 
growth of conservative and strict churches within the US religious landscape 
(Iannaccone, 1994; Kelley, 1972). Again, the stronger the norms, the more 
                                                        
26. While Boas rejected the application of evolution to the study of culture, his primary objection 
was against the progressivist anthropologists who misused evolution to suggest that European 
culture was the pinnacle of progress towards which all "savages" would eventually develop. 
Boas, rightly, dismissed these theories, so it might seem strange to place him as a predecessor to 
the cultural evolution camp. But the seed of Boas' thought that was later taken up by sociobiology 
and behavioral ecologists is that culture responds to the local environment: "Ethnological 
phenomena are the result of the physical and psychical character of men, and of its development 
under the influence of the surroundings ... 'Surroundings' are the physical conditions of the 
country, and the sociological phenomena, i.e., the relation of man to man" (Boas, 1887, p. 588). 
Boas goes on to say that this study of the surroundings is insufficient by itself, but that 
anthropologists must also consider the history of a group and the other groups with which it has 
come into contact. Boas's inspiring vision for anthropology was differentiated into a variety of 
disciplines. Those that took up the study of 'surroundings' were largely the cultural ecologists. 
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persistent the community. Other research only bolsters the relevance of this 
dynamic for religious systems. In a later study, Sosis and colleagues (2007) found 
that the extent to which a cultural group engaged in warfare predicted the 
costliness of male initiation rituals within that group. And using a phylogenetic 
approach, Watts and colleagues (2015) provide evidence that these associations 
are not just correlational– more strict beliefs about supernatural punishment for 
norm violations appear to have driven changes in political complexity among 
Austronesian cultural groups. Much of this research is interpreted within the 
theoretical framework of cultural evolution—strict social norms provide a form 
of costly signaling that prevents free-riders from taking advantage of group 
benefits without contributing (Sosis & Alcorta, 2003)—but they remain ultimate 
explanations because they are oriented towards the persistence of a biocultural 
feature, in this case normative tightness, amidst evolutionary change.  
 For our present purposes, these ultimate explanations for social norms 
keep us attuned to the evolutionary forces that shape the norms relevant for self-
regulation. Just as the research from social identity theory showed how group 
norms are responsive to intergroup dynamics (Hornsey, 2008), this research from 
Gelfand and colleagues (2017), along with the behavioral ecologists, 
demonstrates how these social standards are also influenced by broader 
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ecological pressures. This ultimate perspective helps us recognize that the norms 
by which individuals regulate are not arbitrary constructions relative to each 
group. Instead, these standards, their pervasiveness, and their enforcement, have 
an evolutionary history tied to the functions they provide for a group.27  
 This evolutionary background influences the connection between these 
social standards and self-regulation because certain contexts will demand a 
stricter adherence to and enforcement of social norms. Gelfand's research 
theorizes that this tightness of social norms corresponds to stronger individual 
self-regulation (Gelfand et al., 2011; Gelfand et al., 2017). For example, if stricter 
norms reliably predict better self-regulation, then we should expect that those 
individuals within the tight religious groups that Iannaccone (1994) and Sosis 
(2000) studied, would have better regulatory capacities than their peers in less 
strict contexts. Given the way that norms and their strictness are responsive to 
ecological pressures, we should also expect that the different groups will 
establish norms that correspond to the level of threat or precariousness the group 
experiences. For example, given the systemic violence and marginalization faced 
                                                        
27. As I noted with cooperation above– it is crucial to recognize that a norm being "functional" 
does not imply that such a norm is morally good. Such false inferences are versions of the 
naturalistic fallacy that justifies how things ought to be on the basis of how they are (Hume, 
1751/1998). 
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by African American communities within the US (e.g., Alexander, 2012; Muñoz et 
al., 2015), African American churches may demonstrate tighter social norms and 
their members may have stronger self-regulatory skills than individuals within 
white evangelical churches. These specific hypotheses illustrate how ultimate 
explanations for social norms reframe the relationship between religious systems 
and self-regulation in a more social context. However, Gelfand’s theory about the 
relationship between normative tightness and self-regulation requires stronger 
empirical support; for now, it remains a tentative hypothesis capable of guiding 
future research. 
 While helpful, these explanations for the ultimate origins of social norms 
do not shed light on the proximate mechanisms that lead to the development of 
norms and the dominant theoretical framework that I am arguing against focuses 
exclusively on the proximate level of explanation. In order to frame the 
importance of social norms within the relationship between religious 
engagement and self-regulation, we must now turn to this proximate level. 
Many psychological processes are involved in the establishment, 
persistence, and influence of social norms. Among the various proximate 
explanations for norms, intersubjectivity continually emerges as a foundational 
psychological process necessary for the awareness of and engagement with social 
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norms. The widespread and persistent tendency of individuals to imitate the 
behaviors of those around them is a related, but conceptually distinct process 
that is also essential for the development of conventional behaviors within a 
group. Not only do these psychological tendencies help explain why social 
norms emerge, they also point our attention to important individual differences 
in who perceives norms and experiences them as forceful. For example, as 
discussed below, those whose capacity for intersubjective processing is impaired 
are significantly less likely to orient in relation to conventional norms, which has 
important consequences for their regulatory skills as well. Given their important 
role in the persuasive efficacy of social norms, these psychological processes are 
critical to consider in the psycho-social dimensions of the relationship between 
religious engagement and self-regulation. 
3.3.2 Proximate perspectives– Intersubjectivity 
 Intersubjectivity refers to the complex capacity of people to recognize and 
engage others’ unique mental states. Some psychologists call this ability 
"mentalizing" while others use "theory of mind," a phrase Premack and Woodruff 
(1978) coined as the capacity to impute mental states—including but not limited 
to "purpose or intention, beliefs, thoughts, knowledge, likes, guesses, pretence, 
promising and trusting" (p. 515)—to oneself and others. Intersubjectivity is also 
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an important concept in psychoanalytically oriented research, which adopts a 
more relational approach to the concept, defining intersubjectivity as the capacity 
of mutual recognition (Benjamin, 1990; 2014; Stern, 1985). This perspective is 
attuned to the challenge of differentiation as a child develops a sense of self 
amidst awareness of others and their subjectivity. More broadly within this 
school of thought, intersubjectivity is a theoretical framework for acknowledging 
and studying “the field of intersection between two subjectivities, the interplay 
between two different subjective worlds” (Benjamin, 1990, p. 34). Through this 
section I will take an approach to intersubjectivity that draws more from 
cognitive psychology than this tradition. But this work helpfully highlights 
mature forms of intersubjectivity, in which individuals do not simply absorb the 
surrounding norms, instead they can recognize and respond to the subjective 
states of others from a personal and stable position. The capacity to hold such a 
mature, differentiated, position is another individual difference that modulates 
the impact that social norms will have on regulatory behaviors. 
Turning back to the cognitive psychological work on intersubjectivity, 
research since Premack and Woodruff (1978) has continued to focus on 
populations where this capacity might be impaired in order to study its distinct 
processes. For example, Call and Tomasello (2008) revisit Premack and 
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Woodruff's (1978) initial question —does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 
— with new evidence to argue that primates likely understand other's mental 
states in terms of perceptions and goals, but not necessarily beliefs or desires. 
While some of the research on theory of mind has been conducted with an aim 
towards understanding the cognition of primates (see Tomasello, 2014), a 
separate strand of research focuses on autism. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 
(1985) were among the first to suggest that the behavioral and social tendencies 
associated with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) may derive from an 
impairment in "being able to conceive of mental states: that is knowing that other 
people know, want, feel, or believe things" (p. 38). More recent research on 
autism maintains the central role of mentalizing deficits in ASD while 
recognizing a broader array of other cognitive and affective processes 
undergirding the diverse manifestations of ASD (Dant, 2015).  
 The importance of intersubjectivity for social norms and self-regulation is 
presented most clearly within Tomasello's (2008; 2014; 2016) work on the 
evolutionary origins of human thought, morality, and sociality. For Tomasello, 
intersubjectivity is a crucial foundation for all of these other cognitive and social 
capacities, but intersubjectivity itself is not basic– instead it is the culmination of 
many other psychological processes. For example, Tomasello and Vaish (2013) 
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argue that mentalizing by itself is insufficient for supporting the development of 
social norms. Mentalizing would be necessary for any intensely social primate to 
navigate the challenges of their social hierarchy and group, and we accordingly 
find this capacity for theory of mind in most social primates (Tomasello, 2016). 
But recognizing the thoughts of others is not the same as engaging with those 
thoughts in a mutually recognized space. For most primates, mentalizing 
remains a lonely endeavor. In order to psychologically arrive at social norms, 
humans also engage at the level of shared intentionality. In addition to mere 
mentalizing, shared intentionality involves joint awareness of mental states and 
cooperation premised upon that mutual awareness: e.g., Rasheed recognizes: 1) 
that Sophie has mental states and 2) that she also reflexively knows that Rasheed 
has mental states and 3) with this mutual awareness both are willing to share 
attention and create collaborative goals and action plans. Tomasello and 
colleagues (2005) describe the constellation of psychological capacities necessary 
for shared intentionality "dialogic cognitive representations." I use the term 
intersubjectivity to refer to the process in which all of these capacities are 
enacted.28  
                                                        
28. This rough sketch of mentalizing and shared intentionality is just an initial taste of the 
complexity within the various cognitive processes necessary for such a seemingly simple thing as 
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 These cognitive capacities are essential for establishing social norms. In 
the following long passage, Tomasello and colleagues (2005) discuss how our 
abilities understand others' intentions and beliefs and to form a joint 
intentionality with shared goals provide the foundation for social norms and 
regulation:  
Dialogic cognitive representations pave the way for later cognitive 
achievements that may be called, very generally, "collective intentionality" 
(Searle 1995). That is, the essentially social nature of dialogic cognitive 
representations enables children, later in the preschool period, to 
construct the generalized social norms (e.g., truth) that make possible the 
conceptualization of individual beliefs and, moreover, to share those 
beliefs. Sharing beliefs is responsible for the creation of social-institutional 
facts such as money, marriage, and government, whose reality is 
grounded totally in the collective practices and beliefs of a social group 
conceived generally (Tomasello & Rakoczy 2003). Importantly, when 
children internalize generalized collective conventions and norms and use 
them to regulate their own behavior, this provides for a new kind of social 
                                                        
playing a game together. The simplicity and fluidity with which we exercise all of these complex 
capacities speaks to the deep automaticity of our enactment of social norms. 
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rationality (morality) involving what Searle (1995) calls ‘desire-
independent reasons for action.’ (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 684).  
In other words, social norms, experienced as both institutional facts and 
internalized morality, depend on our ability to recognize the intentions, beliefs, 
and motivations of others, along with our desire to regulate our actions in 
relation to this shared reality. Since I am arguing for the social character of self-
regulation, then intersubjectivity is a crucial component of regulatory behavior as 
it undergirds both the capacity to internalize shared goals and the motivation to 
pursue those goals.29 
 If my general hypothesis about the deeply social character of self-
regulation is true, then the relevance of intersubjectivity for regulation should 
extend well beyond social standards, also impacting what might otherwise seem 
                                                        
29. Researchers discuss this set of shared goals, beliefs, intentions, and motivations as part of a 
group's "common ground." The phrase has a complex philosophical history, drawing from 
Stalnaker (1970) and an older set of concepts including Lewis' (1969) use of common knowledge 
and Schiffer's (1972) mutual belief. The essential component of common ground for psychological 
work on social norms is given by Clark (1996): "Two people's common ground is, in effect, the 
sum of their mutual, common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions" (p. 93). This concept 
therefore extends beyond intersubjectivity to include the broader set of shared assumptions 
within a group (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010). In other words, the 
concept of common ground is similar to the socially constructed reality described by social 
theorists in chapter 3 (see Kashima, 2014). Tomasello (2014) convincingly argues that shared 
intentionality in particular, and intersubjectivity in general, precede the capacity of two or more 
individuals to establish a common ground. Therefore I focus on those processes while 
recognizing the theoretical importance of the more expansive common ground established within 
a group. 
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to be personal forms of regulation. In support of this claim, a large body of 
research among children with ASD shows that deficits in intersubjectivity are 
deeply interwoven with difficulties exercising self-regulation, especially 
emotional regulation and executive functioning (e.g., Gomez & Baird, 2005; 
Jahromi, Bryce, & Swanson, 2013; Loveland, 2005). Importantly, however, these 
regulatory difficulties do not appear to impact delayed discounting among 
children with ASD (Demurie, Roeyers, Baeyens, & Sonuga-Barke, 2012), which 
underlines the importance of differentiating self-regulation as more than just 
self-control. These differences also suggest that intersubjectivity will primarily 
influence motivational and goal-specific aspects of self-regulation, especially 
insofar as the goals and motivations are social or emotional.  
 Intersubjectivity is clearly important for self-regulation, but does it shed 
new light upon the relationship between religion and self-regulation? At first 
glance, intersubjectivity appears to be quite relevant for religiosity. Various 
studies suggest that individuals with ASD report significantly lower levels of 
religiosity (Caldwell-Harris, Murphy, Velazquez, & McNamara, 2011), and 
empirical work from Norenzayan, Gervais, and Trzesniewski (2012) found that 
deficits in mentalizing mediate this relationship (see Banerjee & Bloom, 2013; 
Barrett & Keil, 1996; Caldwell-Harris, 2012; or for a counterargument see 
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Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015). While this evidence suggests 
that intersubjective processes are related to religiosity, most of this research is 
aimed at explaining religious belief. In other words, intersubjectivity is taken to 
be analytically prior to religiosity. It remains possible that this association works 
both ways, such that certain religious practices and beliefs are both supported by 
and amplify an individual's tendency to mentalize and engage in collective 
intentionality (see Gervais, 2013). If that were the case, then increases in 
intersubjective processing could offer a plausible mediating variable that helps to 
explain the influence of religiosity upon self-regulation: if religious participation 
increases intersubjective processing, then it might also increase attunement to the 
regulatory norms of the group and, ultimately, the religious person’s capacity for 
self-regulation. Though obviously tentative, this hypothesis is both plausible and 
testable.  
 While provisional as a mediating variable, considering intersubjectivity 
nevertheless keeps us attuned to certain dimensions of religious engagement that 
are relevant for self-regulation. Many of the theorists just mentioned (e.g., 
Banerjee & Bloom; Norenzayan et al., 2012) emphasize the way theory of mind 
may lead to belief in anthropomorphic supernatural agents. In contrast, 
Tomasello's (2016) and other's (Chiu et al., 2010) work on the relationship 
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between intersubjectivity and social norms points our attention to a Durkheimian 
possibility– that the relationship between religiosity and intersubjectivity is 
rooted in experiential access to a shared sense of reality with a transcendent 
normative and moral force. This is the perspective motivating our engagement 
with moralization below, but we have one more stop before we get there. 
3.3.3 Proximate perspectives– Conventionality 
 According to Tomasello (2014; 2016), the evolutionary utility of 
intersubjectivity is primarily grounded in its capacity to coordinate behavior 
towards instrumental ends. But as intersubjectivity extends into the creation and 
endorsement of social norms, it also begins to facilitate behaviors that are not 
directly instrumental. While seemingly extraneous, these non-instrumental 
conventional norms are the warp and weft of social reality. As such, research on 
the establishment and dynamics of conventional actions provides substance to 
our understanding of social norms and integrates these norms more clearly with 
the work on social identity. The psychology of conventional behavior is a crucial 
component of the psycho-social foundation of social identity and social norms, 
and, as such, is necessary for understanding moralization. 
 Drawing from the work of Legare and colleagues (2015), instrumental 
actions are those whose causal basis and goals are apparent, or at least knowable. 
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For example, preparing food for dinner is causally knowable to a learner because 
all steps of the process have a theoretically clear and direct explanation: "add the 
onions first so that as they soften they release sugars, creating an umami flavor 
base. Once they're soft add the garlic, which does the same thing but more 
quickly, which is why we add it second…" Conventional behaviors on the other 
hand are causally opaque. They are performed in a particular way for no reason 
other than "that is the way it is done." Preparing food for a ritual, for example, 
will follow specific and often strict steps, but the mechanisms by which the ritual 
is taken to be effective remain obscure30 (see Legare & Souza, 2012). Most of the 
work on conventional behaviors takes place among researchers interested in 
social learning, which analyzes the way information is shared among individuals 
rather than having to be learned solely from experience (Hoppitt & Laland, 
2013). As such, the distinction between these types of behavior depends 
primarily on the perspective of the learner. By foregrounding the learner, this 
approach to parsing behavior reveals important differences concerning when 
                                                        
30. Since this distinction depends on understanding causal mechanisms, it may appear to be 
biased towards a scientific worldview and discounting non-naturalistic explanations as causally 
opaque. Such a critique broaches much larger discussions about naturalism and scientific inquiry. 
For our purposes, causal opacity means that the mechanisms by which an action is understood to 
be effective are intrinsically inaccessible to observers from different perspectives, even if they 
"make sense" emicly. 
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people innovate and when they are more likely to follow what has always been 
done. 
 While the distinction between instrumental and conventional actions may 
seem to be splitting hairs, it is supported by an extensive body of research on 
how children learn new behaviors. Within this work, a persistent finding is that 
children tend to over-imitate adult models (Over & Carpenter, 2012). For 
example, Nagell, Olguin, and Tomasello (1993) found that children faithfully 
copy an adult's inefficient use of a rake to retrieve a reward, even when the more 
effective use was apparent. Chimpanzees on the other hand would readily flip 
the rake over to capture the reward. Similarly, Horner and Whiten (2005) found 
that 3 and 4-year-old children copied every action an adult model performed to 
open a box to retrieve a reward, even when it was clear that some of these actions 
were unnecessary. As before, in the same experiment chimpanzees tended to 
omit the unnecessary steps. This tendency of human children to faithfully 
replicate instrumentally useless behaviors is found across many studies and is 
generally taken to be the seed of social norm development (e.g., Claudière & 
Whiten, 2012; Legare et al., 2015; Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011; Whiten, 
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). 
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 This tendency of children to over-imitate is more nuanced than simply 
copying whatever adults do. For example, some studies show that children do 
not copy actions that are clearly mistakes (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998) 
or if the actions do not achieve the intended results (Meltzoff, 1995). In these 
cases, it seems that the decision to imitate is primarily goal-oriented; in other 
words it is still instrumental (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000). Over and 
Carpenter (2012), however, argue that the apparent contradiction between 
imitation directed at convention versus function can be explained by considering 
the social functions of imitation. For example, children are more likely to over-
imitate if they are primed with ideas of social exclusion (Over & Carpenter, 2009; 
Watson-Jones, Legare, Whitehouse, & Clegg, 2014), or if the model is 
prestigious31 (Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012). 
 In other words, children's tendency to over-imitate conventional behaviors 
appears to primarily serve affiliative functions (Legare & Watson-Jones, 2015; 
Over & Carpenter, 2012). This reiterates the social identity dynamics highlighted 
above. Our tendency to conform in both opinion and action begins at an early 
age (Haun & Tomasello, 2011), is consistently influenced by social context and 
                                                        
31. "Prestigious" in these experiments means that other people involved in the study pay more 
attention to the individual. Children are highly sensitive to these subtle social indicators and tend 
to follow the person that others are attending to. 
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relationships (Nielsen & Blank, 2011), and functions as a way to mark our 
identification with a particular social group32 (Legare et al., 2015). Further 
illustrating the social function of conventional behaviors, children readily 
assume that normative rules apply to others within their group and actively 
enforce these norms through sanctioning behavior (Haun, van Leeuwen, & 
Edelson, 2013; Rakoczy, Brosche, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2009). Even more 
remarkable, children only protest about norm violations when the violator was 
part of the in-group (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012). Collectively these 
studies suggest that conventional behaviors are deeply connected with the group 
dynamics–e.g., the creation, maintenance, and influence of social groups—
highlighted by social identity theory.  
                                                        
32. Further emphasizing the intuitive pull towards imitation and conformity within a group, 
research in social psychology continually demonstrates that we tend to prefer and trust 
individuals who are similar to us. This includes extending trust on the basis of such arbitrary 
similarities as sharing letters in surnames (Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & Mirenberg, 2004), or vocal 
pitch and amplitude (Gregory, Webster, & Huang, 1993). Imitation and conformity are not only 
useful for indicating affiliation, but also provide effective ways to build social cohesion. As 
Henrich (2015) and others (e.g., Chudek, Zhao, & Henrich, 2013; Engelmann, Over, Herrmann, & 
Tomasello, 2013) have argued, these tendencies towards imitation and conformity are likely 
rooted in a deep evolutionary social history. By preferentially interacting with unknown persons 
who seem similar to themselves, people increase the probability that these strangers will be 
bound by the same unwritten rules, sanctions, and reputations. In other words, the psychological 
preference for conformity acts as a strategy for increasing the likelihood that a stranger will be a 
reliable collaborator. This point is essential for the dynamics of cooperation, so we will turn to it 
in depth in chapter 7. 
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 Not only do conventional behaviors lie at the convergence of social 
identity theory and social norms, there is also preliminary evidence that 
engaging in these behaviors increases other self-regulatory skills. With children 
in Slovakia and Vanuatu, Rybanska and colleagues (2018) tested the different 
impacts on delay of gratification skills of engaging in socially stipulated 
behaviors versus instrumental behaviors. The experiment involved all of the 
children regularly playing games in small groups over a three-month period. For 
children in the conventional condition, the instructions for the games were 
accompanied with phrases like "'it has always been done this way' or 'those are 
the rules and they must be followed'" (Rybanska et al., 2018, p. 352). In contrast, 
when instructions for kids in the instrumental condition were accompanied with 
phrases to trigger goal orientation, like "'if we do it this way, we will learn how to 
dance,' 'if we do it this way, we will learn about different animals'" (Rybanska et 
al., 2018, p. 352). After three months of regularly playing these games and 
hearing these instructions, children were given a delay of gratification task, one 
they had also completed at the beginning of the three months. All children 
showed improvement, but those who were part of the conventional group had a 
significantly larger improvement than those in the other groups (Rybanska et al., 
2018, p. 354). This seems to confirm Gelfand and colleagues' (2011; 2017) 
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theoretical suggestion that social norms promote better self-regulation, but why 
did this improvement occur? 
 Rybanska and colleagues (2018) argue that engaging in conventional 
behaviors demanded more executive functioning—necessary when attending to 
strict sequential steps, remembering them, and inhibiting other behaviors—than 
instrumental behaviors, which are more flexible. In their analysis they found that 
increases in executive function did mediate the relationship between 
conventional behaviors and improvements in delaying gratification (Rybanska et 
al., 2018, p. 354). While this is a plausible explanation for their results, it is not 
clear that engaging in conventional behaviors more broadly would require more 
executive functioning than instrumental behaviors, especially since conventions 
are often internalized and abidance occurs automatically (Cheng & Chartrand, 
2003; Chiu et al., 2010). Furthermore, Rybanska and colleagues' (2018) measure of 
executive functioning was another game, the Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders task 
(Ponitz, McClelland, Matthews, & Morrison, 2009). This game requires working 
memory and response inhibition, but the children's adherence to the rules could 
also be supported by the same imitative processes fostered by conventional 
behaviors more broadly. This alternative explanation is not mutually exclusive 
with the possibility that conventional behaviors increase executive functioning. 
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Instead, it suggests a mediating link between conventional behaviors and 
regulation that would remain plausible in those more general cases of automatic 
abidance by conventional norms. Regardless of whether conventional behaviors 
lead to conformity, executive functioning, or some combination of the two, this 
study provides empirical support for the connection between normative 
conventions and self-regulation. 
 While the interdependence between conventional behaviors, social norms, 
and self-regulation is apparent, even if not fully articulated, the relevance of 
religion for these dynamics is once again less clear. Similar to the work on 
intersubjectivity as a foundation for religious beliefs, theorists argue that our 
tendency to infer and abide by conventional behaviors undergird religious 
rituals (e.g., Legare & Watson-Jones, 2015). These theorists draw from Durkheim 
(1912/2008) and Rappaport (1999) to argue that religious rituals are an 
elaboration of more general conventional behaviors and that they play a special 
role in fostering group cohesion necessary for large scale cooperation in 
anonymous societies (Hill, Wood, Baggio, Hurtado, & Boyd, 2014; Norenzayan et 
al., 2016). While well supported by evidence, these explanations occur at the 
ultimate level– religions promote rituals and conventional behaviors because 
those religions that did promote these behaviors tended to survive and thrive by 
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fostering group cohesion (Watson-Jones & Legare, 2016). As we saw with 
intersubjectivity, these explanations are aimed at answering why religious rituals 
occur in the first place.  
 These studies do not exclude the possibility that participating in religious 
rituals may strengthen the tendency to abide by the conventional norms of a 
group. As Rybanska and colleagues (2018) demonstrated and Gelfand et al. 
(2017) have theorized, this increased participation in conventional norms may 
enhance other self-regulatory capacities as well. Therefore, from a social 
perspective we cannot rule out the possibility that religiosity impacts self-
regulation by facilitating an increased engagement with conventional norms, but 
currently the causal links in this argument are too tentative to offer this as a 
strong possibility. Instead, there is a more plausible and direct explanation. 
Rather than increasing participation in conventional behaviors, religious systems 
likely influence the way that individuals relate to this conventional reality. 
3.3.4 Social norm summary 
 In the last chapter we surfaced the hypothesis that social norms act as 
important standards within self-regulation and that the affiliative functions of 
norms also impact an individual's motivation for engaging in regulation. In this 
section I reviewed some of the psycho-social dimensions of social norms and 
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social identity that shape and constrain these processes. Henrich (2015) helpfully 
summarizes many of these points:  
Over our evolutionary history, the sanctions for norm violations and the 
rewards for norm compliance have driven a process of self-domestication 
that has endowed our species with a norm psychology that has several 
components. First, to more effectively acquire the local norms, humans 
intuitively assume that the social world is rule governed…The violation of 
these rules could and should have negative consequences. [This] means 
that, at a young age, we readily develop cognitive abilities and 
motivations for spotting norm violations and avoiding or exploiting norm 
violators, as well as for monitoring and maintaining our own reputations. 
Second, when we learn norms we, at least partially, internalize them as 
goals in themselves… internalizations may provide a quick and efficient 
heuristic that saves the cost of running the mental calculations that 
consider all the potential short- and long-term benefits and probabilistic 
penalties of an action; instead we simply follow the rule and abide by the 
norm. (pp. 188-189)  
Henrich's summary helps draw together the threads from this section so far. 
Intersubjective capacities equip us to access and navigate the conventional norms 
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of our group. These norms, in turn, act as standards by which we regulate in 
order to demonstrate and maintain our affiliative identities. The maintenance 
and monitoring of these affiliations is a strong motivator for regulation– 
emerging early in childhood and persisting throughout our lives. We readily 
conform to the norms we absorb from our group in order to maintain our 
affiliations within that group.  
 Throughout this review the persistent question has been whether religious 
participation would influence these processes of social identity and norm 
formation more than participation in any other group. I surfaced the possibilities 
that religious systems lead to a uniquely strong identification with the group and 
that they amplify our innate tendencies towards intersubjectivity or conformity. 
While these hypotheses are worth testing, a more plausible explanation is that 
religious systems change the way that people relate to the conventional norms of 
their group. In order to clarify this claim, we finally turn to moralization 
processes. 
 
3.4 Moralization 
 Among researchers working on social norms, a common distinction is 
made between descriptive and injunctive norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren 
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1990; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). Descriptive norms are 
simply what most people do, while injunctive norms refer to behaviors that 
receive social approval or disapproval (Cialdini et al., 1990). While there is a 
degree of overlap and congruence between these norms (Brauer & Chaurand, 
2010), the theoretical distinction is nevertheless helpful because it points to 
different ways that norms can influence behavior. Descriptive norms are useful 
from an information processing perspective because imitating what most people 
do is often a sensible and efficient guide for behavior. Injunctive norms, on the 
other hand, motivate behavior by keeping an individual aware of social sanctions 
that they will incur if they deviate from what ought to be done (Cialdini et al., 
1990).  
 While conceptually distinct, there is evidence that two types of norms 
readily influence one another (Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, 2015). For example, 
people soften their injunctive judgments of socially undesirable behavior if the 
behavior is widespread (e.g., Trafimow, Reeder, & Bilsing, 2001). Similarly, 
neuroimaging evidence suggests that deviating from a majority opinion, a 
descriptive norm, activates the same neural networks in the amygdala related to 
threat detection, which anticipate the punishment of violating an injunction 
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(Berns et al., 2005). In other words, people readily infer what ought to be done on 
the basis of what is done and vice versa.  
Descriptive and injunctive norms are also jointly effective at guiding 
behavior and accordingly have become influential parts of public health 
campaigns to curtail college drinking (Halim, Hasking, & Allen, 2012; Rimal & 
Real, 2005), reduce gambling (Larimer & Neighbors, 2003), and encourage more 
recycling (Schultz, 1999). While both are influential guides for behavior, evidence 
suggests that descriptive norms act as a default– when individuals are under 
cognitive load, they defer to descriptive norms if there is any discrepancy 
between the two types (Jacobson, Mortensen, & Cialdini, 2011; Kredentser, 
Fabriger, Smith, & Fulton, 2012; Yam et al., 2014). Other significant dynamics, 
such as social identity, influence the interaction between descriptive and 
injunctive norms as well (see Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 
2007).  
 For our purposes it is also necessary to distinguish between an 
individual's perception of these norms and their personal attitudes. For example, 
drawing from work by Tankard and Paluck (2017), "I support same-sex marriage" 
as an individual's attitude is different from the perceived descriptive norm that 
"most US citizens support same-sex marriage." Underwriting the influence of 
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social norms, research suggests that perceived norms are better predictors of 
behavior than underlying attitudes (Paluck, 2009; Tankard & Paluck, 2017). For 
example, Paluck (2009) found that a radio soap opera in Rwanda substantially 
changed listeners perceptions of descriptive norms about prejudice and violence 
without impacting their personal beliefs on these matters. These shifts in 
perceived norms led to behavioral changes such as more open expression about 
sensitive topics, increased cooperation, and more active negotiations within the 
community, even in the absence of attitude change (Paluck, 2009). 
 This creates a complex field for understanding someone's actions. There 
are plenty of situations in which an individual's personal attitudes will shape his 
behavior, but if the descriptive norms within his group shift, then he is likely to 
follow these social tides even if he has not yet changed his mind33. Similarly, a 
group may inscribe a new injunctive rule, but if this rule conflicts with the 
descriptive norms of the group, then the new norm is unlikely to take hold. This 
is not to say that social change does not occur; if key figures within the group 
shift their behavior to abide by new norms, then this change will ripple through 
the social network, changing perceptions of the norm and increasing the general 
                                                        
33 Individual differences will also moderate these dynamics. For example, a highly differentiated 
individual may be aware of the changing descriptive norms but nevertheless act in accord with 
her own personal standards. 
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abidance (e.g. Paluck & Shepherd, 2012). If this was not complex enough, these 
dynamics are also shaped by the character of an individual's association with 
their group and that group's place within the overall social context. For example, 
if a person is strongly attached to her religious group and she perceives her 
group as under attack by the wider culture, then even if descriptive and 
injunctive norms shift in the wider context, she will likely enact her group's 
norms even more strongly, say for instance by refusing to sign same-sex marriage 
licenses.  
 At this point it is not apparent where moralization fits within this complex 
terrain. Rather than describing how moral attitudes provide strong guides for 
people's behavior, these studies suggest that it is actually perceived descriptive 
norms that rule the day. This poses a critical problem for theories suggesting that 
religious systems influence self-regulation by providing clear moral standards 
for behavior (Zell & Baumeister, 2013)– taken alone, moral injunctions are 
relatively impotent. Regarding religious beliefs about morality as isolated 
representational injunctions neglects the broader social context that determines 
when such moral injunctions become effectual. Descriptive conventions may be 
the most persuasive influence on behavior, but their dominant influence is only 
detectable when there are discrepancies between descriptive norms, injunctive 
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standards, and personal attitudes. In many situations these psycho-social forces 
cohere, and when they do our behavior proceeds quite fluidly. This is where 
moralization enters the picture. 
 Morris and Liu (2015) describe moralization as the process by which 
descriptive regularities become injunctive oughts. That is, conventional 
regularities about what people typical do become internalized as moral attitudes 
and injunctive norms about what people ought to do. This process is related to 
the permeability between descriptive and injunctive norms mentioned above 
(e.g., Berns et al., 2005), and, as I will describe below, the process can be 
individually or socially instigated. For our present purposes, the important point 
is that moralization creates coherence between perceptions of what people 
typically do and what they ought to do. Rozin's (1999) work on moralization also 
suggests that moralized norms are more likely to be internalized, become central 
aspects of the self, and be deliberately passed across generations than other 
norms (see also Brandt & Rozin, 2013). When individuals internalize a norm as a 
moral ought, instead of just a descriptive convention, this norm also carries an 
extra motivational force– personal deviance generates shame or guilt (e.g., 
Savani, Morris, & Naidu, 2012) and others violating the norm engenders disgust 
or anger (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). This emotional force is the topic of 
  
 
175 
the next chapter. Here, the crucial point is that moralization processes tend to 
create coherence between descriptive conventions, injunctive oughts, and 
personal attitudes.34 When people relate to their group's norms in this way, those 
norms become powerful standards for regulation exceeding the force of 
conformity alone. 
3.4.1 Horizontal moralization 
 There are two primary dimensions along which the moralization process 
varies. The first dimension is horizontal– people vary in the extent to which they 
moralize everyday behaviors. For example, most people agree that behaviors 
around harmfulness or fairness are morally laden (Graham et al., 2011), but what 
about sleeping past your alarm, taking the elevator up a single story, or packing 
late for a trip? Each of these behaviors is taken from Lovett, Jordan, and 
Wiltermuth's (2012) moralization of everyday life scale, which assesses the 
                                                        
34. To describe moralization as a movement towards coherence is not to say that people always 
experience this coherence. Individuals will have highly personal attitudes about right and wrong 
that vary from the conventions and rules of their group. Such personal moral positions can be 
pivotal sources for social change. 
The preceding analysis, however, suggests that these highly personal moral stances have some 
social origin (likely from encounters with a different group), and that acting upon them will be 
difficult unless one is able to build a new coalition in which the norm can take root. In cases 
where the group is unlikely to change and the personal attitude persists, I would predict that the 
individual will likely disaffiliate. 
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degree to which people see more quotidian actions and situations as morally 
laden.35 
 To understand variation in this tendency to moralize across situations, 
Lovett and colleagues (2012) parse the different moral domains into concerns 
about deception, harm, laziness, failure to do good, body violations, and disgust 
(p. 251). A different attempt to classify moral domains is offered by Graham and 
Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2007; Haidt, 
2013). MFT draws from a social functional perspective to argue that there are at 
least five domains organizing moral thought, norms, and actions: harm, fairness, 
loyalty, authority, and purity (Haidt, 2013). As with Lovett et al.'s (2012) scale, 
people vary in the degree to which they endorse these different concerns, but 
Haidt and colleagues argue that this variance is not random (Haidt & Graham, 
2007). Harm and fairness seem to be primarily oriented towards protecting 
individuals and are more readily endorsed by politically liberal people. Loyalty, 
authority, and purity, on the other hand, appear to serve collective binding 
functions, which conservatives tend to endorse and liberals tend to oppose 
                                                        
35. This scale asks individuals to judge others' actions rather than their own. One could object 
that this is an inaccurate index of moralization, but research shows that these judgments strongly 
relate to one's own personal moral standards and motivations (Stoeber & Yang, 2016; Yang, 
Stoeber, & Wang, 2015). 
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(Graham et al., 2011). This is a relatively new research terrain, so there are 
debates about how many domains there are and how to organize them (e.g., 
Curry, 2016; Suhler & Churchland, 2011), whether results are generalizable to 
more diverse populations (Davis et al., 2016) and whether all of the moral 
domains reduce to different conceptions of harm (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014; 
Schein & Gray, 2015), to name a few (for responses see– Graham, 2015; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2011; Koleva & Haidt, 2012). While engaging and important, most of 
these debates are tangential to our current inquiry.  
Regardless of whether researchers converge on moral domains based on 
individualistic versus binding social functions (Haidt, 2013), evolutionary 
cooperative challenges (Curry, 2016), elaborations of harm (Gray et al., 2014), or 
some other framework (Lovett et al., 2012); my primary question concerns 
whether religious engagement would lead individuals to treat more norms as 
morally laden or not. This is not to say that the content of religious moral 
concerns is irrelevant– it will clearly be important to consider whether 
individuals who are religious are more likely to endorse some domains over 
others. But the more basic dimension I am referring to concerns the extent of 
moralization: are religious individuals more likely to consider more behaviors as 
morally charged than other individuals?  
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 Theoretical arguments suggest that religious systems engage a broad 
range of moral domains (Graham & Haidt, 2010; 2012), but few empirical studies 
connect religiosity in general with pervasive moralization. Graham et al. (2009) 
found that different religious communities tended to differ in the moral 
foundations they endorsed. This has been confirmed and nuanced by Davis et al. 
(2016) who showed that the association between religiosity and conservative 
moral intuitions may be unique to white US populations. Johnson et al. (2016) 
furthered the argument by showing that there are important individual 
differences beneath the umbrella of religiosity. For example, holding a literal vs. 
metaphorical view of religious scriptures predicted the endorsement of different 
moral concerns over and above political leanings (Johnson et al., 2016, p. 59). 
These studies on religiosity and moralization lend plausibility to the hypothesis 
that religious individuals moralize to a broader extent than their nonreligious 
peers. 
 For now, I flag this tendency to moralize conventional norms as one 
pathway through which religious engagement may shape an individual's 
relationship with social norms. Importantly, as noted above, when conventional 
norms become internalized as morally laden they evoke strong emotional 
responses to deviance, which increases individual commitment and abidance 
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(Hosey, 2014). In other words, pervasive moralization would have direct 
consequences for regulatory behaviors as well.  
3.4.2 Vertical moralization 
 People also differ in the degree of force they give to injunctive norms. This 
is the vertical dimension of moralization. For example, Goodwin and Darley 
(2008) asked people whether they regard statements such as "Robbing a bank in 
order to pay for an expensive holiday is a morally bad action" (p. 1343) as true, 
false, or an opinion. Regarding the moral judgment as true or false, versus an 
opinion, demonstrates a degree of objectivism– the moral value of the situation is 
not relative, it is a knowable part of reality. Goodwin and Darley (2008) also 
assessed the way people regard disagreement over moral judgments– it is 
possible to regard a moral judgment as true or false but still consider that truth to 
be relativistic. A stronger form of objectivism does not tolerate disagreement over 
moral judgments. These two aspects create a spectrum along which people can 
be more or less objective regarding moral judgments. This variation is distinct 
from horizontal moralization. Rather than turning conventional behaviors into 
injunctive norms, objectivism takes what are already considered injunctive 
norms and gives them a firmer status. Rather than being relativistic opinions, 
some oughts are regarded as objective and certain truths. 
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 The process by which moral concerns become unimpeachable truths can 
be assessed in a variety of ways. Some researchers, such as Goodwin and Darley 
(2008; 2012), examine whether a moral behavior is perceived as relative or 
objective. Using such a measure, Wainryb and colleagues (2004) found that 
children tended to become more relativistic regarding preferences and 
ambiguous beliefs as they got older, but regardless of age they continued to 
consider moral judgments objective (see also Nichols & Fold-Bennett, 2003). 
Other researchers explore this vertical dimension by assessing whether people 
engage in utilitarian or deontological reasoning about moral issues (Piazza & 
Landy, 2013; Piazza & Sousa, 2014). Utilitarian thinking assesses moral situations 
in terms of the consequences of actions, while deontological reasoning is based 
on moral rules that are regarded as an objective feature of reality.36  
The classic test of these different meta-ethical positions is the trolley 
problem. First emerging in the 1960s and 70s (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976), the 
gist of this dilemma is that a runaway trolley that is about to kill five people who 
are stuck on the tracks, but you have the option to save them. Saving them, 
however, would require you to kill another person. There are many varieties of 
                                                        
36. Importantly, these researchers are not making philosophical claims in support of either meta-
ethical position. Instead they are studying how and when individuals employ each type of moral 
thinking when they reason about morality. 
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this dilemma and some critiques (see Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014), 
but it effectively illustrates the difference between utilitarian reasoning, kill one 
to save five, and deontological thinking, killing is wrong regardless of the 
outcome. This conceptual difference also shows up neurologically– Greene et al. 
(2001; 2004) found that increased emotional processing corresponded with the 
likelihood of engaging deontological moral reasoning (though see Kahane, 2012). 
For now, the point is that this tendency to assess the morality of a scenario in 
terms of an inviolable rule rather than a utilitarian outcome is analogous to the 
objectivism described above– both see moral truths as parts of reality that are 
inalterable, regardless of opinions or judgments about them. 
 A third way to think about this vertical dimension of moralization is 
through research on sacred values, which are those issues around which people 
are unwilling to negotiate (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007; Tetlock, 2003). 
For example, Ginges and colleagues (2007) found that if people were offered 
material incentives to compromise on certain issues (in this case regarding the 
Palestinian/Israeli conflict), then, rather than negotiating, some people became 
even more entrenched in their position. In other words, if a norm had become 
sacralized, then attempts to change someone's position only led them to hold 
their position more strongly. The moral norm is not only an objective part of 
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reality, it is inviolable (see also, Atran & Ginges, 2012; Baron & Spranca, 1997; 
Graham & Haidt, 2012). When individuals reason about sacralized norms, they 
engage the same neural networks as those involved in reasoning about norms 
that are treated as deontological (Berns et al., 2012). 
 Further empirical work is needed to differentiate these processes of 
vertical moralization. For example, it is plausible that perceiving a moral norm as 
an objective part of reality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
sacralizing that norm as inviolable. Regardless of how they are ultimately 
determined, each of these processes point to a vertical dimension of moralization 
along which conventional norms are not just transformed into injunctive oughts, 
they are further enshrined as objective and/or inviolable parts of reality. Given 
the vehemence of reactions when Ginges and colleagues (2007) attempted to 
negotiate around these norms, we can expect that this vertical dimension of 
moralization has strong downstream effects for self-regulation.  
 Importantly, religious engagement also appears to be deeply interwoven 
with this tendency towards objectifying or sacralizing norms. Across three 
experiments Goodwin and Darley (2008) found that individuals who grounded 
their moral judgments in a religious system were the most likely participants to 
be objectivists. Piazza and colleagues (2012; 2013; 2014) found religiosity to 
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reliably predict deontological reasoning about morality, even when controlling 
for other factors like disgust sensitivity or preference for intuitive thinking. 
Young, Willer, and Keltner (2013) nuance this general association with evidence 
that religious fundamentalism may be a primary driver in the relationship with 
objectivism. Researchers on sacred values also repeatedly find that religiosity, 
measured by frequency of participation in religious rituals, predicts individuals’ 
likelihood of sacralizing behaviors. Sheikh and colleagues (2012) found that not 
only was ritual participation correlated with the likelihood to sacralize, but 
priming individuals with reminders of religious rituals causally increased the 
tendency to sacralize.  
3.4.3 Moralization summary 
 As relatively new fields of research, there is still important work to be 
done in delineating the boundaries and entailments of moralization. The vertical 
and horizontal dimensions I propose are deeply interwoven, but conceptually it 
helps to distinguish the process of broadly turning conventional behaviors into 
morally laden actions, from the tendency to ground these moral judgments in an 
objective and inviolable sense of reality. The conceptual distinction is also 
supported by the neurological evidence cited above, which illustrates distinct 
cognitive systems engaging objectified norms (Berns et al., 2012; Greene et al., 
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2001). Regardless of where these distinctions are ultimately drawn, the evidence 
is strong that religious engagement influences each of them. Beyond the general 
association between religiosity and moralization, individual differences in 
fundamentalist stances (Johnson et al., 2016; Young et al., 2013), participation in 
ritual (Sheikh et al., 2012), and religious ideology (Davis et al., 2016; Graham et 
al., 2009) all shape the way that individuals relate to norms. 
 These associations do not imply that moralization processes are only 
influenced by religious systems. The tendency towards pervasive moralization is 
mediated by individual differences, such as disgust sensitivity and empathic 
concern (Koleva, Selterman, Kang, & Graham, 2014). Moralization is also subject 
to the same psycho-social dynamics as other norms. For example, Goodwin and 
Darley (2012) found that people were more likely to treat norms as objective 
when the norms were perceived as being widely conformed to within the group. 
Sheikh and colleagues (2012) found that people were more likely to sacralize 
beliefs if they felt that their in-group was being threatened (see also Jetten, 
Postmes, McAuliffe, 2002; Wan, Torelli, & Chiu, 2010). Moralizing conventional 
norms also acts as a buffer against general forms of insecurity, such as epistemic 
uncertainty (Chao, Zhang, & Chiu, 2010; Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000) 
and existential uncertainty (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 
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1997; Greenberg, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1995). Finally, one of 
the most persistent findings is that the salience of a moral norm is a key 
determinant of behavioral outcomes (Cialdini, 2011). This salience may be 
prompted by situational cues; it might also depend upon how deeply embedded 
the moral norm is within an individual's social identity. In other words, even 
though religious engagement shapes moralization processes, this influence never 
occurs in isolation– it will always be partially determined by the way broader 
social contexts evoke and constrain different aspects of our psychology.37 
 While other psycho-social dynamics influence moralization, the evidence 
that religious engagement shapes this process remains substantial. As such, I 
argue that moralization provides a highly plausible explanatory route connecting 
religious engagement with self-regulation. Current theories argue for the 
importance of religion's injunctive oughts—such as the Ten Commandments—in 
                                                        
37. With these psycho-social forces in mind, it is also important to question religiosity may be 
shaped by these same processes rather than influencing their enactment. Supporting this 
objection, individuals do tend to report higher levels of religious commitment when experiencing 
existential and social threats (Kay et al., 2008; Sibley & Bulbulia, 2012; Vail et al., 2010), and the 
need for cognitive closure correlates with more rigid adherence to moral norms and religious 
fundamentalism (Gribbins & Vandenberg, 2011; Saroglou, 2002). But other evidence suggests that 
this is not so simple. Piazza and Sousa (2014) controlled for such potential psychological 
confounds as disgust sensitivity or preference for intuitive thought, and religiosity still reliably 
predicted the tendency to objectify moral decisions. Sheikh and colleagues (2012) found that 
rather than being explained away by social factors like out-group threats, religiosity amplified 
the effect these forces had on sacralization. Instead of explaining away the role of religiosity in 
these dynamics, the collective bulk of evidence suggests that these psycho-social dynamics are 
deeply reflexive; they shape and are shaped by religious engagement. 
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order to provide clear standards for regulation and self-control (Laurin & Kay, 
2016; Zell & Baumeister, 2013). But the research on social norms suggests that 
these injunctive standards are ineffectual without the foundation of perceived 
descriptive norms and the force of internalized moral attitudes. Undeniably 
religious systems contain clear standards for behavior, but in order for these 
standards to persuasively guide self-regulation, they must be moralized. As we 
will see in the next chapter, once these injunctive norms are moralized, they gain 
the motivational force of emotion compelling regulation. As we saw above, 
moralized norms can also gain the seriousness of a sacred rule, which forestalls 
considerations of deviation. While descriptive norms retain their influence on 
behavior, the evidence above and elsewhere (e.g., Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; 
Hosey, 2014) suggests that the integration of descriptive conventions, injunctive 
standards, and moral attitudes exerts a powerful pull on self-regulatory 
behaviors and self-control. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter described some of the basic psychological processes that were raised 
by religious studies scholars in chapter 2. Most of the reviewed research confirms 
the social dynamics anticipated by Durkheim and company, but it also adds 
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some important nuances that help us generate more specific predictions about 
the psycho-social dimensions of the relationship between religiosity and self-
regulation. 
Work on social identity theory highlights the way affiliation acts as a basic 
motivation for many behaviors– we often regulate in order to index the groups to 
which we belong (or hope to belong) and to create boundaries. Given the strong 
pull of affiliative demarcation, work on social identities and self-regulation 
suggests that different contexts will evoke different motivational needs, which 
will determine the strength or likelihood of regulatory adherence by the group’s 
standards. Social identity approaches also suggest that people navigate multiple 
social identities, which will vary in their salience and persistence. This variation 
will largely be determined by the quality of an individual's association with their 
group. For example, identity fusion suggests that the more deeply an individual 
is connected to their group, the more coherence exists between their social 
identity and personal identity, leading to a more persistent relevance of that 
social identity (and its associated motivation and behavioral tendencies) across 
situations. This stream of research raises the hypothesis that religious systems 
influence self-regulation by fostering a strong identification which leads an 
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individual's religious identity and its associated norms to be more salient and 
persistent across contexts. 
In order to fully articulate the relevance of social identity for self-
regulation, I turned to research on the establishment of social norms and how 
they help groups to cohere. This work highlighted the basic psychological 
processes of intersubjectivity and imitation, which likely precede both religiosity 
and self-regulatory capacities. As noted above, however, a strictly linear model of 
this relationship distorts the ability of cultural systems, such as religions, to 
reflexively shape these psychological processes, thereby encouraging deeper 
modes of collective intentionality and conventional participation. Religious 
systems may partially emerge as elaborations of these basic psychological 
tendencies, but participating in these systems may also reflexively habituate 
intersubjective processes and/or imitative tendencies, with downstream effects 
for self-regulation.  
Examining our innate tendencies to conform turned our attention to the 
pervasiveness of conventional behaviors and how these behaviors become 
engrained and reinforced by our social identities. Initial evidence from Rybanska 
and colleagues (2018) suggests that the simple act of participating in these 
conventional behaviors boosts what may otherwise appear to be individualistic 
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capacities to delay gratification. In other words, conventional norms may not 
only guide behaviors through conformity, they may also have auxiliary effects on 
self-regulation more generally. To understand how and why such influences 
might occur, along with the specific relevance of religiosity, we turned to 
moralization processes. 
Within work on social norms, researchers draw a basic distinction 
between descriptive and injunctive norms. Descriptive norms refer to what 
people typically do, while injunctive norms are those behaviors that evoke social 
approval or sanctioning. There are plenty of situations in which these norms 
conflict, both with each other and with an individual's personal attitudes or 
beliefs. When such conflict occurs, descriptive norms continually emerge as the 
most reliable guides for behavior. However, moralization processes can integrate 
these norms and personal attitudes, so that conventional regularities become 
injunctive oughts and internalized moral attitudes. When injunctive standards 
are imbued with the weight of moralization, they will carry a particularly strong 
influence on self-regulatory behaviors. 
 The impact of moralization on self-regulation motivates the hypothesis 
that religious systems impact regulatory behaviors by leading individuals to 
more pervasively moralize across different domains and to grant moral norms 
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the extra imperative weight of objectivity or sacralization. Substantial evidence 
already suggests that various forms of religious engagement influence 
moralization in both ways. At present, however, further research is required to 
assess whether these moralization processes mediate the relationship between 
religiosity and self-regulation. In chapter 5, I will test this mediation hypothesis. 
Throughout the preceding review, we have seen evidence that moralized 
norms are effective guides for regulatory behavior. Why is this so? The answer to 
that question is complex, but a growing body of research demonstrates that 
much of the behavioral efficacy carried by moralized norms occurs through 
emotional processes. These processes have popped up during the review above– 
for example, disgust sensitivity and empathic tendencies appeared as important 
determinants of how likely people were to abide by normative behaviors. In the 
next chapter we will take up these emotional processes directly, as they clarify 
the psychological processes through which religious engagement shapes self-
regulation.  
 As noted throughout, each of these fields of research is massive and 
complex beyond the material I was able to cover within this survey. In this case, 
sacrificing depth for breadth is necessary in order to surface the constellation of 
psycho-social forces at play within the relationship between religious 
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engagement and self-regulation. We could have simply focused on the 
moralization processes just mentioned, but the norms around which people 
moralize are subject to their own dynamics and these normative processes are 
influenced by affiliative motivations. Thus, we gain a broader social perspective 
on the relation between religious engagement and moralization: religious 
individuals may indeed be more likely to moralize and thereby self-regulate, but 
this relationship will be shaped by their sense of belonging in their religious 
group, which also will be shaped by social context and whether they perceive 
external threat or are actively working to demonstrate their affiliative strength. 
Social identity, normative tendencies, and moralization processes are each 
relevant for the relationship between religiosity and self-regulation. Only by 
holding them all together can we appreciate the contrast between this way of 
construing the relationship and the current model, in which religious beliefs 
provide injunctive standards for behavior, along with supernatural rewards for 
compliance. Instead we see a rich social fabric woven through interactions that 
shape an individual’s sense of who they are, where they belong, and what is 
good and bad. 
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Chapter 4– Valleys in the motivational landscape 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters worked to shift the way we understand the regulatory 
standards that religious systems endorse. Rather than seeing these standards as 
injunctive oughts—i.e., moral dictates that individuals restrain themselves to 
abide by—the picture emerged of norms that are deeply social, tied to one's sense 
of identity as a religious individual, and thereby enacted as a social index. This 
view of standards led us to the argument that religious systems work to entrench 
particular norms so that they become perceived as moral imperatives instead of 
conventional regularities. Within this chapter I turn from examining the 
character of these regulatory standards to consider the psychological processes 
that make these standards persuasive and effective guides for behavior. In other 
words, this chapter will deal with the motivation undergirding self-regulation. 
Throughout this dissertation, motivational processes have played a tacit 
role. For example, abiding by group norms to enact social identity is intrinsically 
motivated by our need to affirm our sense of self and feel that we belong. The 
motivational pull of self-affirmation will shift depending on social context; for 
example, it is especially attuned to the presence of perceived social or existential 
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threats, and is also heavily dependent on the quality of an individual's affiliation 
with her/his group. While this pull towards self-justification figured prominently 
within the last chapter, it is just one aspect of motivation. If I am advocating for a 
social perspective on regulatory standards, it is necessary to characterize the 
other social dimensions of motivation in order to clarify the ways in which moral 
norms exert their regulatory force.  
In this chapter I argue that an overemphasis on the role of religious beliefs 
has obscured the significant ways that the symbolic and actual relationships 
embedded within religious systems shape an individual's emotional experiences 
of the world. These emotional experiences involve immediate appraisals of 
situations and direct forms of feedback that reliably guide one's response to a 
situation in light of the broader social context. I will discuss these processes in 
depth throughout this chapter, but first it is important to return to the 
perspective on motivation that currently prevails in the literature on religion and 
self-regulation, which we reviewed briefly in chapter 1. 
Laurin and Kay (2016) separate their explanations for religions' impact on 
self-regulation into skill-based and motivation-based accounts. There are two 
main points to be drawn out from their motivation-based explanations. First, 
they adopt a perspective on motivation that is heavily dependent on cost-benefit 
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analyses: "self-control comes not only from a person's absolute ability to exert it 
but also his or her analysis of the costs and benefits of doing so" (Laurin & Kay, 
2016, p. 313).38 This homo economicus, or rational choice perspective on human 
behavior is a favorite whipping boy of social scientists and humanities scholars, 
so I will not rehearse their critiques except to say that it is a limited perspective 
on what motivates action at the proximate level39 (see Kahneman, 2003; Sen, 
1977). By framing motivation as cost-benefit analysis, Laurin and Kay (2016) are 
committed to a specific perspective on what elements of religious systems would 
impact this analysis. In particular they suggest:  
From a motivational perspective, religion provides more or less clear ideas 
about what kinds of behaviors will receive divine reward. As a result, 
religion may motivate people to engage their self-regulatory efforts in 
moral domains, or domains that they believe God will reward. (p. 316) 
Not to belabor the point, but they go on to articulate the specific ways that belief 
in divine rewards interacts with the other beliefs within a religious system:  
                                                        
38. A reminder— in their review Laurin and Kay conflate self-control and self-regulation; so 
when they say self-control here, they are not using it to refer only to that subset of regulatory 
behaviors which require the active restraint of prepotent impulses. It is an open question whether 
self-control in this specific sense and self-regulation in a broader sense are activated by different 
motivational processes. 
39. There is still good reason, however, to believe that such "rationality" emerges at the ultimate 
level of selection. Game theoretic perspectives on natural selection depend on this idea. 
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the concept of divine reward can reinforce any religion's specific moral 
code, motivate people to avoid violating that code and, to the extent that 
people believe in a predictable interventionist God, bolster their sense of 
contingency, which can encourage motivation across all domains. (p. 317) 
While these quotes focus on religious beliefs, Laurin and Kay (2016) do go on to 
tentatively explore how religious behaviors could also shift motivational 
tendencies. These behaviors, however, are still framed by the overall 
commitment to cost-benefit analysis; exercising restraint either increases one's 
perception of her or his capacity, thereby driving down the sense of cost, or 
causes cognitive dissonance in which the presumably unpleasant religious 
behavior is justified by increasing the perceived value of the reward (p. 317). In 
short, Laurin and Kay's account for why religious systems will motivate self-
regulation is focused on the way that particular beliefs about divine incentives, 
and behaviors enacted in relation to those divine rewards, shift the motivational 
cost-benefit analysis enough to make it worth abiding by moral dictates. All this 
is a complicated way to say that religious people self-regulate in order to buy 
supernatural goods. 
This could be the case, and for some extrinsically motivated religious 
individuals it likely is. But the previous chapter raises the question of whether 
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this is a complete or even sufficient account of religion's impact on motivation. 
Recall Atran and Ginges' (2012; Ginges et al., 2007) work in which certain norms 
were deeply resistant and reactive to utilitarian bargaining– if these norms are 
still subject to cost/benefit analyses, then the analysis is being done with an 
utterly different set of symbolic costs and rewards. These symbolic costs/benefits 
often de-center the individual self as the arbiter of what counts as a cost and 
benefit and instead place that judgment at the feet of the group. This inverts the 
traditional cost/benefit calculus and undermines the theoretical efficacy of that 
self-centered frame of analysis for understanding motivation.  
If the moral standards endorsed by religious systems are established 
through processes of social affiliation, as I argued in the preceding chapter, then 
motivation may be less about particular beliefs shifting rationalistic incentive 
structures and more about religious systems inculcating an acceptance of these 
moral standards as a way to be part of the symbolic community. By itself, 
however, the claim that moral standards are normative social conventions is not 
sufficient for arbitrating between these two interpretations of motivation. It 
could be that this social perspective just implies that the rewards are more 
immediate, rather than forestalled in the afterlife; the reward of belonging to a 
group can still be self-centered. But, there is a fundamental motivational 
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difference between treating a relationship as a means to an end and regarding 
that relationship as an end unto itself. In the religious context, Allport and Ross 
(1967) drew this distinction fifty years ago: extrinsically religious individuals are 
motivated to be religious in order to gain some other benefit, such as social 
connections; intrinsically religious individuals are religious for its own sake40. 
Recall from chapter 1 that the bulk of evidence suggests that it is intrinsic modes 
of religiosity, not extrinsic orientations, that are associated with better self-
regulation (e.g., Bergin et al., 1987; Bouchard et al., 1999; Hosseinkhanzadel, 
Yeganeh, & Mojallal, 2013; Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Klanjšek et al., 2012; McClain, 
1978). This evidence poses a serious problem for theoretical explanations that 
suggest religious engagement motivates self-regulation through extrinsic means, 
such as promised rewards. 
Building from the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, I argue that in order to 
understand the motivational force that religious engagement exerts on self-
regulation, we have to recognize the ways that some religious adherents view 
regulating by religious standards as an end unto itself, not a means towards 
                                                        
40 Allport and Ross’ (1967) distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations has 
been a mainstay within the psychology of religion, but there are other religious orientations as 
well, including but not limited to religious questing (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a; 1991b) or 
fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992).  
  
 
198 
some other reward. Pairing this perspective on motivation with the accounts of 
social identity and moralization developed in the previous chapter, our 
analytical attention turns to the way that religious engagement shapes adherents’ 
emotional experiences. As I will argue throughout this chapter, emotions are 
deeply social, intrinsically motivational, and undergird the moralization process. 
Therefore, drawing emotions into view helps us recognize that beliefs about 
divine rewards are just one thread of a much richer motivational fabric that 
religious (and other cultural) systems weave. Understanding how these emotions 
guide motivation will also reflexively help us articulate those features of 
religious engagement that we should expect to influence both moralization and 
self-regulation.  
4.1.1 What is an emotion? 
 If I am going to spend the chapter discussing the importance of emotions 
within the relationship between religiosity and self-regulation, then I better be 
clear about what I mean by emotions. Adopting a prevalent stance among 
psychologists, my understanding of what constitutes an emotion draws from the 
two major theorists, Lazarus (1982; 1991) and Frijda (1986). There are two main 
components within this conception of emotion. 
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The first component is that emotions are appraisals of events or situations. 
Building from work by Magda Arnold (1960), Lazarus (1991) remains one of the 
most prominent figureheads for the position that emotional responses depend on 
minimal cognitive appraisals. By appraisals, Lazarus (1991) means an 
interpretation of a situation's goal relevance– i.e. whether it is goal congruent or 
incongruent. This cognition of goal relevance does not need to be conscious or 
conceptual in order to give rise to an emotion. Instead it highlights the way that 
emotions arise from changes in the relationship between an individual and their 
environment which the individual registers as significant.  
By arguing for the necessity of this minimal cognitive content, Lazarus, 
and subsequent appraisal theorists (see Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), 
distinguish themselves from other theorists, such as Zajonc (1980; 1984; 2000) 
who suggest that affect precedes and does not require any cognitive activity. At 
the other theoretical extreme, even though Lazarus (1991) emphasizes the 
necessity of cognitive content for emotion, appraisal theory remains distinct from 
Schachter and Singer's (1962) two-factor model of emotion, which suggests that 
emotions are a combination of diffuse physiological arousal and a cognitive label 
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for this arousal.41 Situating appraisal theory amidst the various other conceptions 
of emotion is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is worth noting that it 
occupies a balanced middle-ground. The part of Lazarus' (1991) theory that I rely 
on is that emotions emerge from a minimal, conscious or non-conscious, 
cognitive interpretation of a situation as pertinent to one's concerns. 
The second component within my understanding of emotion comes from 
Frijda's (1986) work on the action tendencies associated with emotions. Frijda's 
(1986) position is committed to the view that emotions are functional in a 
Darwinian sense (Frijda, 2003). While this view emphasizes the responses that 
emotions motivate, it is harmonious with appraisal theory since these action 
tendencies are shaped by the goal relevance of the eliciting situation. As Frijda 
(2003) explains:  
Emotions can roughly be regarded as motivators for the behavior meant 
to deal with the emotional event… The best characterization of what they 
aim at is the production of relational behavior; that is, they motivate 
                                                        
41. Schachter and Singer's (1962) theory of emotion provides the empirical basis for Proudfoot's 
(1987) argument that there are no simple religious experiences– instead, he suggests, these 
experiences are differentiated and labeled by the person within a unique social context. While 
this makes intuitive sense, the problem is that Schachter and Singer's (1962) empirical results 
failed replication efforts (e.g., Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979). This makes Proudfoot's (1987) work a 
revealing case study in interdisciplinary efforts within religious studies– ideally demonstrating 
the need for rigor, not the impossibility of such efforts. 
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behavior meant to maintain or modify a particular kind of relationship 
with the environment. (pp. 133-134). 
Frijda (1986) is not the only theorist to argue that a key aspect of emotions is their 
capacity to elicit functional behaviors– for example, within attachment theory 
sorrow is framed as a motivator for recuperative behaviors (Bowlby, 1969/1999). 
Importantly, the functional action tendencies that emotions motivate are not 
solely based on individual interests– instead they often serve social functions. 
For example, anger likely serves an important role in stabilizing cooperation 
within groups (e.g., van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2014). I will discuss 
these prosocial dimensions of emotion below. For now the primary point to draw 
from Frijda's (1986) work is that emotions motivate action tendencies that are 
directed by the appraisal of the eliciting event. 
Combining these two components, my conception of emotions is deeply 
functional. Emotional responses depend on appraisals of an individual's 
relationship with her/his environment and this appraisal occurs quickly and 
often unconsciously as a positive or negative evaluation. This emotional response 
then elicits a behavioral response that flexibly seeks to either maintain the 
current relationship, if the appraisal is largely positive, or adjust to remedy the 
source of any negative appraisal. From this theoretical perspective, emotions 
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play a prominent role in the monitoring and maintenance of goals. Therefore it is 
a short step to posit their importance in motivating regulatory processes.  
The perspective I am advancing, which posits the importance of emotional 
responses for motivating self-regulation, is distinct from two other dominant 
perspectives on emotion and self-regulation. Within Carver and Scheier's (1998; 
2016) model of self-regulation, affect serves as an index of whether or not 
regulatory efforts are successful. In other words, you attempt to reduce the 
discrepancy between your current and desired states, and if you succeed then 
you will experience positive affect and if you fail you will experience negative 
affect. This is a crucial role of emotion, but it risks misplacing emotion as 
primarily subsequent to regulation. As we will see throughout this chapter, there 
are many times when one's emotional response occurs prior to and determines 
one's attempt at regulation. 
Other theoretical perspectives see emotions primarily as a target of 
regulation. For example, Gross' (1998; 2015) account of emotional regulation 
construes it as a subset of self-regulation in which the goals are affective:  
Emotion regulation refers to shaping which emotions one has, when one 
has them, and how one experiences or expresses these emotions…Thus 
emotion regulation is concerned with how emotions themselves are 
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regulated (regulation of emotions), rather than how emotions regulate 
something else (regulation by emotions). (Gross, 2015, p. 6) 
No doubt people actively regulate their emotional experience: we call friends to 
help get out of a bad mood, or breathe deeply to overcome the nervousness of 
public speaking. While drawing a sharp distinction between emotional forms of 
self-regulation and others may be helpful for research purposes, it also risks 
obscuring the way that emotional regulatory capacities shape other forms of self-
regulation. For example, as we will see below, the capacity to modulate one's 
experience of temptation likely determines their capacity to resist that 
temptation. 
In contrast to Gross' (2015) sharp distinction, other accounts of emotional 
regulation see it as the primary mode of self-regulation. For example, Skowron 
and colleagues (Skowron, 2000; Skowron & Friedlander, 1998; Skowron, Holmes, 
& Sabatelli, 2003) draw on Bowen's family systems theory (Bowen, 1978; Kerr, 
1984) to develop a perspective on self-regulation that is composed of an 
individual's emotional reactivity and her or his capacity to maintain a sense of 
self (Skowron et al., 2003). As noted in chapter 1, there is already a substantial 
body of research showing that this form of self-regulation impacts the ways in 
which someone is religious (Jankowski & Vaugh, 2009) and mediates the 
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relationship between religiosity and various other psychological and social 
outcomes, such as mental health, social justice commitment, or intercultural 
competence (e.g., Sandage & Jankowski, 2010; 2013; Sandage, Jankowski, 
Bissonette, & Paine, 2017). This understanding of self-regulation as deeply 
emotional and relational is closer to that which I am advancing in this chapter.  
But my own understanding of emotional regulation is somewhere in-
between Gross' (2015) and Skowron et al.'s (2003) accounts. I believe it is 
analytically useful to distinguish the capacity to modulate one's emotions from 
the capacity to pursue other goals, so long as we keep their mutual relevance in 
sight. Since emotions involve initial appraisals of situation, I will argue that this 
emotional regulatory processes are most often crucial antecedent motivators for 
other regulatory efforts. Importantly, I also understand emotional regulation to 
include both the explicit modes of managing emotions, such as those of interest 
to Gross (2016), and the implicit ways that emotional responses may be 
habitually modulated, which we will discuss below. 
Since I am discussing the ways that religious systems may shape 
emotional responses, this inquiry is also bumping up against debates about the 
universality (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, 1992) versus the socially 
constructed character of emotions (e.g., Lutz, 1988). My position within this 
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debate is moderate. Arguing for the universality of emotions helps to highlight 
their evolutionary histories and functions, but risks oversimplifying the cultural 
differences in experience, expression, and interpretation of emotions. While these 
cultural differences are apparent and should be accounted for within 
experimental designs (e.g., Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver, & Barrett, 2014), 
overstating the relativity of emotions risks obscuring their common functional 
dimensions. The foregoing conception of emotions as involving both appraisals 
and behavioral responses is flexible enough to permit vast cultural differences—
in what situations are considered goal relevant and what responses are 
effective—while preserving functional commonalities that are likely to emerge 
from universal evolutionary challenges, such as maintaining cooperation 
partners without exploitation.  
Adding emotion to my theoretical framework continues my trend of 
incorporating wildly complex topics in order to clarify a simpler point. I do this 
because the terrain between the individual and social is wildly complex and we 
do it a deep injustice when we simplify it to meet the demands or limits of our 
inquiry. Throughout this dissertation I have been advocating a different method– 
one in which we do not need to fully understand these psycho-social dynamics 
in order to appreciate their influence. In other words, I do not need to completely 
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explain the nature of emotion in order to recognize its importance within the 
relationship between religion and self-regulation. Instead, I merely need to 
demonstrate that it is important. That is sufficient to broaden our explanatory 
scope away from sole dependence on a rational construal of religion as a system 
offering divine rewards and motivation as sensitive to these rewards.  
4.1.2 An example 
 In a recent study, Lamm and colleagues (2017) took the classic 
marshmallow test to Cameroon. After becoming familiarized with the setting, 76 
Nso preschoolers were offered a puff-puff, a local doughnut, and then told it was 
theirs to eat, but if they waited until the assistant came back into the room, then 
they would receive a second puff-puff. The assistant then left for 10 minutes, 
unless the child ate the treat, at which point the assistant returned and test was 
completed. This is pretty much the normal set-up for this test. What is not 
normal is that nearly 70% of the Nso children waited. Eight of them even fell 
asleep while waiting (Lamm et al., 2017, p. 6). So much for temptation. 
The surprising nature of this result is driven home by the fact Lamm and 
colleagues (2017) ran the same test with 125 German preschoolers, though they 
were offered lollipops or chocolate instead of puff-puffs. Only 28% of the 
German preschoolers held out for the second treat (Lamm et al., 2017, p. 6). This 
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significant difference was not just a matter of the different treats– all the children 
wanted the treat when it was first presented and eagerly ate the treats at the end 
of the test. Instead, the difference seems to come down to the way the different 
children waited. The German kids tended to try and use distraction behaviors, 
such as turning away or singing in an attempt to avoid thinking about the treats. 
They also showed more negative arousal, such as frustration or anger. In 
contrast, the Nso children did not attempt to distract themselves, nor did they 
express frustration with the situation– they simply waited.  
Why am I beginning the chapter with this example? This study illustrates 
two critical points that this chapter will elaborate. First, it shows the crucial role 
that emotional regulation plays within self-regulatory tasks. I will discuss 
emotional regulation more fully below, but within this study it determined the 
different reactions the children had to the desirable treat. The German children's 
tendency to be excited by the treat and frustrated by their inability to have it 
immediately led them to deploy distraction behaviors in an unsuccessful attempt 
to handle the negative emotions and wait. Lamm and colleagues (2017) argue 
that the Nso children's lack of frustration indicates that "[they] had more success 
in down regulating negative emotions or might have experienced fewer negative 
emotions" (p. 8). In other words, the emotions these children experienced and 
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how they handled them were a significant determinant of whether or not they 
successfully waited.  
Second, this study helps to explain why the Nso children may have 
developed more effective emotional regulatory capacities. Lamm and colleagues 
(2017) interviewed the mothers of children about their socialization goals and 
watched how they interacted with their children. Nso mothers tended to 
emphasize goals of respect, obedience, and social harmony, while adopting a 
parenting style that directed the child's activity with highly structured exchanges 
(Lamm et al., 2017, p. 12). German middle-class mothers on the other hand 
emphasized socialization goals oriented towards psychological autonomy, such 
as developing and expressing interests and preferences. Their parenting style 
tended to let the children initiate activity within a minimally structured setting 
(p. 13). In short, the different capacities to regulate their emotions and behaviors 
seem to develop in response to these different socialization goals and habits. 
4.1.3 Where we are headed 
 One study does not prove the case. Instead of being a decisive experiment, 
this study acts as a helpful example for orienting the following review. I have 
been building the argument that religious engagement can change peoples' 
relationship to the norms that are prevalent within their affiliative networks. At 
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the end of the last chapter we arrived at the research on moralization as a 
description of this changed relationship. In this chapter I will argue that the 
morally injunctive weight that makes such norms persistent and persuasive 
guides for behavior is primarily emotional. The study by Lamm and colleagues 
(2017) helps to reveal the critical role that emotional processes play within the 
broader scope of self-regulation. This chapter will extend this point to argue that 
self-regulatory outcomes are often decided within the emotional response to a 
situation, not by any subsequent capacity to restrain or inhibit.  
Furthermore, these emotional responses and the capacity to manage them 
are both trainable. Throughout the preceding review we saw how the 
relationship between religiosity, moralization, and self-regulation cannot be 
taken up in isolation; these are three threads of a rich psycho-social fabric that is 
responsive to intergroup dynamics, such as perceived threats, and psychological 
dynamics such as self-validation, intersubjective engagement, and tendencies 
towards conformity. While this previous review surfaced some of the 
determinants governing when religious engagement is likely to lead to 
moralization, it did not clarify how moralization would impact self-regulation. 
The training of emotional responses is a crucial link in this explanation. Just as 
the mother's parenting style and socialization goals shaped their children's 
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emotional experiences, so too a person's engagement within their affiliative 
networks will shape their emotional responses and their capacity to regulate 
these responses.  
With these two points in mind, we will finally be in a position to discuss 
what it is about religious groups in particular that shapes self-regulation. The 
preceding chapters laid out various ways that social dynamics impact regulation, 
but a nagging problem throughout this review was that these dynamics were 
never unique to religious groups. This broad scope was deliberate. We should 
not expect religious groups to be special or disjunct from other types of social 
groups– instead they should be functioning in pretty much the same way. 
Furthermore, we should expect that any dynamics that may seem particular to 
religious groups, such as the tendency towards sacralization, will not be 
universally present within all religious groups, and will be present in many non-
religious groups. For example, we may expect to see a stronger tendency towards 
"sacralization" in political parties or gangs than in a US Presbyterian 
congregation in which involvement does not extend beyond sharing casseroles 
on Sunday afternoon. 
Nevertheless, the evidence does suggest that there is something about 
religiosity that impacts self-regulation uniquely. Within this chapter I will argue 
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that this "something" has less to do with the conceptual content of beliefs in the 
afterlife or supernatural agents and more to do with the symbolic relationships 
that religious systems tend to embed individuals within. If the different 
socialization habits of the Nso and German mothers led to such dramatically 
different emotional and regulatory outcomes, then we need to ask whether a 
form of socialization occurs within religious engagement that could have similar 
effects. In section 4.4 I will argue that religious systems tend to enact a set of 
highly structured actual and symbolic relationships, which inculcates values that 
closely resemble the Nso mothers' goals of respect and obedience. 
 
4.2 Moral emotions 
The psychological research on moral emotions is one of the areas where the 
importance of emotion within decision-making and behavior has become 
increasingly clear. Over the past two decades, researchers have tracked a variety 
of ways in which particular emotions shape behavioral responses to moral 
situations. Through a review of this research I will argue that these particular 
cases are indicative of the more general ways in which emotional responses to 
situations provide an immediate judgment that persuasively motivates 
behavioral reactions. Throughout this review, religious engagement will recede 
  
 
212 
into the background, but the next section will address the ways in which these 
emotional responses are shaped through socialization processes, which will 
provide the basis for understanding how religious engagement impacts the 
emotional processes relevant for motivating regulatory behaviors. Before getting 
into this research, however, it is important to engage the philosophical 
commitments of these researchers since this can be conceptually fraught terrain. 
4.2.1 The philosophy of moral emotions 
 Often the research on moral emotions is framed as a riposte to the view 
that deliberative reasoning is the crucial determinant of moral behavior. This 
rationalistic perspective is not a straw man. Through most of the 20th century, the 
psychological study of morality relied on a rational theory of moral judgment. 
Kohlberg's (1969; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983) hierarchy of moral reasoning 
embodies this rational focus as it describes the way people engage conscious 
reasoning processes to resolve moral dilemmas and how learning more mature 
forms of reasoning leads to improved moral judgments. Researchers since 
Kohlberg have largely moved away from his stage-based perspective on internal 
development and instead emphasize the way moral reasoning processes grow 
through social interactions (e.g., Nucci & Turiel, 1978). But Kohlberg's main idea, 
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that moral judgments are made through a process of reasoning and reflection, 
remains a central tenet of this branch within moral psychology. 
Drawing from Hume's (1739/2000) argument that reasoning is always 
subservient to emotions, researchers working on moral emotions have 
challenged Kohlberg's emphasis on reasoning in moral decision making. This 
rebuttal began in the 1980s as Kagan (1984) forcefully argued that most reflective 
moral judgments are post-hoc justifications for emotional reactions that have 
already been made. Harris (1989) documented the development of moral 
emotions in young children and how these emotions drove responses to any 
norm violations. More recently, these arguments have been taken up by Haidt 
(2001; 2003) and others (e.g., Greene, 2013) who integrate evidence from a wide 
range of disciplines to provide a solid foundation for the growing perspective 
that emotions are steering moral judgments with a force that swamps the 
influence of reasoning processes.  
In many ways this philosophical debate seems uniquely decidable on the 
basis of evidence. For example, there is strong evidence that manipulating 
peoples' emotional responses to situations has downstream effects for their moral 
judgments of those situations. In one such experiment, Wheatley and Haidt 
(2005) hypnotized participants to experience disgust connected to a specific, 
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otherwise arbitrary, word. When these participants then made judgments about 
different moral scenarios, if the description of the scenario contained the disgust 
laden word, their judgments became more severe. Other studies have induced 
disgust using fart sprays, dirty rooms, (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008), or 
bitter drinks (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011) with similar effects (see Chapman & 
Anderson, 2013). In each case the studies confirm that changing an individual's 
emotional experience, in this case disgust, affects their moral response. 
This is not to say that the rationalist theory of moral judgment lacks 
evidence. For example, many studies have found that people tend to cite the 
presence of harmful consequences as a determinant of whether an action is 
morally right or wrong (e.g., Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991). These results 
suggest the importance of reasoning based on expected consequences as a crucial 
factor in moral judgments. But, part of the force in the arguments for emotion 
over reasoning comes from the fact that these previous experiments do not 
strictly rule out the possibility that these reasons are post-hoc justifications for 
judgments already made. Directly testing this possibility, Haidt and colleagues 
(1993) found that participants' affective responses to moral dilemmas, presented 
as vignettes, were better predictors of their moral judgments than the rational 
claims about harm that participants gave (see also Haidt & Hersh, 2001). Other 
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experimental designs undermine the importance of reasoning within moral 
judgments by thwarting the reasons people typically give. These dilemmas are 
written to exclude the possibility of harm, unfairness, or coercion. For example, 
Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy (2000) presented participants with a story about 
two siblings making love. The story is written to explicitly exclude any 
possibility of hurt or danger, but even in the absence of any justification 
participants nevertheless stick by their initial judgment– "I can't explain it, I just 
know it's wrong" (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). In other words, even when their reasoning 
is unfounded or explicitly confounded, people do not change their initial moral 
judgments (see Prinz, 2006; 2009). Collectively the evidence appears to 
substantiate Hume's position– emotions seem to be reliably steering the moral 
wagon, though this is not uncontested (see McAuliffe, 2018).  
It is worth pausing here to consider the conceptual entailments of this 
claim. More specifically, this distinction is not drawing a sharp line between 
emotion and cognition. Instead, Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model 
distinguishes between two types of cognitive processing: intuitive and reasoning. 
Since writing in 2001, Haidt's model of dual-process theory, which provides the 
basis for this distinction, has become somewhat dated. For example, he relies on 
the language of "systems" rather than "types" and draws the contrast along a host 
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of characteristics—such as effortless/effortful, automatic/controllable, 
unconscious/conscious, parallel distributed processing/serial, holistic/analytical 
(Haidt, 2001, p. 818)— which more current research suggests are distinct 
characteristics of information processing (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013). The 
current theoretical consensus on dual-process theory largely brackets these 
various dichotomies and leans towards the specific distinction between intuition 
and reflection based on the engagement of working memory and mental 
simulation (cf. De Neys, 2018). This current conceptualization, however, does not 
radically change Haidt's (2001) argument; the majority of moral judgments may 
still be made by quick intuitive responses that are largely emotional. 
It is crucial to recognize that this is not a contrast between emotion and 
cognition, because the role of cognition within these intuitive responses 
preserves a place for the importance of belief and rationality. For example, 
Mercier and Sperber (2017) argue that even though rational justifications may not 
be faithful representations of the process by which we arrive at moral judgments, 
they may nevertheless serve important social functions. In particular, when 
people produce reasons for their judgment, they are committing themselves and 
their reputation to these reasons, while also enacting a process through which 
these reasons can be corrected by social feedback (Mercier & Sperber, 2017). In 
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other words, our moral responses may not be guided by ratiocination in the 
moment, but attempting to reasonably justify these responses among peers 
provides a way, over the long run, to either confirm and solidify the judgment or 
arrive at a new judgment. Arguing that emotions, not rationality, drive moral 
reasoning risks obscuring the importance of such processes. This balance 
between the drawn-out social functions of reason and the immediate appraisals 
of emotions is illuminating for our purposes because it acknowledges the 
possible influence of beliefs and explicit standards even while highlighting the 
importance of tacit emotional appraisals. Along these lines, within my argument 
I am not arguing that religious beliefs are irrelevant or inconsequential for the 
motivational processes within self-regulation. Instead I am arguing that we must 
consider these beliefs alongside the relational and emotional processes that likely 
shape how these beliefs are engaged. 
As we turn to the research on the importance of emotions within the 
development of moral responses in particular and self-regulation in general, it is 
important to keep this philosophical terrain in mind. My emphasis on emotion is 
meant as a corrective to the current emphasis on religious beliefs. Rather than 
drawing a dichotomy between emotion and reason and then defending one side, 
I am attempting to highlight the way that both processes are crucial within the 
  
 
218 
motivations people have for self-regulation. Adopting a social perspective on the 
relationship between religion and self-regulation demands that both processes 
stay in view.  
4.2.2 Mapping the terrain 
 To clarify the crucial role of emotions within the motivational processes 
that guide self-regulation, it is necessary to first highlight the key feature of those 
emotions that researchers have designated as particularly "moral." Recall Frijda's 
(1986) functionalist position that all emotions have action tendencies; the 
essential feature of moral emotions is the type of behaviors they tend to elicit. 
Within the theoretical work on moral psychology, Haidt (2003) distinguishes 
moral emotions as those that impact prosocial behaviors in particular.  
Emotions generally motivate some sort of action as a response to the 
eliciting event. The action is often not taken, but the emotion puts the 
person into a motivational and cognitive state in which there is an 
increased tendency to engage in certain goal-related actions (e.g., revenge, 
affiliation, comforting, etc). These action tendencies (Frijda, 1986) can be 
ranked by the degree to which they either benefit others, or else uphold or 
benefit the social order. (p. 854) 
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In other words, moral emotions are characterized as those that are responsive to 
deviations from or abidance by the social order and correspondingly increase the 
tendency to act in prosocial ways, i.e., ways that stabilize that order.42 If we recall 
from the previous chapter, the social order is a set of norms, which I argued are 
highly relevant for regulation (both by directly providing standards for 
regulation and by shaping the overall social context within which regulation 
occurs). Suggesting that there is a set of emotions, what we are calling moral 
emotions, which are directly tied to upholding that social order, also therefore 
suggests that these emotions are crucial for motivating self-regulatory efforts. 
A clear example of this process emerges from Tangney and colleagues' 
(1991; 2003; 2007) extensive research program on shame, guilt, embarrassment, 
and pride. These emotions "function as an emotional moral barometer, providing 
immediate and salient feedback on our social and moral acceptability. Moreover, 
these emotions provide a countervailing force to the reward structure based on 
more immediate, selfish, id-like desires" (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007, p. 
347). This later point, about moral emotions functioning differently than 
                                                        
42. Haidt (2003) also suggests that moral emotions are distinct in that they are elicited by 
situations that are not directly connected to the self (p. 853-854), but if this was a necessary 
feature of moral emotions, it would rule out self-conscious emotions such as shame, guilt, 
embarrassment or pride, which tend to powerfully motivate prosocial behaviors as we will see 
below. 
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motivation based around individual reward, echoes one of my primary 
arguments about the crucial difference between self-centered versus socially-
centered reward structures. As such, moral emotions, with their prosocial action 
tendencies provide a way to incorporate social dimensions within our 
understanding of the relationship between religion and self-regulation. 
Tangney's (1991) early research worked to differentiate between shame 
and guilt, both in character and in consequence. Drawing from Lewis (1971), 
Tangney offers a substantial body of empirical work showing that shame is 
primarily about a negative evaluation of the whole self, while guilt involves a 
negative response to particular behaviors (Tangney et al., 2007). This distinction 
helps explain the different phenomenological presentations of the two emotions–
–e.g. shame tends to be more devastating––and the different ways people explain 
the cause of their distress (see Tangney & Dearing, 2003; Tracy & Robins, 2006). 
Since our inquiry is focused on the influence of emotions such as these on self-
regulation, we are more interested in the different behavioral outcomes of shame 
and guilt. 
These differences are substantial. There is a large body of research tracing 
these differences (see Tangney et al., 2007), so I will only briefly summarize some 
of the major points. Motivationally, shame spurs action tendencies that lead 
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individuals to withdraw, hide, and become more defensive. Guilt, on the other 
hand, leads individuals to engage the eliciting situation and constructively make 
reparations (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; 
Tangney, 1995). Shame and guilt also appear to have different effects on an 
individual's access to empathy and their enactments of anger––shame tends to 
impede empathy and amplify aggression while guilt produces opposite effects 
(Harper, Austin, Cercone, & Arias, 2005; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Paulhus, 
Robins, & Trzesniewski, 2004; Tangney & Dearing, 2003). More pertinent to our 
current question, guilt also appears to be effective at preventing a variety of anti-
social43 behaviors, such as criminal delinquency, substance abuse, unsafe sex, and 
recidivism among inmates (Dearing, Stuewig & Tangney, 2005; Stuewig & 
McCloskey, 2005; Tangney, Mashek, & Stuewig, 2007; Tibbets, 2003). Shame, on 
the other hand, has no reliable impact on preventing these behaviors. 
These impacts on antisocial behaviors is especially salient for our 
purposes because much of the evidence connecting religiosity and self-regulation 
comes from similar behavioral outcomes. For example, religiosity is associated 
                                                        
43. While "anti-social" carries connotations of a value judgment, I mean it in the technical sense of 
behaviors that deviate from the prevailing social norms. Given the fact that many social norms 
can actively marginalize particular groups, it is important to note that deviating from these 
norms is not necessarily a "bad" thing to do. 
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with lower incidence of substance abuse (e.g., Desmond, Ulmer, & Bader, 2013; 
Hoffmann, 2014; Montgomery, Stewart, Bryant, & Ounpraseuth, 2014) and other 
delinquent behaviors (e.g., Klanjšek, Vazsonyi, Trejos-Castillo, 2012). Some of 
these studies even directly test the role of self-regulation in mediating this 
influence (e.g. Kim-Spoon et al., 2015; Pirutinsky, 2014). Given the preventative 
impact that experiences of guilt can have on these behaviors, it is worth 
questioning whether these emotional processes may be playing a mediating role 
here as well. Could the self-regulation itself be a result of the way that religious 
engagement fosters experiences of guilt around particular behaviors? 
Since both of these emotions are typically construed as reactions to a 
situation, they may seem to be subsequent to any regulatory act (or failure) and 
therefore unlikely mediators. But this is not necessarily the case. As Tangney and 
colleagues (2007) argue: 
Actual behavior is not necessary for the press of moral emotions to have 
effect. People can anticipate their likely emotional reactions (e.g., guilt 
versus pride/self-approval) as they consider behavioral alternatives. Thus, 
the self-conscious moral emotions can exert a strong influence on moral 
choice and behavior by providing critical feedback regarding both 
anticipated behavior (feedback in the form of anticipatory shame, guilt, or 
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pride) and actual behavior (feedback in the form of consequential shame, 
guilt, or pride). In our view, people's anticipatory emotional reactions are 
typically inferred based on history—that is, based on their past 
consequential emotions in reaction to similar actual behaviors and events. 
(p. 347) 
Below I will discuss more thoroughly how these forecasted emotional responses 
are constructed as a way to preempt sanctioning. For now, though, the salient 
point is that the action tendencies and the influence of shame and guilt on other 
psychological processes can be elicited through prospection alone. In other 
words, if the initial emotional appraisal of a situation does not already tilt the 
motivational scales one way or another, the prospective consideration of possible 
actions, shaded by learned emotional responses, may prove decisive. 
Shame and guilt are not the only emotions to prospectively and 
retrospectively shape social actions. Prior to the recently revived interest in 
moral emotions, sympathy was one of the commonly recognized emotional 
tendencies connected to morality (Hoffman, 1982; Lewis, 1971). More recently 
Tomasello (2016) argued that sympathy remains one of the evolutionary 
foundations upon which the rest of morality is built:  
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Our first step on the road to modern human morality is an expanded 
sympathetic concern for nonkin and nonfriends, which leads to helping 
them and, possibly, to a qualitatively new Smithian empathy in which the 
individual identifies with another in his situation based on a sense of self-
other equivalence. Because of interdependence, this sympathy and 
empathy for others presumably contributes to the helper's reproductive 
fitness on the evolutionary level, but, to repeat, the evolved proximate 
mechanism contains nothing about interdependence and reproductive 
fitness. It is based only on an unalloyed sympathy for others, which may 
then compete with a variety of other motives, including selfish motives, in 
the actual making of behavioral decisions. (p. 49)44 
In the last chapter we saw that intersubjectivity was a crucial component in the 
psychological process by which people internalize shared goals and become 
motived to abide by those norms. Here, Tomasello (2016) is arguing that the 
emotional experience of sympathy is a necessary foundation for intersubjectivity. 
In other words, the feeling of sympathy towards one's group members may be a 
                                                        
44. By "Smithian" Tomasello is referring to Adam Smith's (1759/1976) account of human action as 
largely modulated by the natural affective bonds we share with those around us. Smith's account 
is often cited in contrast to Hobbes' (1651/1994) theory of humans as inherently selfish. Modern 
evolutionary accounts, such as that advanced by Tomasello (2016) strike a balance between these 
tendencies towards competition and cooperation. 
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more fundamental emotion that elicits the salience of the group's norms and the 
motivation to abide by those norms. 
Behaviorally, the influence of sympathy on moral behaviors shows up 
through a variety of studies. For example, oxytocin, the likely hormonal 
component of sympathetic feelings (Carter et al., 2008), reliably leads people to 
distinguish between in-group and out-group members while motivating 
cooperative behaviors towards the former (De Dreu, 2012). In a longitudinal 
study, Malti and colleagues (2016) found that feelings of sympathy interacted 
with experiences of guilt to facilitate sharing and other forms of cooperation 
among children. Extending beyond humans, Tomasello (2016) cites experiments 
suggesting that chimpanzees and other primates feel sympathy—inferred by 
increased levels of oxytocin—for those individuals they are helping (e.g., 
Crockford et al., 2013; Wittig et al., 2014). Collectively the research supports the 
crucial role that feelings of sympathy play within both attachment to the group 
and abidance by the group's norms.  
Just as the question emerged for guilt and shame above, the important 
role of sympathy within norm abidance demands that we consider whether 
religious systems foster a sympathetic concern for the group that would 
intrinsically motivate regulatory behaviors considered relevant for the group. If 
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so, then as Tomasello (2016) notes above, this motivational landscape would be 
"based on an unalloyed sympathy for others" (p. 49), which is distinct from, and 
potentially in competition with, more self-centered motivational tendencies. 
Disgust, shame, guilt, and sympathy are not the only moral emotions. To 
name only a few, researchers also include embarrassment, pride, elevation, 
gratitude, loyalty, and anger (see Tangney et al., 2007; Tomasello, 2016). These 
emotions can be sorted in different ways: they vary in whether they are 
negatively or positively valanced; some are predominately about one's self and 
some are other-focused; and as we saw with guilt and shame, some lead to 
approach behaviors while others lead individuals to avoid (Janoff-Bulman & 
Carnes, 2013; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 
2010). These differences matter for how the moral emotions functionally impact 
prosocial behaviors. For example, Ugazio, Lamm, and Singer (2012) found that 
inducing anger, which involves a negative appraisal and a motivational tendency 
to approach, led to different moral judgments than disgust, which is also 
negative but more likely to elicit avoidant behaviors. These different moral 
judgments also depended on whether the situation was personal or impersonal. 
In short, the impact of emotions on moral judgment and action is complexly 
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determined by various features of both the emotion itself and the eliciting 
situation. 
Given this complexity, the research fields investigating these differences 
in the character and function of moral emotions are vast. Some moral emotions 
have entire handbooks devoted to them. In other words, the preceding review is 
hopelessly sparse if my intention were to cover the nuance present in each moral 
emotion and the ways it impacts prosocial behaviors. Instead my purpose is 
simpler and broader– my aim is to highlight the fact that these emotions guide 
the regulatory processes, especially those relevant for social behaviors. Disgust 
can lead standards to become more stringent, which impacts the severity of one's 
social- and self-sanctioning. Guilt can motivate reconciliation or preemptively 
discourage behaviors that would demand such reparations. Sympathy fosters the 
internalization of moral standards and thereby motivates cooperative actions. 
The impact these emotions have on regulatory moral behaviors is direct, 
therefore they are highly plausible factors within the relationship between 
religious engagement and self-regulation. The possibility of their influence 
becomes even more likely when we consider what these emotional processes 
reveal about motivational tendencies more broadly. 
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4.2.3 The motivational landscape 
 One of my primary arguments within this chapter is that drawing moral 
emotions into view forces us to re-evaluate explanations of regulatory motivation 
that depend on a self-centered cost-benefit analysis. As Tangney and colleagues 
(2007) argue, these emotions often run counter to the selfish instincts that 
otherwise may provide the motivational basis for regulation. Tomasello (2016) 
makes the same point by noting how sympathy can be a motivational foil to 
selfish goals. It could be argued, however, that the motivational import of these 
emotions is only relevant for social or relational standards and if we turn to focus 
on personal goals, then selfish motivations again take center stage. But, 
throughout this dissertation I have argued that any sharp distinction between the 
personal and the social becomes blurred beyond meaning once we consider the 
pervasive exchange between the two domains. The most seemingly personal 
standards are absorbed from the social order and acting in accord with those 
standards signals one's relational position. From beginning to end, personal 
standards have a social dimension. Therefore, arguing that self-centered 
motivations govern personal goal pursuit while prosocial motivations govern 
social goal pursuit, relies on a sharp distinction that crumbles under scrutiny. 
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As a way around this false dichotomy, moral emotions direct our 
attention to the powerful concern individuals feel for the social orders within 
which they are embedded. The personal and the prosocial blend. From the 
ultimate perspective of evolution, maintaining this order is a self-serving 
endeavor as it likely increases individual, or kin, fitness. At a proximate level, 
however, the continuation of this order (either by individual abidance or through 
the social sanctioning of others' deviance) is an end unto itself.45 The costs and 
the benefits that shape morally relevant behaviors are registered directly in the 
emotion experienced when prospectively or retrospectively considering these 
behaviors. This immediacy is rooted in the way emotions index one's 
relationship to the group: the cost of deviance is the experience of potential 
rupture within that relationship and the prevailing sense of order, which is part 
of why even subtle forms of social sanctioning can be so effective; the reward of 
abidance is an assurance of belonging and the continued stability of the 
perceived order. In other words, moral emotions force us to recognize the ways 
in which motivation is not a calculus weighing future benefits versus present 
                                                        
45. This framework for understanding moral emotions is heavily dependent on evolutionary 
perspectives in which emotions act as ways to encourage people to engage in strategies that are 
optimal for their good in the long run but may not immediately appear to be beneficial within the 
moment (see Frank, 1988; Greene, 2013; Ridley & Dawkins, 1981). 
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costs to the self, but instead is a socially oriented system that shapes the very 
experience of what is a cost or a benefit.  
This is not to say that all motivation is socially-centered. Clearly, we often 
act with our own self-interest in mind and from an evolutionary perspective 
purely altruistic behaviors are unsustainable. But within our deeply social 
species, these prosocial behaviors are also unavoidable. My point is simply that a 
great variety of motives, both selfish and social, come into play when an 
individual is faced with a regulatory dilemma. When we consider the ways in 
which religious engagement influences regulatory decisions, we should at least 
consider the possibility that such engagement is not primarily oriented by selfish 
motivations but instead is shaped by a social landscape within which the 
individual's concerns are continually made subservient to the broader values and 
norms carried by the community.  
Put differently, when people are regulating by religiously endorsed moral 
standards, are they relating to their god as a shop-keeper who will dole out 
rewards for good behavior, or are they reaffirming to themselves their identity in 
relation to that god? Of course, the answer is both– different people will relate in 
different ways. But, given the divergent motivational tendencies that emerge 
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from these different ways of relating, we should ask– which way of relating is 
more effective at fostering self-regulation? 
 Remember that while the German children struggled to resist the enticing 
treat, the Nso children did not seem to experience the puff-puff as a temptation. 
The primary determinant that Lamm and colleagues (2017) found was how these 
children were socialized to handle their emotions. For the Nso children, the 
decision was embedded within a broader socio-emotional context that was 
structured by hierarchy and concern for the social consequences of individual 
decisions. For the German children, the decision was experienced as a highly 
individual choice about what they wanted and when. Acknowledging the role of 
moral emotions in the regulatory process forces us to recognize that this 
motivational landscape is at least partially shaped before any deliberation occurs. 
Below I will argue that religions are precisely the sort of institutions that lead 
practitioners to experience standards as socially relevant rather than just 
personally significant. In order to construct that case, we must first engage 
research about the highly relational process through which emotions are shaped.  
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4.3 Relational emotions 
My focus up until now has been on the way emotions shape regulatory 
processes, especially when those processes are socially relevant. Rather than 
portraying emotions as an index of regulatory success, as they are construed 
within the typical model (Carver & Scheier, 2016), this social perspective on 
regulation helps to recognize the role that emotions play in the antecedent 
motivational decision of whether to regulate or not. While this role may seem 
obvious at this point, it is far from clear how and why we should expect religious 
systems to bear any special influence on these emotional processes. In order to 
clarify this pathway, I will turn now to psychological research that highlights 
how those anticipatory emotional responses that Tangney and colleagues (2007) 
discussed are formed not only through past personal experiences but also 
through a persistent flow of social sanctioning and approval.  
"The baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it 
all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion" (James, 1890/1950, p. 488). William 
James' point was that perception is not a ready formed package that a child 
arrives with in the world. Instead, perception must be worked out through 
exploring the environment and discriminating feedback. By moving and 
bumping up against things a child's nervous system learns the contours of his 
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body. By integrating the swirling mess of greens and blues with her head 
bobbing and bold crawling, a child learns to see the horizon. Feedback hones 
ambiguous stimuli into a coherent experience of the world. I argue that a child's 
emotional experience is shaped in the same way, but the environment that 
provides the formative feedback is social as much as it is physical.46 
In a helpful review, Morris and colleagues (2007) offer a three-part 
structure to organize the various ways that children learn to experience emotions 
and develop the capacity to modulate that experience through emotional 
regulation (ER):  
Firstly, children learn about ER through observation. Secondly, specific 
parenting practices and behaviors related to the socialization of emotion 
affect ER. Thirdly, ER is affected by the emotional climate of the family, as 
reflected in the quality of the attachment relationship, styles of parenting, 
family expressiveness and the emotional quality of the marital 
relationship. (p. 362) 
                                                        
46. This does not imply that emotion is purely cultural any more than it means that visual 
perception is cultural. Twin studies continually find genetic influences on emotionality (e.g. 
Montag et al., 2016). The balance here is similar to that advocated throughout the book– biology 
provides the basic working material that culture shapes, and that biological starting point 
constrains and guides the directions that culture can take. 
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While Morris et al. (2007) are discussing emotional regulation in particular, these 
channels of influence also helpfully organize the various ways that a person's 
emotional experience more generally is shaped by their social context. Within 
this chapter, I take the third influence to be a more generalized effect of the 
second– the overall emotional climate emerges from the cumulative impact of 
socialization. Regardless of how you organize these processes, however, they all 
support the basic point that an individual's emotional experience is shaped 
through relationships with significant others. 
4.3.1 Observation 
 One approach to understanding the formation of emotional experiences is 
research on social referencing. Klinnert and colleagues (1983) first describe social 
referencing as the way that people actively seek out emotional information from 
others in order to appraise an ambiguous situation. For example, in a classic 
experiment, researchers use a visual cliff, which is a large box, about as big as a 
dinner table. One side of the box is solid, but the other half is constructed to look 
like a drop-off or a short cliff. This drop-off side is covered with plexiglass at the 
same level as the other side, so any child or animal can safely move wherever 
they wish on the box. The point of this experiment is to see how children or other 
animals react as they approach the apparent drop-off (see Gibson & Walk, 1960). 
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In the context of social referencing, this apparent drop-off provides the 
ambiguous context. Is it safe or dangerous? As babies approached the drop-off, 
they looked to their mothers, who were standing on the other side of the box so 
that the child would have to cross the plexiglass to reach them. One set of 
mothers gave a happy, positive face, and the others were instructed to give a 
fearful or negative face. When the mothers expressed happiness, 14 out of the 19 
babies crossed the plexiglass. When the mothers expressed fear, 0 out of 17 of the 
babies crossed (Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). As an example of social 
referencing, this study and others like it show that, when children do not know 
how to feel about a situation, they will look to parents or trusted adults for 
emotional cues that then shape their experience. 
Subsequent studies have repeated and nuanced these effects. Flom and 
Bahrick (2007) found that infants are aware of and can discriminate between 
others' emotions as early as 4-5 months old. This capacity also appears in young 
chimpanzees and other primates (Russell, Bard, & Adamson, 1997; Suddendorf & 
Whiten, 2001). The rate at which children look to their parents as emotional 
referents increases significantly from 6 to 24 months (Klinnert, 1984; Walden & 
Ogan, 1988), though the rate and character of social referencing is also influenced 
by the familiarity of the environment and the valence of the affective expression 
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(Walden & Baxter, 1989). Social referencing is not limited to parents– children 
also reference other adults who are familiar or who their parents appear to trust 
(De Rosnay et al., 2006; Klinnert, Emde, Butterfield, & Campos, 1986; Zarbatany 
& Lamb, 1985). Furthermore, children are not simply mimicking these adults' 
emotional reactions; Egyed and colleagues (2013) found that infants tend to 
differentiate between those emotional expressions that are communicative and 
those that represent another's own preferences. This finding also highlights the 
way that social referencing is a reciprocal process– for example, mothers 
regularly adjust their vocalization tones in order to communicate emotional 
information to their children, a habit called "motherese" (Gleitman, Newport, & 
Gleitman, 1984). Moving beyond the simple use of others' emotional reactions as 
data to inform immediate decisions, Hertenstein and Campos (2004) found that 
infants selectively retain this emotional information and that it shapes their later 
behaviors toward target objects. In other words, not only are children attentive to 
the emotional reactions of relevant adults, these reactions provide the basis for 
the children's own appraisal of similar situations and objects. So, imagine a child 
who regularly goes to temple and watches his parents' reverence towards the 
space and particular objects and people within that space. The seeds of his own 
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emotional experience towards religious objects and symbols will be sown by 
watching his parents’ emotional cues. 
Most of the work on social referencing focuses on early development, but 
adults appear to use similar processes—with a broader and more discriminating 
pool of possible referents—in order to interpret ambiguous stimuli (Walle, 
Reschke, Knothe, 2017). For example, Latane and Darley (1968) had participants 
wait in a room that was gradually filling up with smoke. If the other people in 
the room, confederates of the researchers, did not show any worry about the 
smoke, then the participants also appeared unworried. This study is commonly 
taken to show how conformity leads to by-stander effects, but it is also an early 
example of social referencing since participants are taking their cue from the 
emotional reactions of those around them. 
The research that examines such processes among adults often occurs 
under the name social appraisal. This field of study dates back to Campos and 
Stenberg (1981) but was formalized later by Manstead and Fischer (2001). Social 
appraisal refers to the way that people's interpretation of an event or object is 
influenced by the appraisals that others give. A variety of studies now have 
shown that adults modulate their emotional expression and experience based on 
the presence and emotional expressions of peers (Jakobs, Manstead, & Fischer, 
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2001; Yamamoto & Suzuki, 2006). People use these social appraisals not only as 
templates for their own emotional experience but also as guides for their 
behavior. For example, Parkinson and colleagues (2012) had participants inflate a 
balloon as full as they thought it could go. Each of these participants also had a 
friend watching. If the friend expressed any anxiety, then the participant tended 
to stop inflating sooner, suggesting that they modulating their risk-taking 
behavior on the basis of others' expressions. Other studies have found that 
people tend to prefer objects if they see others attending to it with positive 
emotions (e.g., Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske, & Tipper, 2007; Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, 
& Tipper, 2006). In short, our emotional experience of the world—along with our 
resultant actions—is built, at least partially, from the emotions that we see others 
express.  
It is also worth noting that these social appraisals often occur 
automatically. Mumenthaler and Sander (2015) showed participants images of 
faces that expressed ambiguous emotions, such as a blend of fear and surprise. 
While being shown these ambiguous expressions, participants were also 
subliminally (10 ms) shown a face that was either looking towards or away from 
the target face with the ambiguous expression. Importantly, this subliminal face 
was expressing unambiguous anger. If the subliminal prime face was looking 
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towards the target face, then participants were significantly more likely to judge 
the target face as fear rather than surprise. In other words, people were 
automatically registering the emotional significance of the situation and 
assessing it based on unconscious information.  
The work on social appraisals is closely related, but distinct, from research 
on emotional contagion. The primary difference between these two processes is 
that emotional contagion is essentially a form of mimicry in which people match 
the emotional states of those around them (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; 
Parkinson, 2011). This convergence of emotional responses among groups varies 
depending on the emotion (see Bruder et al., 2012), but is generally well-
documented. Whether it is the spread of crying among infants in a nursery 
(Martin & Clark, 1982) or becoming sadder after speaking to a depressed 
individual (Coyne, 1976), emotional contagion is commonplace.  
Analytically, emotional contagion is distinct from social referencing and 
social appraisals because the person is not responding to another's emotional 
assessment of the environment, instead they are matching the other's emotional 
state (Saarni, Campos, Camras, & Witherington, 2008). Some researchers, such as 
Cléments & Dukes (2017), argue that social referencing and social appraisals are 
also distinct because in the former case emotional information is being 
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communicated intentionally. But others maintain that the two processes are 
functionally equivalent (Walles et al., 2017). Regardless of how we distinguish 
these processes, the collective evidence suggests that people readily gather 
emotional information about their environment and this information shapes their 
own emotional experiences and their actions. 
The fact that we form our emotional experiences based on the emotional 
information expressed by those around us is not surprising. But, consider the 
implications of this fact for the emotional experiences one has around religion. In 
order for a religious system to foster a sense of guilt around particular behaviors, 
it does not need to explicitly teach that those behaviors are bad; if other 
adherents express that guilt, then through these social processes of referencing, 
appraising, and mimicking, these emotional responses can become an established 
norm. Similarly, feelings of respect, authority, and loyalty towards one's 
religious symbols and group do not need to be explicitly taught, they need to 
only be present amidst salient members within the group. Given the importance 
of these emotions for regulation, discussed above, we are beginning to see how it 
is that religious systems might shape the emotional experience of adherents in 
ways that foster self-regulation.  
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4.3.2 Socialization and sanctioning 
 Beyond the ways that people absorb emotional information about their 
environment, there are also routes of influence in which others actively attempt 
to mold someone else’s experience. The research literature on direct emotional 
socialization and sanctioning is vast (see Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 
1998; Reeck, Ames, & Ochsner, 2015; von Scheve & Ismer, 2013), but it generally 
supports the significant role that trusted figures have in directly guiding the 
formation of a child's emotional landscape. For example, Gottman and colleagues 
(1997) tracked the various ways parents tacitly and explicitly teach their children 
to understand and manage their emotions. They found that when parents 
adopted active and warm emotional coaching strategies their children tended to 
internalize these capacities and develop more effective forms of emotional 
regulation (Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1996). Eisenberg and colleagues (1998; 
1999) also developed a strong research program showing how parents' emotional 
expressivity and their reactions to a child's emotional displays are internalized 
by the child with downstream consequences for the child's emotional responses 
and social functioning. Recent studies have more specific foci, such as the way 
emotional disorders interact with socialization processes (e.g., Hurrell, Houwing, 
& Hudson, 2017), or the neurological-cognitive mechanisms that mediate these 
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processes (Reeck et al., 2016). In all these studies, the foundational tenet—that 
active emotional socialization has a significant impact on later emotional 
experiences—remains intact. 
The simplicity of this point should not obscure the complexity of these 
processes. The socialization process is reciprocal, such that the child's own 
emotional expressivity in turn shapes the parents' reactions over time (Eisenberg 
et al., 1999; Morris et al., 2007). Furthermore, these repeated interactions 
accumulate into an overall emotional atmosphere within the family, which can 
set an influential tone for subsequent socialization processes. For example, the 
child's acceptance of emotional information from their mother depends on the 
quality of their attachment, such that securely attached children tend to rely on 
their mother's emotional information, while those who are insecurely attached, 
with avoidant tendencies, are less accepting of this information (Corriveau et al., 
2009). This overall climate can also predispose children to recognize particularly 
relevant emotions with greater ease. For example, Pollak and colleagues (2002; 
2009) have shown that children from physically abusive homes are especially 
attuned to subtle expressions of anger that children from non-abusive homes 
tend to miss. Again, the developmental psychology literature extends well 
beyond the limits of this review as it engages the complexity of this terrain, but 
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the key point is that emotional experience and the capacity to handle that 
experience is forged in relation to the people that are significant to the child.  
While these examples are focused on the family, the same dynamics 
emerge in other social groups, whether they are as minimal as partners within an 
economic game or as complex as religious communities. The minimal context of 
economic games afford researchers the chance to investigate the nuanced role 
emotions play in shaping social behavior. For example, in an early 
neuroeconomics study Sanfey and colleagues (2003) tracked people's decisions 
and responses during an ultimatum game47. They found that increased neural 
activity in the anterior insula, indicating a heighten emotional response, was a 
significant predictor of people's tendency to reject unfair offers. While this study 
primarily analyzes the perspective of the person who sanctions, other research 
has found that there are individual differences in the way these sanctions from 
others are internalized. People systematically vary in the extent to which they 
experience pleasure from behaving fairly, and these experiences of pleasure are 
predictive of cooperative behaviors (Haselhuhn & Mellers, 2005). More recent 
                                                        
47. There are two players within the ultimatum game. One is the proposer and she gets to choose 
how to divide a sum of money with the other player. The other player, the responder, gets to 
either accept or reject the proposed split. If the responder accepts the split, then each player gets 
the proposed amount. If the responder rejects the offer, then neither player receives anything. 
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studies using similar games have replicated and nuanced these results. Van der 
Schalk and colleagues (2012) used an autobiographic recall task—essentially 
asking participants to remember a time when they felt pride (or regret) about 
acting fairly—to prime anticipatory emotions before playing the ultimatum 
game. Those who were primed to anticipate pride acted more fairly while those 
primed with regret behaved more selfishly (Van der Schalk et al., 2012, p. 4). 
Harkening back to the social appraisal literature, the same research team also 
found that observing others' emotions after a resource allocation game changes 
how people play. Specifically, seeing others' regret leads individuals to shift their 
choices to avoid the same emotion (Van der Schalk, Kuppens, Bruder, & 
Manstead, 2015). While these studies suggest the fluidity of emotional appraisals, 
they also point to the way that habituated emotional appraisals functionally 
guide social behaviors. Such experimental games are a highly idealized mode of 
social interaction, but they align with the developmental psychology research 
and collectively gesture toward a broader point– our emotional responses and 
the actions they elicit are shaped largely by the social environment in which we 
experience sanctions and approval from significant others. 
The fact that others' direct expressions of emotion and communications 
about emotion shape one's own emotion experience is relatively unsurprising. 
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More pertinent for our current inquiry, research also shows that this emotional 
information is actively used in order to convey norms. Returning to the example 
above about motherese, the intonations that parents make are nuanced so as to 
convey various forms of emotional sanctioning and approval. Studying these 
vocalization patterns, Dahl and colleagues (2014) found that the emotional tones 
mothers use systematically vary based on their child's transgression: if the two-
year-old children were harming others, the vocal tone was reliably intense and 
angry; if they were at risk of harming themselves, then mothers used more 
fearful tones; and if the children simply had an accident, then the tone was more 
comforting or playful (see also Dahl & Tran, 2016). In other words, before the 
children can register the semantic meaning of injunctions, emotional sanctions 
are used to convey moral rules and shape the child's appraisal of what 
constitutes right and wrong behavior. These studies on vocalization patterns are 
part of a larger research field in developmental psychology that analyzes the 
formation of morality through social interactions (see Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 
2013). The prevailing view among these researchers is that children actively rise 
to the developmental challenge of discerning the social rules and expectations 
surrounding them, and that parents aid in this process through direct forms of 
predominately emotional feedback. 
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For our purposes, the important point of this research is that the 
normative web of morality, through which individuals navigate the social world, 
is woven by the individual's observations of others' emotional reactions and 
through the internalization of others' direct sanctioning and feedback. This 
creates a network of emotional responses that guide one's sense of appropriate 
and inappropriate behaviors. As we saw in the previous section, these socialized 
emotional responses, especially in so far as they embody the group's norms, hold 
a powerful motivational sway on regulatory behavior. Since we are seeking to 
understand what facets of religious systems might lead to an increased tendency 
towards moralization and self-regulation, this body of research suggests that the 
answer lies within these social emotional processes. Rather than looking to the 
explicit moral teachings of a religious system, this research turns our attention to 
the relational fabric that permeates religious symbols, communities, and 
behaviors, and how it may shape the adherent's emotional experience of the 
world. 
4.3.3 A sociological summary 
The perspective I am advancing is aligned with work by the sociologist 
Randall Collins (2004). Collins draws from Goffman's (1959; 1967; 1971) work on 
micro-interactions to argue that the social order is woven by everyday rituals 
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formed through repeated social exchanges, which he calls interaction rituals. 
This is salient to our present purposes because Collins (2004) argues that 
emotional experiences are the key determinant in how people navigate this 
ritualized social environment. More specifically he argues that people are always 
actively seeking emotional energy:  
Everyday life is the experience of moving through a chain of interaction 
rituals, charging up some symbols with emotional significance and 
leaving others to fade… we are constantly being socialized by our 
interactional experiences throughout our lives. But not in a unidirectional 
and homogeneous way; it is intense interactional rituals that generate the 
most powerful emotional energy and the most vivid symbols, and it is 
these that are internalized. (p. 44) 
 When Collins (2004) is discussing symbols, he is referring primarily to 
representations of a group or a relationship. For example, an intimate 
conversation between two husbands will charge their marriage, the symbol in 
this case, with a positive emotional energy that is internalized and furthers their 
commitment to the relationship. When interaction rituals fall flat, on the other 
hand, then the participants' emotional energy drops and they become less 
committed to the joint symbolic reality of that relationship. Collins' (2004) theory 
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acts as a dynamic framework for understanding why relationships and 
allegiances shift and how these shifts change people's emotional experiences and 
their commitments to the relationship or group and its norms.  
As such, interaction ritual theory helps to flesh out the perspective that I 
am advancing. We are both focused on how the social fabric within which we act 
is woven largely by emotional experiences of coherence or disruption. Collins 
(2004) also helpfully recognizes how commitments are formed through a blend 
of both intense and mundane rituals. Clearly, strong emotional experiences, 
fostered through intense rituals, act to solidify social bonds– this is present from 
military boot camps to fraternal hazing to religious rituals (Durkheim, 1912/2008; 
Whitehouse and Lanman, 2014). But, these conspicuous rituals may distract us 
from the mundane, habituated rituals, such as a mother's gentle admonishments 
or a friend's consistent support, which are also capable of fostering deep and 
abiding commitments.48 Given the relative rarity of intense ritual and emotional 
experiences, I believe that if we are looking for the way norms are developed and 
                                                        
48. The contrast I am drawing here is similar to McCauley and Lawson's (2002) distinction 
between high frequency and high arousal rituals and Whitehouse's (2004) similar distinction 
between imagistic and doctrinal modes of religiosity. Both of these theoretical frameworks, 
however, are primarily considered with the question of religious transmission and persistence. 
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become impactful, then we must also remain attuned to the routine social 
interactions that provide habituated checks on an individual's behavior.  
These checks bring us to a point of disagreement between Collins' (2004) 
account and my own. He continues Durkheim's (1912/2008) emphasis on 
collective effervescence, which is largely a positive experience of absorption into 
the group. Along the same lines, Collins (2004) argues that people actively 
pursue positive experiences of emotional energy. While I normally share such 
optimism, this focus on the pursuit of pleasure may neglect the important role of 
pain. More recent work on intense rituals and attachment to collective symbols 
suggest that dysphoric rituals are a more prevalent and influential way to foster 
strong attachment to the group (Whitehouse et al., 2017). I do not want to rule 
out the importance of positive feedback, but most moral standards appear to be 
communicated through sanctioning when they are transgressed. In other words, 
just as the child learns the contours of his body by bumping into objects, he 
learns the moral environment largely through transgressing and being 
reprimanded.  
This point of divergence, however, is minor when compared to the larger 
perspective that I share with Collins (2004). Conventions and moral norms are 
passed along to children through direct and indirect socialization processes, 
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which shape their emotional interpretations of the social world. These emotional 
responses provide quick appraisals of situations and guides for what constitute 
appropriate behavioral reactions. In short, the normative fabric of the social 
world is largely woven from emotional threads upon a relational loom. 
This point may seem so obvious that it needs no argument. But my claim 
is that viewing emotional development as a form of social learning helps us see 
that it is not just any relationship that matters. The particular effectiveness of a 
relationship in shaping emotional responses will be subject to the same pressures 
that constrain social learning processes. Sanctioning from a stranger will not 
carry the same weight as sanctioning from a respected authority figure. Social 
accolades from a friend will be more highly valued than applause from a set of 
strangers. In short, one is most likely to absorb the emotional reactions of family, 
peers, and prestigious, successful, or trusted figures within one's broader social 
group. This aligns with the research highlighted in the last chapter on the social 
dynamics that influence the development of normative behavior (Chudek, 
Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012; Legare & Watson-Jones, 2015; Over & Carpenter, 
2012). If moral emotions provide the push and pull of norms, then we should not 
be surprised that their development occurs through the same social dynamics 
that shape conventional behavior. 
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In the previous section I argued that emotional responses not only shape 
the contours of what we perceive as right and wrong, but they are also a 
powerful motivational force that brings the costs and benefits of action into the 
present by judging prospective responses on the basis of past experiences. 
Furthermore, these judgments are made on a relational scale, because the cost of 
transgression is the threat of fracturing the relationship and losing the order that 
relationship provides. The importance of emotion within motivation forces us to 
recognize its role within self-regulatory processes. The fact that these emotional 
responses are shaped through relational dynamics directs our attention to those 
facets of religious systems that are likely to be influential determinants of an 
individual's self-regulatory capacities. Alone, the commands of a parent do not 
carry weight; they become persuasive when embedded within the fabric of the 
relationship. Similarly, it is not the moral rules of a religion that carry weight; it 
is the way those rules are enforced and embodied through the actual and 
symbolic religious community. 
 
4.4 Relational religion 
Throughout this chapter religion has receded into the background. This was 
necessary in order to foreground the psycho-social processes that determine 
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when conventional or moralized norms become persuasive guides for behavior. 
My emphasis on these processes is part of my larger commitment to the view 
that religion is natural and therefore subject to the same psycho-social dynamics 
as any other natural system. As McCutcheon (2012) said: “it is only when we 
start out with the presumption that religious behaviors are ordinary social 
behaviors—and not extraordinary private experiences—that we will come to 
understand them in all their subtle yet impressive complexity” (p. 14-15). In 
other words, religious systems—along with the norms they induce, the social 
processes that entrench those norms, and the resultant emotional responses—are 
no different than any other social system. These psycho-social processes provide 
the channels through which we should expect religious engagement to shape 
self-regulation; just because the group or behavior is “religious” does not mean 
that it has special access to alternative routes of influence. This raises the 
important possibility that “religious” engagement may bear no special influence 
above and beyond that of engaging within any particular social group. 
While this remains a possibility, the bulk of empirical studies suggest that 
religiosity does bear an influence on self-regulatory capacity (Laurin & Kay, 
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2016; Zell & Baumeister, 2013).49 ⁠ My naturalistic commitment to religion as 
ordinary therefore suggests that any special influence is a difference in degree 
rather than kind. In other words, there are ways by which norms become 
particularly persuasive guides for behavior, and religious systems tend to engage 
these persuasive means—though they remain available to other social systems as 
well. In the previous chapter, moralization processes emerged as a likely 
candidate for how norms become persistent and influential guides for behavior. 
The psychological efficacy of these moralized norms, however, remained a 
lacuna within my explanatory framework. Now that we have unpacked some of 
the emotional processes by which norms are persuasive and how these processes 
are shaped, we are in a place to discuss how it is that religious engagement 
might influence this dynamic. That is the purpose of this section. 
Before discussing the ways that religious engagement may shape the 
emotional processes relevant for motivating self-regulation it is worth briefly 
recalling my argument from the last chapter in more depth. We began that 
chapter by recognizing that the standards endorsed by religious systems are 
                                                        
49 These studies do not directly compare religious engagement with other forms of social 
engagement such as joining a sorority, the army, a service club, or a sports team, so the claim of a 
special influence is tentative. But it is unlikely that the less religious individuals within these 
studies are utterly unengaged socially, so it remains reasonable to suppose that religious 
engagement could provide an especially effective influence on self-regulation. 
  
 
254 
social norms. As such, when people abide by these standards, they are not only 
pursuing the goal itself, they are also indirectly pursuing the goal of enacting 
their affiliation. This affiliative function raised the point that an individual's 
religious identity—with its associated motivational and behavioral tendencies—
is a social identity. As social identities vary in their degree of salience and 
persistence across domains, the initial hypothesis emerged that religious identity 
may be a special case of social identity with strong salience and persistence 
ranging over various arenas of life. In order to articulate this hypothesis more 
clearly, I reviewed the research on social norms that distinguishes between 
descriptive conventions (what people typically do) and injunctive oughts 
(behaviors that garner social approval or sanctioning). If conventions are 
moralized into injunctive norms, then they become particularly persuasive 
guides for behavior. Recognizing the importance of such moralization processes 
for self-regulation led me to re-articulate the initial hypothesis with more specific 
terms for what the salience and persistence of religious identity would mean: 
religious engagement impacts regulatory behaviors by leading individuals to 
more pervasively moralize across different domains or to grant moral norms the 
extra imperative weight of sacralization. 
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I am recalling this hypothesis here because it has a motivational 
dimension that was previously left unspecified. As I have argued throughout this 
chapter, the moralization of norms is largely an emotional process wherein 
abidance and deviance (or the prospect of either) evoke strong visceral responses 
that bring the rewards and costs of regulation into the immediate moment. By 
lacing a norm with emotions, such as guilt or sympathy, the moralization process 
can change the motivational landscape surrounding that norm from one that is 
self-centered to one that is more socially-centered. As we turn now to religion, 
this motivational difference helps to highlight the features of a religious system 
that we should expect to be influential in determining whether or not a person 
tends to moralize those norms relevant for self-regulation.  
As we saw in the previous section, the shaping of emotional processes—
such as those involved in moralization—occur largely through relationship. This 
is not to say that explicit injunctions are not important, just that their 
internalization and efficacy will depend on their embeddedness within a 
relationship. This relational stance provides a marked contrast to the current 
explanations for why religious engagement would motivate self-regulation. 
Recall from the beginning of this chapter that those explanations depend largely 
on the conceptual content of religious systems: explicit moral dictates are 
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motivationally loaded by belief in divine reward or punishment which shifts the 
rational calculus in favor of abidance. I am not arguing that the conceptual 
content of these beliefs is insignificant. But, if that content were the primary 
motivational driver within this relationship, then we should be very surprised by 
studies where religious engagement has varying or inconsequential impacts on 
self-regulation (e.g., Morgan, et al., 2016, Paglieri, et al., 2013; Shenhav, et al. 
2017), because whatever that content might be, it is a stable feature of religious 
systems. Therefore, while beliefs may be influential, we are likely to gain better 
explanatory traction by adopting a perspective that can accommodate the 
different ways that people relate to these beliefs.  
For example, two people may share the belief in a god that watches them, 
but if one relates to this belief in warm fashion that is focused on the attributes of 
forgiveness, then she will have different behavioral outcomes from the other who 
relates to this belief fearfully with a continual concern about punishment (e.g., 
Good, Inzlicht, & Larson, 2015; Ironson et al., 2011). One could argue that this is 
still a difference in content, and it is, but the content varies based on the 
relationship between each person and the symbolized entity. Since we are 
seeking to understand how religious engagement shapes a motivational 
landscape, then this relational perspective will keep us attuned, not just to the 
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content of belief, but also to how that content can become influential within an 
individual's emotional experience. 
It is worth noting that I am far from the first to suggest a relational 
perspective on religiosity. William James defined religion as "the feelings, acts 
and experiences of individual men in their solitude so far as they apprehend 
themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider divine" (1902, p. 
42). Even though this definition is often critiqued as overly individualistic, it is 
noteworthy that it is still a deeply relational definition. The feature that makes 
particular feelings, actions, or experiences "religious" is their occurrence within a 
context in which the individual perceives herself in relation to what she considers 
sacred. More recently, Sandage and colleagues (Sandage & Harden, 2011; 
Sandage, Jensen, & Jass, 2008; Shults & Sandage, 2006) advanced a similar 
perspective that suggests a relational perspective not only helps explain the 
developmental transitions people experience within their spiritual or religious 
lives, but also is uniquely suited for understanding the social and interpersonal 
dimensions of religiosity. In this section I continue these lines of thought to argue 
that a relational perspective can also help us reinterpret the moralization 
processes that mediate the connection between religiosity and self-regulation.  
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In particular I argue that, insofar as religious systems differ from any 
other social system in their capacity to foster moralization and self-regulation, 
this difference emerges because religious systems encourage moralization by 
symbolically instantiating the social order within beliefs about supernatural 
beings, which are uniquely capable of drawing the religious participant into an 
obligatory relationship with that order. There are two pieces to this hypothesis: 
first, the social order of a group is part of what is woven within their 
supernatural beliefs; second, by being anthropomorphic, these beliefs activate 
many of the same social processes that prevail within any group, which leads 
adherents to subordinate their personal emotional response to the dictates 
perceived within that order. I will take up each of these pieces in turn. 
4.4.1 Anthropomorphism 
Within the cognitive science of religion, research on the ways people relate 
to the supernatural tends to focus on the content of these beliefs and the way 
they arise from our predispositions toward anthropomorphism. We see faces in 
the clouds (Guthrie, 1995), hear voices in the bushes (Barrett, 2004), and regularly 
assume intentionality behind processes that we otherwise know are agentless 
(Bering, 2006). Each of these psychological tendencies have been offered as 
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proximate by-product explanations for the prevalent belief in supernatural 
beings– they seek to explain how such beliefs arise. 
While these accounts may be true, it is worth pausing to ask: what is being 
anthropomorphized? When we see a face in the clouds, the stimuli that are 
interpreted as a face are the light-waves reflecting off of the cloud. What are the 
stimuli that are interpreted as a supernatural being? Durkheim (1912/2008) posed 
a similar question over a century ago: "the totem is above all a symbol, a material 
expression of something else. But of what?" (p. 154). His answer provides the 
foundation for our own: 
The totem expresses and symbolizes two different kinds of things. On the 
one hand, it is the external and tangible form of what we have called the 
totemic principle, or god. But on the other, it is the symbol of that 
particular society we call the clan… it is the sign by which each clan 
distinguishes itself from others… So if the totem is both the symbol of god 
and of society, are these not one and the same? (p. 154) 
Durkheim's rhetorical question elaborates beyond the totem and reiterates one of 
the primary points we drew from his work in chapter 2: "the idea of society is the 
soul of religion" (p. 314). In other words, from a Durkheimian perspective, the 
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social order—the idea of the group with its associated expectations for 
behavior—is that which is anthropomorphized into the supernatural. 
This is a strong expression of the more reserved claim that I am 
advancing– the social order is part of what is symbolically instantiated as the 
supernatural. My claim is more reserved than Durkheim's thoroughly social 
etiology because I believe that the supernatural also symbolically represents 
hoped for answers to existential problems surrounding origins, death, meaning, 
goodness, and value, to borrow a few from the philosopher Robert Neville 
(2014). But even if the social order of any given group only constitutes part of 
what is symbolically instantiated as the supernatural, it remains significant that 
people continually compose this symbol in forms to which they can relate. 
Within Durkheim's (1912/2008) analysis this is the totem, but the prevalent belief 
in supernatural beings—whether they are spirits, ancestors, deified saints, or 
gods—provides a more cross-culturally apparent form of this symbol. Below I 
will review evidence that supports this claim by showing that people tend to 
perceive supernatural beings as especially concerned with the moral issues of 
their group, but first it is worth unpacking the second part of this argument.  
By anthropomorphizing the social order, religious adherents are brought 
into relationship with it and this relational dimension lends the social order its 
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emotional efficacy. Durkheim (1912/2008) provides a helpful entry into this point 
as well: 
An individual or collective object is said to inspire respect when the 
conscious representation of it is endowed with such power that it 
automatically stimulates or inhibits behaviour, regardless of any relative 
consideration of its practical or harmful effects. When we obey someone 
because of the moral authority we recognize in him, we follow his advice 
not because he seems to be wise, but because a psychic energy immanent 
in the idea we have of this person makes us bend our will and incline to 
compliance. Respect is the emotion we experience when we feel this 
internal and entirely mental pressure. We are then moved, not by the 
advantages or inconveniences of the behaviour prescribed or 
recommended to us, but by the way we imagine the person who has 
recommended or prescribed it. (p. 155)  
There are several important points within this quote. One, it is deeply relational. 
The influential force exerted by moral authority is not about the conceptual 
content of our belief in this person or her moral dictates—it is not because she 
seems wise—it is about the respect people feel towards her. Durkheim's 
(1912/2008) uses the term 'respect' very broadly to capture the felt sense of moral 
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authority carried by a person or object; in contemporary psychological terms, this 
respect could be decomposed into various social-emotional attributions such as 
prestige, status, honor, or authority, any of which would lend the individual or 
object extra persuasive influence. Second, the influential force carried by respect 
is not instrumental or utilitarian. Religious individuals do not follow the moral 
dictates of their religion because of what they hope to gain, they abide in order to 
maintain the relationship they perceive themselves to be in with the supernatural 
as represented and reinforced by their community. This point unpacks some of 
the social dimensions carried within intrinsic religiosity– the effective weight of 
moral norms is carried by the emotions that embed the norm within a 
relationship. Below I will review evidence that this dynamic is especially salient 
within the influence religion bears on self-regulation. 
In many ways we have returned to the place we arrived in chapter 2 with 
Durkheim's claim that the religious, the moral, and the social order are 
inextricably interwoven: "religious force is nothing but the collective and 
anonymous force of the clan… [Religious forces] are moral powers since they are 
wholly constructed from the feelings the collective moral being arouses in those 
other moral beings, the individuals" (1912/2008, p. 166-168). What we can now 
bring to this place is a richer understanding of the psycho-social processes 
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through which moral authority is formed and gains its force. In order to give 
substance to that formative process, consider three examples. 
4.4.2 Examples 
Imagine being a child and joining your parents on a trip to the local 
pagoda. They bought flowers, fruit, and gold leaf beforehand. They also brought 
along a picnic to enjoy. You and your family remove your shoes and flip flops 
before entering. The complex itself is incredible– bustling with other people, 
some strangers and some friends. Some are carrying flowers and fruit, just like 
your parents, though many of them look urgent. Others are relaxing with each 
other and eating their lunch. The building is beautiful, unlike any home or shop 
you have been in. Bells are ringing. The floor and walls are marble, the ceilings 
are high, and there are paintings and statutes everywhere. In one alcove people 
are giving a small statue their flowers and pouring water over the statue's head. 
Your mother leads you through a different hallway. Then you enter a space that 
seems to be the center of the complex, where you can see a huge statue of the 
Buddha. It is covered in gold leaf. The space is quiet, nothing like the normal 
bustle and noise of the street. There is a side door, a special door, where only 
certain people can enter to lay the flowers, fruit, and gold at the feet of the 
Buddha. Your father takes the gifts your family has brought and heads that way. 
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You sit with your mother, feet carefully pointed away from the Buddha, and you 
are surrounded by people bowing, or quietly watching the Buddha. Some have 
their eyes closed, hands pressed to their lips. Your mother bows. You bow. What 
do you feel? 
Does that seem too exotic? Imagine being a child again and seeing your 
mother sick. She has not been able to work for the past two weeks. Your father is 
worried and you can hear him talking with your grandmother and the rest of the 
family each night. You do not know what is wrong, but you know everyone is 
worried. One day your father takes you with him, you buy gifts again, this time 
strange liquids from a shop you do not know, and go to a house a little outside of 
town where a man you have never seen before lives. Your father gives the man 
the liquid and some other gifts along with an envelope. Then the man leaves and 
you and your father wait. Another guy brings you lunch. Later in the afternoon, 
the man returns and speaks to your father briefly before taking you both behind 
the house. There is a statue, it looks like a horse but is painted with white and 
red stripes and is surrounded by candles and flags. The man lights a fire near the 
horse statue. He throws strange plants on the fire and sings songs you do not 
understand. Your father is very serious this whole time. He is watching the man, 
cautious and respectful. At one point the man begins to shake, his voice raises 
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and it sounds like he is arguing with someone, but there is nobody else there. 
Your father looks slightly afraid. Then the man slumps, quiet as if napping. This 
all takes the rest of the afternoon, and you and your father are exhausted as you 
make the long trip home. The next day, your mother is out of bed, still sick but 
certainly feeling better. What do you feel? 
Still too foreign? Imagine you go every weekend with your family to 
church. You sit through the service, you like the singing, but not the long 
readings or the sermon– both are hard to understand. In the middle of each 
service, everything seems to shift. The priest, the main guy everyone's been 
watching the whole time, moves to a large table, that is elevated above 
everything else. There are candles, gilded cups and a silver tray. He begins 
reciting a whole different sort of reading from a special book, speaking fast. 
Everyone is silent as he bows, lifts up a large wafer and then a fancy cup. His 
actions seem exaggerated and very deliberate. Then, all the adults and older 
children silently make their way up to the table, but your parents tell you to stay 
in the pew. Everyone bows in front of the priests receives a small piece of bread 
and a little sip of from a gilded cup. You watch this every week, until one week 
your parents tell you it is finally your turn to join. What do you feel? 
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My point is not that you will all feel the same thing or even that you will 
feel awe or reverence or some presumably prototypical religious-y feeling. For all 
I know you are more likely to feel bored and eager for lunch. My point is that all 
of the trappings of social learning are infused throughout these rituals. Grant me 
one more example. 
Imagine that instead of a statue or a healer or communion laying at the 
center of these rituals there was a person. Week after week you and your family 
go this amazing and wealthy building. You bring gifts, wear your nice clothes, 
and your parents always carry an air of reverence. Each week there are elaborate 
rituals building up to a moment when your parents are finally allowed in to visit 
this person. You are kept outside, but can see in through a window. Your parents 
bow before this person. They give her gifts. Then they leave. There are lots of 
people and all of them are behaving the same way towards this mysterious 
person in a special room, in a special building, that you go a visit at set times or 
particularly urgent times. Now, say you finally met this person, what would you 
feel? Respect? More importantly for our inquiry about self-regulation, imagine 
she asked you to do something for her. Would you do it? Why? 
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4.4.3 Symbolic relationships 
Of course these examples are idealized reconstructions and as such do not 
prove my point, but they hopefully help to highlight how a person's symbolic 
representation of the supernatural is woven from deeply social processes. While 
the content of these representations may be filled in through explicit teachings 
and stories, the relational posture towards the supernatural is composed more 
tacitly– through the behavioral and emotional cues of friends and family. These 
cues are the same sort of signals that we use to understand the contours of our 
social environment– through social referencing and appraisals we use these sorts 
of signs to understand who and what is important, prestigious, valuable, 
dangerous, etc. We not only tacitly absorb these signals and their significance, we 
are also directly sanctioned into following them– if the child points her toes 
towards the buddha statue, she is reprimanded. In short, the moral authority of 
the supernatural is enacted by the same social learning processes that bestow 
prestige, authority, and respect on any other member of the group. The explicit 
content of this morality is as variable as the norms of any group, but its efficacy 
will depend on this relational dimension.  
Clearly I respect Durkheim, but his authority does not guarantee my 
argument. Fortunately, there is evidence that the relational authority that one 
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bestows on the supernatural is an influential factor in whether one tends to 
moralize conventional norms and whether religiosity fosters self-regulation. This 
evidence can be organized along three different routes. First, I will consider 
evidence that the social order, especially in the form of moral norms, are 
instantiated within religious beliefs. After that point is developed, I will review 
evidence that one's relationship to these beliefs is largely determined by social 
learning processes. And finally, I will engage the line of research that suggests it 
is this relational posture towards particular beliefs that determines the 
relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation.  
Some of the evidence that the social order is symbolically woven within 
religious engagement was covered in the previous chapter. Recall the work on 
moralization and objectification processes. Throughout this research, one of the 
consistent findings is that religiosity predicts the tendency to see moral norms as 
objective parts of reality (Goodwin & Darley, 2008; Piazza, 2012; Piazza & Landy, 
2013; Piazza & Sousa, 2014; Sheikh, Ginges, Coman, & Atran, 2012). While this 
does not directly show that the social order is that which is symbolized within 
religious beliefs, it suggests that the two are not easily parsed. In other words, 
part of the system of religious beliefs links a sense of the supernatural with a 
sense that moral rules are objective.  
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A separate stream of evidence in support of this point comes from recent 
work on religion within cultural evolution. While these researchers are 
particularly interested in the way religious systems may have facilitated the 
expansion of large-scale prosociality (see Norenzayan et al., 2016), one of their 
key hypotheses is that "representations of gods as increasingly knowledgeable 
and punitive, and who sanction violators of interpersonal social norms, foster 
and sustain the expansion of cooperation, trust, and fairness" (Purzycki et al., 
2016, p. 327). Setting aside the capacity to foster cooperation, the more primary 
part of this hypothesis is that people tend to form representations of gods as 
morally concerned. This assumption is based in other research, such as 
Purzycki's (2013) fieldwork in the Tyva republic where he studied how people 
think about the mind of god. Christians reliably reported that god was actively 
concerned with moral behaviors, and even though people did not explicitly 
attribute Tyvan spirit-masters with any particular moral concern, they 
nevertheless tacitly rated these spirit-masters as more knowledgable about moral 
information than non-moral information (Purzycki, 2013, p. 172-173). In short, 
people's representations of what supernatural beings care about is interwoven 
with the moral norms of their group. This research field is relatively new, and it 
has found mixed results in the efficacy of these sorts of beliefs for supporting 
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cooperation (e.g., Purzycki et al., 2018; Watts et al., 2015), but a fairly stable 
finding amidst these studies is that one of the things the gods often care about is 
maintaining the moral norms that prevail within a group.50 My claim is not that 
this is a universal feature of religious systems, but instead that it is a common 
feature and that when present we should expect religious engagement to foster 
self-regulatory capacity. This is not the only component of our framework 
however. 
Not only is the social order interwoven within religious beliefs, evidence 
suggests that people do not hold these representations as they do other beliefs– 
instead they relate to these beliefs through the processes of social learning. The 
examples given above hint at the ways social referencing and social appraisal 
would foster particular emotional responses toward the supernatural. These 
social learning processes, however, depend on the more fundamental signaling 
process of credibility enhancing displays (CREDs; Henrich, 2009). CREDs are 
actions that help people assess the reliability of someone else's beliefs. As 
Henrich (2009) puts it:  
                                                        
50. Other concerns include environmental management and ritual performance as well (see 
Purzycki, et al., 2012; Purzycki & Sosis, 2011). 
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[CREDs] provide the learner with reliable measures of the model's actual 
degree of commitment to (or belief in) the representations that he has 
inexpensively expressed symbolically (e.g., verbally). Learners should use 
such displays in determining how much to commit to a particular 
culturally acquired mental representation such as an ideology, value, 
belief or preference. (pp. 244-245) 
So in the example where the family brought gifts to leave with the statue of the 
Buddha, this act not only signals the importance of the represented being, it more 
fundamentally demonstrates the reliability of the family's belief in that 
supernatural being. More simply CREDs reiterate the common aphorism 
"practice what you preach."  
Henrich (2009) developed this concept to help explain how, within an 
evolutionary context in which we are heavily dependent on social knowledge, 
we need to be able to discern what is reliable information from that which is 
likely false. Subsequent research on CREDs has focused on how they determine 
the acquisition and transmission of religious beliefs. For example, Lanman & 
Buhrmeister (2017) found that exposure to CREDs predicted religiosity and 
theistic belief, even when controlling for other forms of religious socialization 
and practice. Willard and Cingl (2017) found similar results in the Czech 
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Republic and Slovakia, with exposure to CREDs being the most reliable predictor 
of why people held religious beliefs and participated in religious practices (see 
also Langston, Speed, & Coleman, 2018; Turpin, Andersen, & Lanman, 2018). 
These studies on CREDs continue and nuance the long line of research 
showing that social processes have a strong impact on an individual's religiosity 
(e.g., Baker & Smith, 2009; Dudley, 1999; Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009; Hunsberger 
& Altemeyer, 2006; Hunsberger & Brown, 1984). For our purposes, the work on 
CREDs in particular helps to demonstrate that the cognitive content of these 
representations is not the primary determinant in its transmission or efficacy. In 
other words, religious adherents are much more attuned to what others' actions 
signal rather than what others' explicitly say. While not definitive, this stream of 
evidence suggests that an individual's relationship to the instantiated social 
order is established by watching the way that salient models orient in relation to 
these symbols.  
 The final component of my argument is that it is the character of this 
relational orientation to the supernatural that determines the relationship 
between religious engagement and self-regulation. This point gets us back to 
Allport and Ross’ (1967) distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic forms of 
religiosity. These religious orientations are complex variables that likely capture 
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a variety of psychological processes and tendencies. The preceding analysis of 
social processes involved in religiosity, however, raises the question: what are 
the social and relational dimensions of this difference between intrinsic and 
extrinsic religious orientations? My hypothesis is that the distinction Durkheim 
(1912/2008) drew between following a moral command out of respect for the 
issuing authority versus out of instrumental interest captures an essential 
component of the social relational difference between intrinsic and extrinsic 
religious orientation. Moreover, the impact of religious engagement on 
moralization and self-regulation depends on intrinsic, respectful, orientation. As 
I reiterated in the introduction, when studies include Allport and Ross's (1967) 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity51, it is only intrinsic 
religiosity that is positively associated with self-regulatory capacity. This 
divergent impact is well corroborated across a variety of studies (e.g., Bergin et 
al., 1987; Bouchard et al., 1999; Hosseinkhanzadel et al., 2013; Jonas & Fischer, 
2006; Klanjšek et al., 2012; McClain, 1978). What Durkheim and the preceding 
analyses add to this body of evidence is a social interpretation.  
                                                        
51 Typically this distinction is measured with Gorsuch and McPherson’s (1989) more recent 
version of the religious orientation scale. 
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 The different effects that intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity have on self-
regulation is especially revealing for the difference between the self-centered, 
restraint-based account of motivation and the socially-centered account that I 
have developed through this chapter. One can safely assume that the intrinsically 
and the extrinsically religious hold similar conceptual content about god as 
omniscient, capable of punishing, morally concerned, etc. If that content were the 
primary motivational driver for the association between religiosity and self-
regulation, then it should not matter how individuals orient to the supernatural. 
But, it does matter, in a significant and reliable way. Not only does it matter, but 
it is only those modes of religiosity in which religious engagement is an end unto 
itself that foster self-regulation. 
These streams of evidence do not directly prove my alternative 
explanation for the motivational routes by which religious engagement would 
influence self-regulation, but they do pose important challenges for the existing 
explanations that focus on conceptual content while lending support for my 
relational alternative. The picture that begins to emerge is of the religious 
individual being brought into relationship with a symbolic world that is 
interwoven with the norms of the group. As that relationship develops, through 
regular enactment within the community, the individual becomes more attached 
  
 
275 
to the group and the symbolic supernatural beings or processes that the 
community is enacting. As that attachment grows, the individual begins to 
perceive the moral concerns of that group as an objective part of reality, which 
occurs as much through a gradual carving of her or his emotional landscape as 
from explicit teachings and stories of the tradition. Once those norms have 
become moralized and objectified, then the possibility of transgression is 
experienced as a potential rupture in the relationship the individual now feels 
with the group and the supernatural. This rupture is not only a loss of the 
relationship, but also a threat to the social order that the relationship embodies. 
This shift fundamentally changes the calculus of abidance and deviance from an 
analysis that weighs what is best for the self to a posture that is ready to 
subordinate personal proclivities to the needs and demands of the group as 
symbolically instantiated within the supernatural.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Not everyone who is religious follows this type of trajectory. People vary in the 
degree to which they are attached to their religious groups, the pressure they 
experience from conventional norms, their willingness to objectivity those 
norms, etc. Religious systems also vary in the degree to which they symbolically 
  
 
276 
represent moral concerns, how much they anthropomorphize those concerns, 
and the extent of ritualized practices that lend those symbols authority, respect, 
and prestige. Religious engagement, motivation, and self-regulation are 
complicated constructs. 
As such, we should be attending to the various facets of each if we hope to 
gain explanatory traction on why religious engagement bears a reliably positive 
association with regulatory behaviors. The current explanations—that the 
conceptual content of religious beliefs motivate regulation by shifting self-
centered incentives through promises of divine rewards—may explain a portion 
of the relationship. But, it relies on a very narrow construal of motivation, 
especially when the motivated behavior is as deeply social as regulating towards 
a religiously endorsed moral norm. The research on moral emotions from 
Tangney et al. (2007), Tomasello (2016), and Haidt (2003) collectively suggests 
that the motivational landscape guiding moral behaviors is so thoroughly social 
that a self-centered conception of motivation is inadequate to describe its 
contours. Therefore, a more promising route for explaining how religious 
systems foster self-regulation should account for these social dimensions of 
religious engagement and how they might shape the motivation landscape 
through which moral behaviors flow. 
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Turning to these relational dimensions of religion showed how religious 
communities, like any social group, are likely to establish moral norms by 
inculcating particular emotional responses among their members through 
processes of social referencing, appraisal, emotional contagion, and direct 
sanctioning. In this way, religious systems are no different than any other social 
group. Yet the evidence suggests that there is something distinct about religious 
systems. The current explanation focuses on the unique conceptual content of 
religious beliefs—i.e., divine rewards and punishments—but this explanation 
struggles to account for the variance between religious individuals, all of whom 
likely endorse these beliefs, but not all of whom show the religion/self-regulation 
association. Following Durkheim (1912/2008) I hypothesized that the salient 
difference lies within the way religious groups symbolically represent aspects of 
the moral order within their beliefs, such that people are drawn into a respectful 
relationship with that order as authoritative. This symbolic relationship is 
established through the same social learning dynamics that designate any 
authority within the group and as such is subject to the same dynamics that can 
erode that authority. Recognizing this relational dimension of religious beliefs 
helps explain the variance within the religion/self-regulation relationship by 
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highlighting who is motivated to regulate based on their connection with the 
group, and who is motivated to regulate for their own good. 
Throughout this chapter I have supported this distinction between self-
centered motivation and socially-centered motivation by emphasizing the 
emotional processes salient for self-regulation. Returning to a point I made 
earlier, this emphasis should not be taken as an antagonistic stance against 
cognitive content or rational processes. As Turiel (2010) put it: "thought and 
emotion are not independent pieces of a puzzle… [They] are interdependent 
parts of a whole" (p. 557). My focus on emotion was a corrective to the dominant 
emphasis on the content of belief and how it motivates restraint. Emotions 
balance this perspective while also drawing forth the important relational 
dimensions of the association between religiosity and self-regulation. One can 
analyze this dynamic in terms of belief and restraint, but that is only a narrow 
slice of a much richer relational fabric. The challenge of our inquiry is to draw 
that relational fabric into view for empirical study. That is the task of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5– An empirical investigation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters aimed to advance the plausibility of an alternative 
explanation for the relationship between religious engagement and self-
regulation. The prevailing accounts focus on how the conceptual content of 
religious beliefs provides clear moral standards, along with the motivating force 
of promising divine rewards, which leads people to abide by those standards 
(e.g. Laurin & Kay, 2016; Zell & Baumeister, 2013). My alternative account takes a 
more social perspective on this dynamic, arguing that the standards of religious 
traditions are moralized social conventions and that, as such, abidance by these 
standards is intrinsically motivated by adherents’ relationship to the symbolic 
and actual religious community. The differences between these two accounts are 
largely conceptual, but both explanations nevertheless function as broad 
working hypotheses. While I have been arguing that my alternative account is 
more plausible in its description of psycho-social dynamics, this claim is not a 
test for or against either hypothesis– instead it acts to motivate empirical tests in 
new directions. 
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The difficulty of directly testing these hypotheses is rooted in their 
vagueness and complexity. In the next chapter, I will engage the philosophy of 
science in order to contextualize the challenge of testing theoretical claims. Stated 
briefly, the problem is that these theories are not conceptually specific, so they 
rely on nested sub-hypotheses to generate specific predictions.52 This complex 
structure can obscure which sub-hypothesis is the target of contravening 
evidence and whether that empirical challenge threatens the general theory. To 
help mitigate this challenge, I have articulated the specific hypotheses of my 
general theory during the preceding chapters. For example, in chapter two I 
arrived at Durkheim’s (1893/1984; 1912/2008) hypothesis that religion, morality, 
and the social order are intimately interwoven. In chapter three I reviewed the 
broad social-psychological context for Durkheim’s claim in order to argue that 
the process of moralization is a likely mediator within the relationship between 
                                                        
52 For example, the core hypothesis of the current theory is that religious beliefs encourage 
restraint. One specific hypothesis nested within this theory is that the Protestant belief in an 
afterlife that is determined by moral behavior in this lifetime leads some Protestants to not use 
elicit substances. If research finds evidence for or against this specific hypothesis, then how does 
that impact our confidence in the broader hypothesis? The picture becomes even more complex 
because this general hypothesis about belief and restraint is actually a sub-hypothesis of the 
broader claim that religious engagement influences self-regulation. The theoretical argument I 
built in the previous chapters—that focusing on belief and restraint obscures other religious and 
regulatory processes that are arguably more relevant—is targeted at this secondary level of 
explanation. The next chapter will reflect on the plausibility of this theoretical argument and the 
way it is influenced by the evidence presented in this chapter. 
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religious engagement and self-regulation. And in chapter four I argued that 
moralization is linked to the emotional processes that emerge when individuals 
are brought into a respectfully subordinate relationship with an authoritative 
social order. 
 Even these sub-hypotheses, however, are too vague to directly test. 
Ultimately, arbitrating between the complex theoretical networks of the current 
account and my alternative explanation can only occur in the long-run through 
the gradual accumulation and careful interpretation of evidence. While 
recognizing that fact, it is nevertheless important to contribute to that body of 
evidence with particular tests that help to draw neglected processes into view 
and test their relevance for the relationship between religion and self-regulation. 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a series of empirical tests that will examine 
condensed and sharper forms of the preceding hypotheses. If my alternative 
explanation is correct, then social, moral, and emotional processes will 
significantly determine the relationship between religion and self-regulation. The 
next section articulates my predicted relationships in detail. 
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5.2. The hypotheses53 
Durkheim’s claim is a broad interpretation of the relationship between the 
personal and the social, and the way this tension forges our engagement with 
religion, morality, and the group. A hundred years of evidence have neither 
solidified nor dethroned this perspective. As such, I do not expect that the 
current study will tip the scales. But, the value of Durkheim’s claim is that it can 
turn our attention to otherwise obscured evidence, and lead us to make more 
specific hypotheses about the way religion, sociality, and morality relate. 
In chapter four I argued that it was not simply religiosity that is bound 
within these Durkheimian processes; instead it is the way religious engagement 
leads a person to subordinate or align their personal proclivities with the 
demands of their tradition and group. Below I call this type of religious 
engagement “conventional.” Similarly, sociality is not a monolithic concept. 
Durkheim (1893/1984), and subsequent social theorists such as Bernstein (1971) 
and Douglas (1970), argued that one of the most important differences in 
sociality is whether it is characterized by tight and familiar interactions that are 
                                                        
53 The preceding chapters have been a gradual process of motivating the following hypotheses. 
As such, the brief explanations and clarifications that I offer here serve as reminders rather than 
full justifications for the specific hypotheses. Where appropriate I have noted the specific sections 
from previous chapters in which the motivation for the hypothesis is more fully articulated. 
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bound by tacit norms, or whether it is more loose, due to the anonymity of 
interaction partners. Colleagues and I (Morgan, Wood, & Caldwell-Harris, 2018) 
more recently characterized this difference in terms of social density – which 
refers to a mode of sociality in which a person is engaged in frequent and 
obligatory relationships. Finally, as we saw in chapter three, there are various 
forms of morality. In particular, Haidt and Graham’s (2007) influential moral 
foundations theory suggests that there is a set of “binding” moral intuitions—
loyalty, authority, and sanctity—that are functionally concerned with preserving 
the group. Recognizing these more specific forms of religiosity, sociality, and 
morality leads me to re-articulate the Durkheimian hypothesis as: 
• H1a: Conventional forms of religiosity will predict higher degrees of 
social density and the endorsement of binding moral intuitions. 
• H1b: Social density and the endorsement of binding morality will be 
positively associated. 
Throughout chapters two, three, and four I argued for the relevance of these 
moral and social processes for self-regulation (see sections 2.3, 3.4, and 4.2.2). 
Therefore, the crux of my alternative explanation is that social density and 
moralization mediate the relationship between religiosity and self-regulation. 
Throughout this dissertation (see sections 1.2.1 and 1.5), however, I have also 
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argued that self-regulation is a multi-faceted construct that varies depending on 
the type of goal-state (i.e., is it emotional or behavioral?) and on the degree of 
effort required (i.e., is it effortful or automatic?). Drawing on recent evidence 
(Lamm et al., 2017; Luerssen & Ayduk, 2014) in chapter four (4.1.2) I suggested 
that emotional regulation is an important determinant of the capacity to exercise 
self-control, such as that indexed by delayed discounting tasks. These insights 
combine into my second and third hypotheses: 
• H2: Degree of social density and endorsement of binding morality will 
mediate the relationship between conventional religiosity and the 
capacity for emotional regulation. 
• H3: The relationship between conventional religiosity and lower 
impulsivity on the delayed discounting task will be mediated by the 
capacity for emotional regulation. 
Finally, the relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation does 
not exist in isolation. As noted in chapter 1, this relationship is often cited as an 
explanation for the connection between religiosity and other important 
behavioral outcomes such as cooperation (Ainsworth & Baumeister, 2013) and 
health (Koole et al., 2010; McCullough & Willoughby, 2009). For example, 
Ainsworth and Baumeister (2013) argue that “human cooperation and fairness 
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depend on self-regulation” (p. 79). Similarly, within their groundbreaking review 
of religiosity and self-regulation, one of McCullough and Willoughby’s (2009) 
key propositions is that “religion affects health, well-being, and social behavior 
through self-regulation and self-control” (p. 71). Given the current emphasis on 
effortful modes of self-regulation, however, this mediating role for self-
regulation is often construed solely in terms of self-control. In order to assess 
whether other modes of self-regulation are relevant within these dynamics, I will 
also include a public goods game—a standard index of cooperation with 
experimental economics (Zelmer, 2003)—and a public health survey about 
depressive symptoms (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2003) as an indicator of 
well-being. Including these measures as dependent variables will allow me to 
directly assess whether delayed discounting or emotional regulation are relevant 
mediators. In contrast to accounts that emphasize the importance of restraint, my 
final hypotheses are: 
• H4a: Emotional regulatory capacity will mediate the relationship 
between conventional religiosity and levels of cooperation within a 
public goods game.  
• H4b: Including emotional regulatory capacity within the mediation 
model will reduce the relationship between impulsivity on the delayed 
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discounting task and cooperation in the public goods game to non-
significance. 
• H5a: Emotional regulatory capacity will also mediate the relationship 
between conventional religiosity and depressive symptoms. 
• H5b: Impulsivity on the delayed discounting task will not be related to 
depressive symptoms. 
These are not the only hypotheses that emerged during our theoretical analysis. 
For example, I also claimed that moralization and sacralization are two distinct 
processes (see section 3.4.1) and that attachment styles would bear a significant 
influence on an individual’s relationship to their community’s moral norms (see 
section 4.4.3). This set of five hypotheses, however, captures the crucial elements 
of my alternative explanation by highlighting the social, moral, and emotional 
processes that have previously been neglected when researchers move to explain 
why religious engagement would influence self-regulation. 
 In order to test this model, I recruited an online sample of predominately 
Christian participants. There is a clear need for psychology as a whole and 
psychology of religion in particular to include more diverse samples (Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), but my argument is primarily directed at 
theoretical explanations for how religion impacts self-regulation. These 
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explanations are built from studies using predominately Christian samples from 
North America and western Europe. My argument is not that the dynamic 
between religion and self-regulation is different in different cultural and 
religious contexts (though this is likely true); my argument is that the current 
explanation misconstrues the dynamic in general. Therefore, it is important to 
use a similar sample in order to test my alternative explanation.  
 
5.3 Methods 
5.3.1. Sample & variables 
This study was approved by Boston University’s Institutional Review Board as 
protocol #4869X. I recruited participants through the online research platform 
Prolific Academic (Prolific.ac). This platform, similar to Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk), is an online venue for interested people to register and participate 
in research for compensation. Research shows that recruitment through these 
platforms produces high-quality and representative data (e.g., Buhrmeister, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Crump, McDonnell, Gureckis, 2013; Rand, 2012), but 
recently concerns have been raised that MTurk participants may no longer be 
naïve to common behavioral surveys (Chandler et al., 2015). In response to these 
concerns, Peer and colleagues (2017) found that Prolific.ac still offered a highly 
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naïve pool of participants that were also more diverse than samples found on 
MTurk. 
A power analysis based on 10 variables (specified below), desired 
statistical power of 80%, small to moderate anticipated effect sizes (f2 = .15), and a 
statistical significance level, p = .05, indicates a necessary minimum sample size 
of 118. Given available funds, we recruited 615 participants. Participants were 
older than 18 and spoke English as a primary language.  
5.3.2 Demographics 
In addition to our predictor variables, each participant completed a brief 
demographic survey to indicate their age, ethnicity, gender, education, and 
subjective social status. These questions are especially important since they can 
each influence the other variables of interest (e.g., Wink & Dillon, 2003; 
Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013). 
5.3.3 Religiosity 
As an initial measure of conventional religiosity, I included three 
questions: “How important is religion in your life?” (ranked 1- very important to 
4-not at all important); “I consider myself orthodox or conventional in my 
religious or spiritual beliefs” (1-strongly disagree to 7-strongly agree); and 
“Thinking about your life these days, how often do you attend religious services, 
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not counting social obligations such as weddings or funerals?” (1-never to 6-
every week or more than once a week). While these items track different 
dimensions of religiosity, they coalesce as a rough index of religious 
conventionality and commitment. In previous studies, similar indices for 
religiosity predicted moralization and sacralization processes (Sheikh, Ginges, 
Coman, & Atran, 2012) and delayed discounting (Paglieri, Borghi, Colzato, 
Hommel, & Scorolli, 2013). The three items had a standardized internal 
consistency of Cronbach’s a = .76. 
Within the analysis, responses to these three items were combined into a 
composite score. Religious importance was reverse-scored, so that higher scores 
indicated more importance, and the composite index was formed as an addition 
of z-scores in order to standardize the different scales. The resulting index 
ranged from: -5 to 5.5, with higher scores indicated more conventional religiosity. 
In order to nuance this general measure of conventional religiosity, we 
also included the Multidimensional Religious Ideology (MRI) scale (Wildman et 
al., in prep.). This scale captures a spectrum of religious ideologies that range 
from liberal to more conservative perspectives. These perspectives are further 
differentiated into how people engage their religious beliefs, practices, and moral 
systems. With 51 items measured from 1-7 on a Likert scale, the results of the 
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MRI scale provide a religious profile indicating the conservatism or liberalism of 
their religious beliefs, practices, and morality. This scale will serve as a measure 
of participation in conventional religious practices, adherence to traditional 
religious beliefs, and endorsement of binding moral intuitions. An individual’s 
support for conventional religious practices is measured by the average of four 
sub-dimensions: formation of community, spiritual growth as submission, 
traditional use of rituals, and adherence to institutional structures. Cronbach’s a 
reliability for this scale was .80.  
Endorsement of traditional religious belief is also indicated by an average 
of four sub-dimensions: views on religious authority, views on religious texts, 
whether reality includes a transcendent dimension, and if purpose comes from 
that supernatural dimension. The internal consistency of this dimension was a = 
.90. 
5.3.4 Morality (BM) 
As noted, the MRI also includes a truncated version of the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). This 
questionnaire includes sub-dimensions for an individual’s concern for fairness, 
harm, loyalty, authority, and sanctity. The average endorsement of loyalty, 
authority, and sanctity will serve as our variable for binding moral intuitions 
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(Graham & Haidt, 2010), with a range from 1-7, higher scores indicate consistent 
endorsement of these moral positions. The MFQ is common in research on 
religiosity and moral intuitions (Graham et al., 2009), even when that research 
suggests that binding moral dimensions are not uniquely relevant for all forms of 
religiosity (see Davis et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2016)  The Cronbach reliability 
for this short version of the scale was a = .76. 
5.3.5 Social density (SD) 
We assessed social density using seven items from the mini-k subscale on 
the Arizona Life History Battery (Figueredo, Vásquez, Brumbach, & Schneider, 
2007). The entire subscale uses self-report questions to assess individual 
differences in life history strategies. The mini-k subscale includes items that 
directly assess the degree to which an individual is connected to their friends, 
family, and community, as well as the amount of support they give and receive 
in these relationships. For example: “I am often in social contact with my 
friends,” “I often give emotional support and practical help to my blood 
relatives.” Each item is scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), 
resulting in a total score ranging from 7 to 49, with higher scores indicating a 
higher degree of social density. The internal reliability of this scale was a = .84. 
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5.3.6 Emotional regulation (ER)  
We assessed emotional regulatory capacity with a sub-dimension of the 
brief Differentiation of Self Inventory– revised (DSI-r; Sloan & van Dierendonck, 
2016). This measure of emotional regulation assesses how stable a person feels in 
their sense of who they are (IP), along with the degree of emotional reactivity 
they experience in potentially evocative situations (ER; Skowron et al., 2003). 
This brief version of the DSI-r includes 10 items such as: “At times my feelings 
get the best of me and I have trouble thinking clearly.” Each item is scored from 1 
(not at all true of me) to 6 (very true of me), with some reverse scored, to give a 
total score ranging from 10-50, with higher scores indicating greater emotional 
regulatory capacities. The full DSI has been used in various studies on self-
regulation and religiosity (see Jankowski & Vaughn, 2009). The DSI-r is strongly 
correlated with the full DSI (r = .95; Sloan & van Dierendonck, 2016, p. 149) and 
has a high Cronbach reliability a = .90. Within our sample the internal 
consistency was a = .82. 
5.3.7 Delayed discounting (DD)  
As an index of self-control, we used Kirby and Maraković’s (1996) 
Monetary Choice Questionnaire to assess individual discounting rates. The task 
includes 21 questions which ask individuals to choose between a small reward 
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offered immediately and a larger reward delayed over a certain period. For 
example: “Would you rather have $40 today or $65 in 70 days?” By varying the 
magnitude of the offered reward and the time interval, this measure provides a 
stable estimate of an individual’s discounting rate, which is commonly 
interpreted as their impulsivity (Kirby, 2009; Odum, 2011). This task is prevalent 
in work on self-regulation (Madden & Johnson, 2010) and has been used in many 
of the studies connecting religiosity to self-control (e.g., Carter, McCullough, 
Kim-Spoon, Corrales, & Blake, 2012; Kim-Spoon, et al., 2015; Shenhav, et al., 
2017). 
Following conventions, we excluded discounting data from any 
participant who selected the larger later (n = 9) or smaller sooner (n = 5) option 
for all trials, since their discounting rate cannot be reliably estimated (Kirby & 
Maraković, 1996; Paglieri, et al., 2013). We normalized raw discounting rates 
with a natural log transformation, resulting in a range of: -3.15 to -0.87, with 
higher scores indicating more impulsive responses. The MCQ also contains an 
internal measure of consistency by estimating the percentage of choices that are 
compatible with the discounting rate estimate (Kirby & Maraković, 1996). The 
mean consistency score for our study was 93%, which supports the accuracy of 
our parameter estimation. 
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5.3.8 Public goods game (CO)  
As our measure of cooperation, we used an online, one-time public goods 
game modeled after a survey version of the dictator game (see Piff et al., 2015). 
Each participant was presented with the following scenario: 
You have automatically been given 10 raffle tickets. Each ticket is 
equal to one entry into the raffle for the extra $50. These 10 tickets 
are yours to keep. 
However, you have also been teamed up with 5 other participants, 
each of whom also has 10 raffle tickets. Within your team, everyone 
has the option to contribute as many tickets as they like into a group 
pot.  
The number of tickets that end up in the group pot will be doubled 
and then split evenly among all team members, regardless of their 
contribution. 
How many of your 10 raffle tickets would you like to contribute to 
the group pot? 
The number of tickets that individuals contributed to the public pot will serve as 
our measure of cooperation, ranging from 0-10.  
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5.3.9 Depressive symptoms (PHQ-2) 
As a very brief index of depressive symptoms, we included the two-item 
Participant Health Questionnaire: Depression screener (Kroenke et al., 2003), a 
common measure within public health research. This survey asks whether the 
participant has been bothered by “little interest or pleasure in doing thing” or 
“feeling down, depressed, or hopeless” over the last two weeks. Each symptom 
is ranked in terms of frequency from 0- not at all to 3-nearly every day, resulting 
in a score from 0-6. The PHQ-2 is prevalent in research on mental health, with 
current citations over 2,000. The reliability of these two-items within our study 
was Cronbach’s a = .80. 
 
5.4 Results: 
5.4.1 Preliminary analyses 
621 participants completed our surveys. The MRI survey includes two 
catch and calibration questions, which force respondents to use the two extreme 
ends of the scale in order to detect insincere respondents. The items are: “When 
you decide whether a person's action is right or wrong, it is relevant what that 
person's favorite color is,” which should produce Strongly Disagree; and “In 
general, all other things being equal, it is better to be kind than cruel,” which 
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should produce Strongly Agree. Following the guidelines for exclusion that we 
articulated within our pre-registered hypotheses, we excluded participants who 
failed to answer within 1 point of the appropriate extreme for both questions (n = 
182).  
We also included a five-item socially desirable response set, with 
questions such as: “No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener” 
ranked from 1-definitely true to 5-definitely false (Hays, Hayashi, & Stewart, 
1989). Following our pre-registered protocol, we also excluded participants who 
gave the socially desirable response for four or five of the five items (n = 27). 
While these may seem to be extreme exclusion criteria, it represents a 
conservative approach to internet sampling that prioritizes the removal of 
statistical noise from insincere respondents rather than broad inclusion.  
 For the remaining 412 participants, 58% (n = 238) were female, 41% (n = 
170) male, and 1% (n= 4) other. They ranged in age from 18 to 74 years old, with a 
mean of 34.7 (SD = 12.3). Participants were from the UK (n = 169), the USA (n = 
136), Mexico (n = 22), Canada (n = 14), Australia (n = 5), New Zealand (n = 3), 
Chile (n = 4), Israel (n = 2), Turkey (n = 1), and across the EU (n = 51), with five 
participants not reporting. Ethnically, 61% of participants were White/European 
(n = 251), 8% were Hispanic (n = 34), 8% were Black/African (n = 31), 6% were 
  
 
297 
South Asian (n = 26), 6% were East Asian (n = 25), 2% were Middle Eastern (n = 
7), and 9% reported either multiple ethnicities or other (n = 38). And finally, our 
sample was predominantly Christian (72%; n = 295), but also included 
participants who were Muslim (4%; n = 18), Jewish (2%; n = 10), Buddhist (1%; n = 
4), Neo-Pagan or Shamanistic traditions (1%; n = 5), along with Atheists (3%; n = 
13), Agnostics (5%; n = 20), Humanists (1%; n = 6), Nones (5%; n = 19), and those 
reporting other (5%; n = 22). The religiosity of this sample is fairly representative 
of religiosity in the US, which the Pew Research Council (2015) reports as 71% 
Christian, 6% other faiths, and 23% as unaffiliated. Similar demographic exists 
across western Europe and the UK, where 73% of people identify as Christian 
(although on 18% regularly attend church), 23% are unaffiliated, and 4% report 
other religious affiliations (Pew Research Council, 2018).  
 Table 1 reports the bivariate correlations, means, and standard deviations 
of the various measures. 
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Table 1. Bivariate correlations between measures 
 Rel BM SD ER DD PGG PHQ-2 
Rel .11 (2.4)       
BM .15** 2.36 (.7)      
SD .16*** -.02 25.7 (11.2)     
ER .12* .15** .24*** 35.6 (8.5)    
DD -.13** -.08 .02 -.02 -2.15 (.5)   
PGG -.02 -.01 .13** .01 -.16** 6.45 (3.1)  
PHQ-2 -.12* -.13* -.28*** -.42*** .03 -.03 2.64 (1.5) 
Rel– Conventional religiosity; BM– Endorsement of binding moral intuitions; SD– Social density;  
ER– Emotional Regulation; DD– Delayed discounting rates; PGG– Cooperation within public 
goods game; PHQ-2– Frequency of depressive symptoms. 
Note: Means and standard deviations for the scales are reported on the diagonal. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
  
5.4.2 Hypothesis testing 
I tested each of the hypotheses with mediation models (Baron & Kenny, 
1986; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007) assessed with hierarchical linear 
regressions. Since age, education, and socioeconomic status (SES) impact our 
variables of interest, I controlled for them in the following analyses by adding 
them as the first step of each hierarchical regression. 
5.4.2a H1 
The first hypothesis concerned the direct effects between conventional 
religiosity, social density, and binding morality. Using a hierarchical regression 
model, I first tested the relationships that age, education and SES had on the 
endorsement of binding moral intuitions. As reported in Table 2, both age and 
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education were significant predictors of the tendency to endorse binding 
morality. In the second step, I added conventional religiosity to the model, which 
had a small significant effect over and above the demographic variables. 
Table 2. Hierarchical regression model predicting the endorsement of binding moral 
intuitions from demographic variables and conventional religiosity. 
Step and 
variables 
R2 ΔR2 B 95% CIa b t p 
Step 1 .08***       
   Age   .01** .00, .01 .15 3.24 .001 
   Edu   -.00 -.02, .02 -.01 -.17 .866 
   SES   .11*** .07, .15 .24 5.04 <.001 
Step 2 .09*** .01*      
   Age.   .01** .00, .01 .15 3.20 .001 
   Edu   -.00 -.02, .02 -.01 -.28 .781 
   SES   .10*** .07, .13 .23 4.73 <.001 
   Conv. Rel.   .03* .01, .06 .12 2.47 .014 
Note: Significance testing for ΔR2 was done with an ANOVA between models. In Step 2: F(1, 407) 
= 6.07, p = .014. 
a. 95% CI = 95% Confidence interval for B 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
The second part of my initial hypothesis was that conventional religiosity 
would also predict higher degrees of social density. In order to test that 
relationship, I used a separate hierarchical regression analysis. The first step of 
the analysis predicted social density from age, education, and SES; both 
education and SES were moderately positively associated with the degree of 
social density (details in Table 3). Adding conventional religiosity to the model in 
step 2 explained an additional 2% of the variance. Religiosity’s relationship to 
social density was about as strong as that between education and social density.  
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H1b predicted a positive relationship between social density and binding 
moral intuitions, a key facet of moral foundations theory. Contrary to this 
prediction, social density and the endorsement of binding moral intuitions were 
not significantly related after controlling for age, education, and SES (B = -1.24, 
95% CI [-2.75, .27], p = .11). Despite this lack of significance, when the 
endorsement of binding moral intuitions was included as step 3 of the overall 
model predicting social density, it showed a marginally significant negative 
relationship with social density (Table 3). This negative association between 
social density and the endorsement of binding morality contradicts H1b, 
suggesting a more complicated relationship between religiosity, sociality and 
morality. Our hierarchical analyses did support H1a, suggesting a positive 
association between religiosity and both social density and the endorsement of 
binding morality, over and above the impact of our demographic variables. 
These direct effects lend support for advancing to our second hypothesis. 
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Table 3. Hierarchical regression model predicting social density from demographic 
variables, conventional religiosity, and the endorsement of binding morality. 
Step and 
variables 
R2 ΔR2 B 95% CIa b t p 
Step 1 .06***       
   Age   .02 -.06, .10 .02 .46 .647 
   Edu   .47** .16, .78 .14 2.90 .004 
   SES   1.26*** .61, 1.91 .19 3.80 <.001 
Step 2 .08*** .02**      
   Age.   .02 -.06, .10 .02 .40 .690 
   Edu   .45** .14, .76 .14 2.80 .005 
   SES   1.15*** .50, 1.80 .17 3.47 <.001 
   Conv. Rel.   .59** .16, 1.02 .13 2.71 .007 
Step 3 .09*** .01*      
   Age   .03 -.05, .11 .03 .71 .481 
   Edu   .44** .13, .75 .13 2.79 .006 
   SES   1.30*** .63, 1.97 .19 3.84 <.001 
   Conv. Rel.   .65** .22, 1.08 .14 2.94 .003 
   B. Morality   -1.52* -3.03, -.01 -.10 -1.98 .049 
Note: Significance testing for ΔR2 was done with an ANOVA between models. In Step 2: F(1, 407) 
= 7.35, p = .007. In Step 3: F(1, 406) = 3.90, p = .049. 
a. 95% CI = 95% Confidence interval for B 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
5.4.2b H2 
My second hypothesis—that social density and morality mediate the 
relationship between conventional religiosity and emotional regulation—was 
tested with a three-step hierarchical regression. These analyses are reported in 
Table 4. Conventional religiosity had a slight, but significant, positive association 
with emotional regulation above and beyond the influence of demographic 
variables. In a separate hierarchical regression analysis, entering social density at 
the second step, after the demographic variables, had a direct effect on emotional 
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regulation (B = .16, 95% CI [.09, .24], b = .21, p <.001) and explained 4.3% of the 
variance above that accounted for by the demographic variables (R2 =.10, ΔR2 = 
.043, F(4, 407) = 11.89, p <.001). In a different analysis, entering the endorsement 
of binding morality at the second step, after the demographic variables, did not 
have a significant direct effect on emotional regulation (B = 1.01, 95% CI [-.15, 
2.17], p = .087). Including social density and the endorsement of binding morality 
in the third step of the full model (see Table 4) reduced the association between 
conventional religiosity and emotional regulation to non-significance (from B = 
.34 to B = ,20; from b = .10 to b = .06). The Sobel test revealed a significant indirect 
effect through social density (ab = .09, z = 2.36, p = .018). The endorsement of 
binding morality was not significantly involved in the relationship between 
conventional religiosity and emotional regulation, as assessed by a Sobel test (ab 
= .03, z = 1.51, p = .131). 
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Table 4. Hierarchical regression model predicting emotional regulation from 
demographic variables, conventional religiosity, social density, and the endorsement of 
binding morality 
Step and variables R2 ΔR2 B 95% CIa b t p 
Step 1 .06***       
   Age   .06 -.01, .12  .08 1.73 .085 
   Edu.   -.14 -.38, .10 -.05 -1.14 .254 
   SES   1.24*** .75, 1.73 .24 4.91 <.001 
Step 2 .07*** .01*      
   Age   .06 -.01, .12 .08 1.69 .092 
   Edu.   -.15 -.39, .09 -.06 -1.23 .218 
   SES   1.17*** .68, 1.66 .23 4.64 <.001 
   Conv. Rel.   .34* .03, .65 .10 2.00 .046 
Step 3 .12*** .05***      
   Age   .04 -.02, .10 .06 1.31 .189 
   Edu.   -.22 -.46, .02 -.09 -1.83 .068 
   SES   .87*** .36, 1.38 .17 3.38 <.001 
   Conv. Rel.   .20 -.11, .51 .06 1.20 .231 
   Social Density   .16*** .09, .24 .21 4.38 <.001 
   B. Morality   1.12 -.01, 2.26 .10 1.94 .053 
Note: Significance testing for ΔR2 was done with an ANOVA between models. In Step 2: F(1, 407) 
= 4.02, p = .046. In Step 3: F(2, 405) = 10.77, p < .001. 
a. 95% CI = 95% Confidence interval for B 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
5.4.2c H3 
My third hypothesis extended findings that self-control depends on the 
prior capacity of emotional regulation (e.g., Lamm et al., 2017) to suggest that the 
relationship between religiosity and delayed discounting is mediated by 
emotional regulation. I tested this hypothesis with a three-step hierarchical 
regression (see Table 5). Corroborating past studies, religiosity was significantly 
associated with lower discounting rates, over and above the demographic 
variables. Adding emotional regulation to the model in step 3 did not 
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significantly change this relationship. Furthermore, emotional regulation had no 
significant direct effect on discounting rates, when entered at the second step, 
after the demographic variables in a separate hierarchical regression (B = .001, 
95% CI [-.01, .01], p = .83). While this analysis does not support the mediation 
effects predicted by H3, it does support previous findings that religiosity is 
associated with lower discounting rates. 
 
Table 5. Hierarchical regression model predicting discounting rates from demographic 
variables, conventional religiosity, and emotional regulation 
Step and variables R2 ΔR2 B 95% CIa b t p 
Step 1 .019       
   Age   .001 -.003, .005 .02 .50 .621 
   Edu.   .001 -.013, .015 .01 .19 .851 
   SES   -.044** -.077, -.011 -.14 -2.69 .007 
Step 2 .032* .015*      
   Age   .001 -.003, .005 .03 .53 .596 
   Edu.   .002 -.014, .018 .01 .26 .795 
   SES   -.040* -.073, -.007 -.12 -2.42 .016 
   Conv. Rel.   -.026* -.047, -.006 -.12 -2.36 .019 
Step 3 .033* .001      
   Age   .001 -.003, .005 .02 .50 .616 
   Edu.   .002 -.014, .018 .01 .28 .778 
   SES   -.042* -.075, -.009 -.13 -2.46 .014 
   Conv. Rel.   -.026* -.048, -.004 -.12 -2.39 .018 
   Emo. Reg.   .001 -.01, .01 .02 .45 .654 
Note: Significance testing for ΔR2 was done with an ANOVA between models. In Step 2: F(1, 399) 
= 5.54, p = .019. In Step 3: F(1, 399) = .20, p = .654. 
a. 95% CI = 95% Confidence interval for B 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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5.4.2d H4 
Given the positive associations between conventional religiosity and both 
emotional regulation and delayed discounting, I tested the fourth and fifth 
hypotheses about self-regulation mediating the relationship between religiosity 
and outcomes such as cooperation or mental health. To test H4 I used a series of 
linear regressions. Conventional religiosity was not significantly associated with 
levels of cooperation in the public goods game (B = -.04, 95% CI [-.16., .08], p = 
.573). The lack of a direct effect between religiosity and cooperation rules out the 
mediation effect predicted by H4a. Likewise, there was no significant association 
between emotional regulation and levels of giving in the public goods game (B = 
-.01, 95% CI [-.05, .03], p = .677). There was, however, a significant effect between 
discounting rates and contributions in the public goods game (B = -.92, 95% CI [-
1.51, -.33], b = -.15, p = .002), which explained 2% of the variance in contributions 
beyond that predicted by demographic variables (R2=.05, ΔR2 = .02, F(4, 399) = 
4.94, p = .002). My prediction that religiosity would be associated with higher 
levels of giving and that emotional regulation would fully mediate this 
relationship above and beyond discounting behaviors was not supported by the 
evidence. 
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5.4.2e H5 
Finally, I tested the fifth hypothesis about the associations between 
religiosity and various modes of self-regulation with the frequency of depressive 
symptoms, with a series of hierarchical regressions. While conventional 
religiosity showed a significant negative bivariate correlation with depressive 
symptoms (see Table 1), after controlling for age, education, and SES, 
conventional religiosity was not significantly associated with frequency of 
depressive symptoms (B = -.05, 95% CI [-.11, .01], p = .083). While this undermines 
the likelihood of any mediating effects, both social density and emotional 
regulation were significantly associated with fewer depressive symptoms in the 
full model (see Table 6). Unsurprisingly, emotional regulatory capacity had the 
strongest protective effect on depressive symptoms with a standardized b = -.33 
and notably social density also had an ameliorating impact (b = -.15) that was 
almost equal to that of SES (b = -.18). 
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Table 6. Linear regression model predicting frequency of depressive symptoms from 
demographic variable, conventional religiosity, social density, binding morality, 
emotional regulation, and discounting rates 
Variables R2 B 95% CIa b t p 
Full model .27***      
   Age  -.02*** -.03, -.01 -.17 -3.87 < .001 
   Edu  .01 -.03, .04 .01 .25 .806 
   SES  -.17*** -.24, -.09 -.18 -3.76 < .001 
   Conv. Rel.  -.016 -.07, .04 -.03 -.57 .571 
   Social density  -.02** -.03, -.01 -.15 -3.31 .001 
   B. Morality  -.026 -.21, .16 -.01 -.28 .783 
   Emo. Reg.  -.06*** -.08, -.04 -.33 -7.22 < .001 
   Delay Disc.  .026 -.27, .22 .01 .21 .837 
Note: a. 95% CI = 95% Confidence interval for B 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
5.5 Discussion 
These analyses provide mixed support for my hypotheses. Conventional 
religiosity was positively associated with both social density and the 
endorsement of binding moral intuitions. The relationship between binding 
morality and social density, however, was more complicated. Supporting my 
second hypothesis, conventional religiosity was positively related to emotional 
regulatory capacity, and this relationship was fully mediated by social density. 
Binding morality did not influence the association between religiosity and 
emotional regulation. Conventional religiosity was also negatively associated 
with impulsivity, as indicated by discounting rates. This relationship was not 
mediated by emotional regulation. Lower discounting rates were associated with 
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more giving in the public goods game, though religiosity had no direct effect on 
levels of giving. Finally, after controlling for demographic variables, the 
frequency of depressive symptoms was not significantly related to religiosity, 
but both social density and emotional regulation were significantly associated 
with fewer depressive symptoms. While not every one of my hypotheses were 
supported by these analyses, these results lend preliminary evidence to some of 
the main critiques I brought against the current theoretical accounts of the 
relationship between religion and self-regulation. There are four main points to 
take away from these results.  
First, Durkheim’s hypothesis about the interwoven relationship between 
religiosity, morality, and sociality appears to have partial support. Conventional 
religiosity was significantly associated with both higher levels of social density 
and more endorsement of binding moral intuitions. Given previous studies have 
demonstrated that the relationship between religiosity and moral intuitions 
depends on cultural context (Davis et al., 2016) and individual differences in 
religious ideology (Johnson et al., 2016), we should expect that the later effect—
between binding morality and religiosity—depends heavily on how I measured 
religiosity. In this case, conventional religiosity may be tapping into conservative 
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dimensions of the religiosity within our sample, which was predominately white 
Christians from the US or western Europe.  
The relationship between conventional religiosity and social density is a 
novel finding worth further exploration, especially given the various factors 
subsumed within both variables. For example, social density includes 
relationships with both family and peers, which could play distinct roles in 
relation to religious sociality. Contrary to the theoretical predictions of moral 
foundations theory (Graham & Haidt, 2010), social density and the endorsement 
of binding moral intuitions were not significantly related. When religiosity was 
included in the model, this relationship became significant, but was negative. 
This could be the result of problems within the theoretical construction of 
binding moral intuitions, which—as noted in 3.4.1—has come under criticism 
(e.g., Curry, 2016). The lack of significance could also be the result of the different 
factors within our measure of social density, noted above. Given the complexities 
of social learning, it is likely that familial and peer social networks would 
influence moral endorsements in different ways, and these dynamics would also 
likely depend on the broader social context. Regardless, there is enough 
theoretical support for an association between binding moral intuitions and 
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sociality that one insignificant association found here is not sufficient to dismiss 
the relationship. 
Second, emotional regulation and the self-regulatory processes 
responsible for delayed discounting appear to be distinct. Importantly, 
conventional religiosity was positively associated with each type of self-
regulation. I hypothesized that emotional regulation would be a primary 
determinant of delayed discounting, H3, but there was no evidence of mediation. 
Nevertheless, the fact that these two modes of self-regulation were unrelated 
poses problems for theoretical accounts that conflate self-regulation with self-
control (Laurin & Kay, 2016; Zell & Baumeister, 2013). By generalizing from one 
particular type of self-regulation, self-control, to all types, these theories risk 
obscuring the important relationship between religious engagement and 
emotional regulation. This theoretical omission is especially problematic given 
the different behavioral outcomes that emerged in H4 and H5. 
Third, the relationship between conventional religiosity and emotional 
regulation was fully mediated by social density. This mediation analysis 
supports my argument in chapter 4 that religious engagement tends to motivate 
regulatory processes by shaping an individual’s emotional responses through 
dense and obligatory relational contexts. Of course, that broad hypothesis was 
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too complex to be tested within a single study, but these analyses offer initial 
evidence that should encourage more research on the dynamics between 
religiosity, social density, and emotional regulation. Within the mediation 
analysis I framed this relationship as a unidirectional impact of religious 
engagement on social density, but it is important to recognize that this is likely a 
reciprocal relationship. A dense familial environment, for example, may foster 
religious commitment, which in turn maintains that social network. It is this 
complex feedback loop that I am suggesting fosters emotional regulation, but 
with a cross-sectional study I cannot infer causal directions. 
Surprisingly, social and moral processes had no impact on the relationship 
between conventional religiosity and delayed discounting. This suggests that not 
only are there various types of self-regulation, but that there are also various 
pathways through which religious engagement impacts these types. Previous 
research has shown that future time orientation—the tendency to see the future 
as rapidly approaching (Gjesme, 1979)—partially mediates the association 
between religiosity and delayed discounting (Carter, et al., 2012). Paglieri and 
colleagues (2013) suggested that religious doctrines of predestination versus 
confession and expiation drove cultural differences between Dutch Calvinists 
and Italian Catholics in the association between religion and delayed 
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discounting. It is possible, therefore, that the content of particular religious 
beliefs does impact this type of self-regulation, while social processes—such as 
obligatory relationships, attachment styles (Kirkpatrick, 2004; Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2019) or relational tendencies (e.g., Davis, Granqvist, & Sharp, 2018; 
Sandage & Harden, 2011)—within religious engagement have a stronger impact 
on emotional forms of regulation. 
Fourth, and finally, these distinct modes of self-regulation have divergent 
relevance for behavioral outcomes. Lower discounting rates were significantly 
associated with higher levels of giving in the public goods game. While these 
tasks are highly idealized versions of self-control and cooperation, the significant 
relationship nevertheless lends support to past findings associating self-control 
and prosociality (see Ainsworth & Baumeister, 2013). In this study, emotional 
regulation was not significantly involved in these dynamics, but previous 
research has found that the cooperative tendencies fostered by religion are 
primarily directed toward the in-group (Norenzayan et al., 2016; Purzycki et al., 
2016; Sosis & Bressler, 2003). Since emotional regulation was strongly associated 
with sociality, its potential role in this relationship between religiosity and 
cooperation remains an important subject for future research. 
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In contrast, discounting behaviors had no significant associations with 
depressive symptoms in our sample. Instead, emotional regulatory capacity and 
social density become more important to consider as they predicted significantly 
fewer depressive symptoms. Even though the relationship between religiosity 
and depressive symptoms was insignificant in this study, there is substantial 
research connecting religiosity and depression, with some showing an 
ameliorating relationship (Bonelli & Koenig, 2013; Koenig, 2015), while other 
studies show mixed effects (Wei & Liu, 2013) or positive association between 
religiosity and depressive symptoms (e.g., Eliassen, Taylor, Lloyd, 2005; Miller et 
al., 2008; Pargament et al., 2004). Much of this previous research has focused on 
the role of spiritual and religious coping practices (e.g., Ahles, Mezulis, & 
Hudson, 2016; Pargament, 2011) or social support (e.g., Chatters, Taylor, 
Woodward, & Nicklett, 2015) in explaining this variance, though relational 
dimensions likely play an important role as well (Paine & Sandage, 2017).  
My results build on this literature to suggest that both emotional 
regulation and social density may be playing important and distinct roles in 
these dynamics. Given the positive relationship between social density and 
emotional regulation, it is surprising that both variables maintained unique 
relationships with depressive symptoms in the full model. In regards to the 
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above associations between religiosity and depression, social density may 
highlight some of the practical effects of social support, emphasized by Chatter et 
al. (2015). On the other hand, religious coping strategies (e.g., Pargament, 2011) 
and relational styles of spirituality (e.g., Paine & Sandage, 2017) may bear more 
of an impact on emotional regulatory capacity. This suggestion is similar to 
Aldwin et al.’s (2014) argument that behavioral and emotional forms of self-
regulation have different impacts on well-being, but it resists the sharp 
distinction they draw between spirituality and religiosity. At the very least, these 
results help nuance prior suggestions to look beyond self-control when 
considering the connection between religiosity and health (Koole et al., 2010). 
There are also important limitations to the current study. As noted above, 
since this study is cross-sectional, it does not tell us about the causal 
directionality within any of these relationships. Where possible I have leaned on 
other evidence to infer such directionality, but a longitudinal design would be 
necessary to directly test these causal hypotheses. Second, the generalizability of 
these results is hampered by the narrowness of our sample. Henrich, Heine, and 
Norenzayan (2010) have shown the various ways that samples from western, 
education, industrialized, rich, and democratic nations are very peculiar. My 
sample was predominantly from the north Atlantic and was also 
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overwhelmingly Christian. As noted at the end of 5.2, however, most of the 
studies that inform the current theory were drawn from similar samples. 
Nevertheless, in order to generalize these dynamics, future research will need to 
extend to more diverse samples (e.g., Chilcott, 2016). Third, my index of 
conventional religiosity is a very rough indicator of the dynamics I unpacked in 
chapter 4. In order to test my hypothesis about the consequences of individuals 
being in a subordinate relationship with a symbolically instantiated authoritative 
social order, I need a more sophisticated index or method. Similarly, extending 
beyond self-reports of emotional regulation and social density would enrich 
future studies on these dynamics. 
Despite these limitations, this study still offers an important contribution 
to research on religious engagement and self-regulation by encouraging a 
broader scope beyond the sole focus on religion as a set of beliefs and regulation 
as cognitive restraint. Instead, this is only one part of the broader picture in 
which religious engagement is interwoven with social, moral, and emotional 
processes. Understanding the complex dynamics of these associations, along 
with their consequences for health and prosocial outcomes, will take more 
research than this single study. At the very least, however, this study offers an 
initial set of evidence that suggests we must cast our empirical net quite broadly 
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if we want to understand the relationship between religious engagement and 
self-regulation.  
As I noted in the introduction, moving from this evidence to the 
theoretical account that I have been building in chapters two, three, and four is a 
complicated process. Does the evidence from this study do more than simply 
encourage us to include more processes in the dynamics we consider? Does it 
also shift the plausibility of one account over the other? In the next chapter, I will 
take up these questions to reflect on how we might understand the role of theory 
and evidence within the psychology of religion. 
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Chapter 6– Reflection and the weight of metaphors 
 
6.1 Introduction 
My argument within this dissertation was multifaceted. In chapters 2-4, the 
argument was primarily a theoretical challenge to the current explanations for 
why religion impacts self-regulation. This challenge consisted of various 
interdisciplinary reviews and analyses, which encouraged researchers to broaden 
the range of evidence considered relevant for understanding this relationship. In 
chapter 5, however, my argument was a more specific empirical challenge to 
features of the current explanation. This study brought new evidence to bear on 
how we understand the concepts of religious engagement, self-regulation, and 
their relationship. The question now is: where does our inquiry stand? How do 
we measure the success of a project that blends interdisciplinary analysis and 
empirical work in order to shift plausibility claims? 
In this final chapter, I will use theoretical tools from philosophy of science 
to reflect on these questions. I will begin with a brief discussion of conceptual 
vagueness. Along with pragmatic philosophers, I recognize that conceptual 
vagueness plays a generative role within the process of inquiry. A vague concept 
is one which allows for multiple inconsistent specifications of itself. For example, 
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the statement, “She has dark hair” is vague, leaving open the possibilities that 
the person’s hair is dark black, brown, auburn, etc. When a vague concept is 
unreflectively specified, however, it can also lead to miscommunication and to 
unperceived restrictions of imagination within interdisciplinary approaches. I 
suggest that unreflective specification is what created the theoretical issues 
facing the current explanation for religious engagement and self-regulation. 
When we say “religious engagement” or “self-regulation” what sort of 
phenomena are we referring to? Understanding vagueness will help clarify the 
theoretical work of chapters 2-4 by articulating the problem that this project aims 
to overcome. 
With these philosophical contours in view, I will give a brief review of my 
proposed solution, which can be viewed as a three part process: first, I stepped 
back from the dominant specification of the religion and self-regulation 
relationship; second, from within the vague terrain of religious engagement and 
self-regulation I considered other relevant evidence that both challenged the 
current specification and suggested alternatives; third, I constructively offered 
and tested an alternative explanation for the relationship between religious 
engagement and self-regulation, which specified the vague categories in a new 
and plausible direction. 
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 The final step, therefore, is to reflect on the entailments of my alternative 
specification for both the dominant explanation that I argued against and the 
vague association between religious engagement and self-regulation. To foster 
that reflection, I will briefly engage work within the philosophy of science to help 
us understand the epistemic and social terrain of theory construction. Kuhn 
(1962) and others who have followed his lead (e.g., Bloor, 1976) will offer a 
radical objection to the very possibility of building novel explanations on the 
basis of evidence. While this perspective helps highlight the challenges my 
project faces, it also is committed to an unnecessarily severe separation between 
descriptions of the world and the world itself. To preserve the helpful aspects of 
Kuhn (1962) but permit the possibility of theory construction in relation to the 
world, I will turn to Lakatos (1978). Lakatos offers a perspective on inquiry that 
recognizes the way it is constrained by theoretical commitments but also 
receptive to new empirical challenges. Reviewing this framework will help me 
articulate the intellectual fault lines between my explanation, the dominant one, 
and the various interdisciplinary schools that I have engaged. While Lakatos 
(1978) provides an epistemic framework for situating interdisciplinary inquiry, 
he leaves the social dimensions of such projects largely unspecified. In order to 
briefly consider the social character of inquiry, I will briefly engage Longino’s 
  
 
320 
(1990) account of criticism amidst a diverse community of concerned inquirers. 
These concluding philosophical reflections describe the broader intellectual 
context for my current project. From this wider vantage point I will conclude by 
arguing that interdisciplinary approaches are essential to the vitality of inquiry, 
especially within biocultural terrain such as that between religious engagement 
and self-regulation. 
 
6.2 The value of vagueness 
I follow Neville (2014) and others in the pragmatic tradition by defining 
vagueness as applying to any “category that is capable of being instantiated or 
specified by instances that are mutually contradictory” (Neville, 2014, p. 26). This 
definition follows Peirce’s early formulation that something is “vague in so far as 
the principle of contradiction does not apply to it” (1905, p. 488). For example, 
the category of “religious behavior” is vague. Scholars regularly develop 
different and potentially conflicting conceptions of what religious behaviors are: 
social signals of solidarity and reliability (Soler, 2012), protests against 
oppressive social conditions (Taussig,1980), enactments of relationships with 
supernatural beings (Luhrmann, 2012). At a more practical level, most people 
have a commonsense idea of what religious behavior is and can point to specific 
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instances, such as Salat, even if borderline cases, such as cheering for a football 
team, cause confusion. We are left with a category that includes everything from 
the mass pilgrimage of Kumbh Mela to the quiet devotional prayers of an 
American Protestant, and that does not even include controversial cases. What a 
mess for any inquiry about religious behavior. 
But also, what promise. As Wildman (2010) and others have argued, 
vagueness is necessary for meaningful comparison. For example, self-regulation 
is a vague category because it has been conceptualized as automatic (Bargh, 
1997), deliberate (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), mechanical (Carver & Scheier, 
1998), and value-driven (Berkman, Hutcherson, Livingston, Kahn, & Inzlicht, 
2017) to name a few theoretical positions. While this ambiguity fosters relentless 
turf battles in psychology about how to accurately define the regulatory terrain 
(e.g., Bargh, 1997; Galla & Duckworth, 2015; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), it also 
permits the fruitful comparison of these conflicting accounts of self-regulation. 
Rather than creating distinct categories with sharp boundaries around behavior 
that is automatic and that which is deliberate, for example, maintaining a vague 
category that includes as potential specifications these mutually contradictory 
accounts of self-regulation creates the conceptual space necessary for productive 
discussion and debate about the merits of alternate accounts of self-regulation. 
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Within this section I will explore how the vagueness of both “religious 
engagement” and “self-regulation” permits some of the problems with the 
current explanation to emerge. But the characteristic of vagueness itself is not the 
source of the problem. Drawing stricter boundaries around these categories 
would not lead to a more satisfying account of how religious engagement 
impacts self-regulation, instead it would make such an account impossible. If we 
abandoned the vague categories of religion and self-regulation and only 
deployed concepts with clearly determinate boundaries, we would have a 
plurality of very specific insights. For example, researchers could ask: does belief 
in the selective presence of the Holy Spirit held by middle class Ghanaian 
Pentecostals in the suburbs of Accra during the dry season of 1995 impact their 
intertemporal discounting behaviors for caloric rewards of medium magnitude; 
or does Shavuot impact subsequent dietary restraint among male members of 
three Kibbutzim in 2016; etc. Preserving the vague categories of religion and self-
regulation provides a flexible conceptual basis for integrating these specific 
results into a broader insight about how religious rituals or beliefs impact 
behaviors.54 
                                                        
54 There are some scholars who are philosophically opposed to such integrative projects; recall the 
“incredulity towards metanarratives” of Lyotard (1979/1993, p. xxiii) and other postmodern 
scholars I reviewed in chapter 2. In the terms of vagueness, these scholars tend to be wary of 
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There are two reasons that attempting to remove vagueness from inquiry 
is undesirable. First, it does not seem to be possible, despite the demand for 
analytically distinct ideas that has persisted since Descartes (1641/1993). In the 
examples above, the vagueness of “religion” was specified by time, geography, 
political and social context, and particular beliefs/behaviors etc. for each of the 
categories. But even these categories are vague in terms of membership (e.g., is 
Abena part of the group if she only came to church once during that period?) and 
content (e.g., is a belief about disrespectful business practices relevant if it is 
considered to impact one’s relationship with the Holy Spirit?). The world will 
never perfectly fit our conception of it—thankfully—so the demand for perfectly 
distinct categories is vain. 
Second, not only is vagueness unavoidable, it is also valuable in its 
capacity to foster novel insights and fruitful comparisons. By maintaining an 
openness for conflicting features within a vague category, inquiry remains 
receptive to new evidence from fields with different interests. In other words, 
                                                        
vague categories because the imprecision allows for the intrusion of bias and coercion. That is 
true to a degree, but the problem can be mitigated in ways that do not require abandoning the 
possibility of the comparative project. Furthermore, psychologists are also concerned about 
including more diverse representations of phenomena, as indicated by the nearly 5000 citations 
of Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan’s (2010) call for better representation within psychological 
research. 
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vague categories are crucial to the success of interdisciplinary inquiry. My 
defense of the value of vagueness, however, should not be mistaken as an excuse 
for sloppy categories. Instead it is a call for transparency around how we specify 
our objects of study and care around how we compare these objects with others. 
As we will see below, it is in the process of specification and interpretation that 
problems emerge. 
6.2.1 Vague religion 
At the outset of this project I discussed the difficulties inherent in defining 
religion. Now we can see how these problems emerge because of the vagueness 
of the category. Within that initial chapter, I also discussed the promise of 
adopting a family resemblance definition, which relies on a loose cluster of 
similar features, none of which is essential to the whole (Wildman, 2010; 
Wittgenstein, 1953/2009). One of the virtues of this approach is how it moves our 
attention away from concerns about whether or not something is “religious” and 
instead focuses inquiry on the ways in which it is similar and different from 
other religious phenomena. With regards to vagueness, however, the salient 
point here is that “religion” is vague because it can be specified in a variety of 
contradictory ways while still referring to the same object. 
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When studying any of these phenomena as relevant to the overarching 
category, researchers necessarily reduce religion or religiosity to particular 
characteristics through their methods and their sampling. For example, in their 
study on cultural differences in discounting rates, Paglieri and colleagues (2013) 
sampled Dutch students and Italian students and grouped them based on 
whether they had received any sort of religious teaching while growing up (p. 
741). Therefore, Paglieri and colleagues (2013) were not studying “religion” per 
se, they were studying this particular form of socialization among two student 
populations. By following the norms of psychological science—such as 
contextualizing this study amidst others, statistically controlling for other 
potentially influential variables, etc.—they were nevertheless able to generalize 
from their results to claim that variance in beliefs about asceticism and salvation 
led Dutch Calvinists to be significantly less impulsive than their Italian Catholic 
counterparts (Paglieri, et al., 2013). Their interpretation is not posited as 
unimpeachable, instead it functions as a plausible explanation for the significant 
differences that emerged within their results.  
All of the studies comprising the empirical foundations for the claim that 
religiosity impacts self-regulation follow this form. Religion is reduced to specific 
groups and characteristics, and the results are interpreted in light of the more 
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general category. This is a normal process of inquiry and so long as the 
interpretations remain open to correction, it is epistemologically sound.55 Why 
then am I dwelling on this point? Within this process we can see two places 
where bias can enter inquiry. The first is in the process of selecting evidence and 
the second is within the theoretical interpretation of that evidence.  
As inquiry proceeds, these two points of potential bias often enter a 
reinforcing feedback loop. Choosing which features of a vague category to study 
as potentially salient necessarily requires some subjective judgment. For 
example, does one analyze religion in terms of affiliation, belief, or practices? 
This judgment is guided by whatever the existing theoretical framework within 
our discipline might be. If previous studies have found that religious beliefs are 
the salient feature of religion’s impact on self-regulation, then new studies will 
likely follow this lead. Even if researchers do not adjust their methods to focus on 
particular aspects of the vague category, when they move to interpret their 
findings, this is done in light of existing theories. For example, Paglieri et al. 
(2013) did not specifically analyze religious belief, but they interpreted the group 
                                                        
55 I recognize that this statement completely dodges Hume’s (1739/2000) problems with induction 
and the fraught terrain of generalization. Fully treating those issues is well beyond the scope of 
this project (for a pragmatic defense of induction see Reichenbach, 1949), but I will note that 
adopting both vague categories and fallibilism significantly deflate Hume’s concerns, which were 
based on the felt need for distinct and certain knowledge. 
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differences as resulting from belief because that is the explanation that existing 
theories could support. Over time, this process can become mutually reinforcing 
in a way that lends false assurance to the sense that the most salient feature of the 
vague category has been found. 
The accumulation of evidence that religious belief fosters particular forms 
of self-regulation does increase the plausibility that this is a salient feature of 
religion. But, we need to be careful to discern what is confirming evidence and 
what is interpretative– for example Paglieri et al.’s (2013) account is not strictly 
supportive of the claim about religious belief because they did not measure 
religious belief versus practice versus affiliation.56 This is not to say that their 
explanation is not very plausible, just that it does not rule out the potential 
influence of these other aspects of the vague category, “religiosity.” This is 
significant in the long run because their interpretation then acts as existing 
theory, which guides how future researchers choose and interpret their evidence. 
The ruts on the road to Rome were deep. 
When researchers such as Zell and Baumeister (2013) or Laurin and Kay 
(2016) write their reviews of the relationship between religion and self-
                                                        
56 I do not mean to imply the work of Paglieri et al. (2013) is particularly egregious. I find their 
research quite compelling and rigorous. The dynamics I am describing apply to all of this 
research, including my own. 
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regulation, a singular focus in the literature on one part of the vague category 
“religion” can be easily mistaken as evidence that that part is the most salient 
feature. This repetition further increases the perceived importance of that feature 
without ever directly testing it in light of the other possible features within the 
overarching category. Calling for researchers to consider the full range of 
possibly salient features within the vague category of religion is too strenuous a 
demand, but we should at least remain attentive to their existence.  
The preceding analysis hopefully highlights my motivation and method 
within chapters 2-4. Rather than drawing from the currently prevailing theory, I 
sought other disciplines and research programs with perspectives and evidence 
pertinent to the relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation. 
Religious studies in the tradition of Durkheim (1912/2008) highlighted the 
potential importance of ritual practice, sociality, and morality as salient facets of 
religious engagement. Reviewing psychological work on social identity and 
moralization processes highlighted the potential significance of affiliation and 
the way people relate to their religious community’s norms (e.g., Atran & 
Ginges, 2012; Molden, Lee & Higgins, 2013). Analyzing these processes through 
the perspective of moral emotions further enhanced the plausible influence that 
relational dynamics within religiosity would have on self-regulation. 
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Throughout chapters 2-4, I brought theoretical perspectives and evidence from 
across disciplines to construct an alternative specification of the vague category, 
religious engagement, and argue that it offered a more plausible influence on 
self-regulation. In short, my claim was not simply that the focus had grown too 
narrow, but that it had grown too narrow in the wrong direction. 
A deeper intellectual history of this discipline would likely reveal other 
theoretical commitments and philosophical assumptions that led researchers to 
posit the importance of belief in the first place (see Smith, 1979). My point, 
however, is that we do not need to speculate about these deeper origins of bias in 
order to recognize that the vague category was not necessarily specified on the 
basis of decisive evidence. Even so, the vagueness of this category is not the 
problem; if anything, the vagueness of “religiosity” is what permits and 
encourages the interdisciplinary consideration of other relevant processes. The 
issues within this process emerge from the way inquiry is socially established 
and theory-laden, which we will take up below. Before we turn to that, however, 
we must first deal with the vagueness of self-regulation as well. 
6.2.2 Vague regulation 
As noted above, self-regulation is also a vague category because it can be 
specified in various and conflicting ways. Just as inquiry about religion in 
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relation to self-regulation became focused on belief, so too the vague concept of 
self-regulation became solidified as effortful restraint. When Carver and Scheier 
(1998) wrote the definitive text on self-regulation, there was no mention of 
willpower or effortful restraint as the paradigmatic form of regulation. By 2016, 
in the Handbook of Self-Regulation,57 Carver and Scheier devote a section of their 
chapter to dual-process theories of regulation, but remain clear that regulation 
encompasses both automatic and effortful forms of goal-pursuit. Given their 
persistent maintenance of regulation as a vague category, where does the 
emphasis on effortful restraint enter this research program? 
Within the space of this chapter I cannot offer a definitive account of this 
trajectory, but a brief sketch of the emergence and predominance of work on ego-
depletion suggests that the attachment of this metaphor to self-regulation was a 
fairly routine occurrence. Baumeister and colleagues’ (1998) first major article on 
ego-depletion has been cited over 4,744 times, with the paired experiment 
(Muraven et al., 1998) cited 2248 times (both assessed by Google scholar on 
September 1st, 2018). One of the first meta-analyses of ego-depletion by Hagger et 
                                                        
57 It is worth noting that Vohs and Baumeister, both strong proponents of self-control as ego-
depletion (see Baumeister & Vohs, 2016), are the editors of this third edition of the handbook of 
self-regulation. 
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al. (2010) reported 198 unique tests of ego-depletion. These are all signs of a 
thriving research program.  
Given the way this research program flourished, it is no surprise that the 
key piece of this theory, that regulation depends on a limited resource, became 
interpreted as an essential part of the explanatory model connecting religion and 
self-regulation. In 1999, Baumeister and Exline were already suggesting that 
religion fosters morality by increasing one’s regulatory strength58 (see also, 
Baumeister & Exline, 2000). McCullough and Willoughby’s (2009) review, which 
highlights the fact that self-regulation is both deliberate and automatic, 
nevertheless draws from Schmeichel and Baumeister (2004) to suggest that 
enacting self-regulation depends on “self-regulatory strength” which “can be 
likened to a muscle that can be weakened through acute exertion but that can 
also be strengthened through repeated use” (2009, p. 82). The metaphor of effort 
has snuck into the theory. McCullough and Willoughby (2009) go on to argue 
that the evidence for religion being a way to build self-regulatory strength is 
thin, but despite this measured appraisal it is apparent that the vague category of 
self-regulation has begun to be implicitly specified by the characteristic of effort. 
                                                        
58 The ego-depletion model and the strength-based model of self-control are one and the same. 
The strength-based model is meant to highlight that willpower (the limited resource) can be 
enhanced through practice (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). 
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In the Handbook for the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 
(Paloutzian & Park, 2013), Zell and Baumeister’s chapter uses self-control and 
self-regulation interchangeably. When outlining the essential features of self-
control/regulation, willpower as conceptualized by the limited resource model, 
i.e., ego-depletion, is one of four crucial features of regulation. Laurin and Kay 
(2016) similarly suggest “recent controversy notwithstanding (e.g., Job et al., 
2010; Molden et al., 2012), it is undeniable that exerting self-control relies on 
some forms of limited resources” (p. 313). If we were just discussing self-control, 
then this might be true, but Laurin and Kay (2016) also use self-control and self-
regulation synonymously, which is an issue because it is quite deniable that 
other forms of regulation depend on willpower.  
My point is that over the past two decades, the vague conception of self-
regulation that accommodates various conflicting accounts of self-regulation, has 
gradually condensed into a more specific focus on regulation as restraint (at least 
within the literature on religion and self-regulation). Alongside this conception 
of restraint, the tacit view that motivation is based on self-centered cost-benefit 
analyses became similarly entrenched. Just as the focus on religion as belief 
obscured other facets of religiosity, this focus on self-regulation as self-interested 
restraint overshadows processes that are goal-directed but not necessarily 
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effortful or purely self-centered. If this specification of self-regulation as 
dependent on restraint were based on evidence, then it would not pose a 
problem, but instead it seems primarily based on theoretical proclivities. 
There are many reasons this is a problem. Most pressingly, the recent 
“replication crisis,” which has been gradually toppling some of psychology’s key 
findings and reconfiguring the norms of the field (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 
2012),59 has come for the concept of ego-depletion. Carter and McCullough’s 
(2014) meta-analysis suggested that the apparent abundance of evidence for ego-
depletion may actually be the result of publication bias and overestimation. This 
was one of the first signs that all was not well with the theory. Dealing another 
crucial blow, the pre-registered replication efforts of Hagger and sixty-three 
colleagues (2016) failed to show any evidence of ego-depletion. Baumeister and 
Vohs (2016) responded with the promise of a multi-lab replication of their own, 
but so far there is no sign of their results. 
I reviewed this debate in more detail in chapter 1 (1.2.1), but I mention it 
here because the proliferation of research on ego-depletion likely supported the 
                                                        
59 Reviewing the full extent of this “crisis” is well beyond the scope of this chapter, which is 
unfortunate, because it is a living example, and test, of theories within the philosophy of science. 
Epistemological (Ioannidis, 2005) and social (Dominus, 2017) concerns are on full display as 
researchers adjust to new norms. While the popular media tends to see this as a challenge to the 
very foundations of psychology, it is more likely a sign of health (OSC, 2015). 
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tacit assumption of its integral role within self-regulation. The repetition of this 
interpretation developed like any other habit, with each occurrence increasing 
the likelihood of the next. This is the same dynamic as above– the vague concept 
of self-regulation was gradually equated with a specific concept of self-
regulation, and this occurred primarily due to repetition, rather than direct 
evidence of that feature’s salience within the broader category. 
To be clear, there was evidence that ego-depletion existed– lots of it. But, if 
Carter and McCullough’s (2014) analysis is right, then significantly more studies 
were done that returned null results– they just never saw the light of day. 
Publication bias—the tendency of journals to only publish significant results 
(Franco, Malhorta, & Simonovits, 2014)—and the resulting file drawer problem—
discarding or never reporting studies that return null results (Rosenthal, 1979)—
add an extra layer of false assurance to the process of conceptual condensation. 
Imagine you are running a lab and a research assistant wants to examine 
whether religious primes counteract the ego-depletion effect, which you 
regularly teach in your introduction to psychology class. She designs the 
experiment and does a few test runs of the depletion task, but they do not show 
any evidence of depletion. So, you work together, tweak the task a little, and try 
again. Finally, the task shows significant ego-depletion effects, but it turns out 
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that the religious primes do not influence these effects. What do you do with this 
data? Publishing it will be a monumental task since few journals are interested in 
null results, so it is probably best to just take it as a lesson and move on a 
different project.60 The wider impact of these understandable practices is the 
dramatic increase in Type I errors being published. The point of this example is 
that publication bias can exaggerate the process of conceptual specification that I 
described above– the inflated prevalence of significant effects within the 
published literature will magnify the perception that the effect is real, thereby 
leading researchers to doubt their methods or design when they find null results. 
All of these dynamics likely amplified the perceived importance of ego-
depletion, which then supported the assumption that it must play a crucial role 
in self-regulation. The vague category of regulatory behaviors became restricted 
in the process. But the vagueness of the concept also permitted a sustained body 
of research arguing against the identification of self-regulation with effortful 
control (Bargh, 1997; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, Macrae, 2014; Koole et al., 2010; Kuhl, 
2000). As fissures in the concept of ego-depletion developed, this vagueness 
allowed the concepts of self-control and self-regulation to be reimagined, a 
                                                        
60 In this example I am not mentioning other questionable research practices, such as excluding 
data for post-hoc reasons or p-hacking, which only exacerbate these problems (see John, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012). 
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process still underway (e.g., Berkman et al., 2017). This is the ambiguity of 
vagueness– it allows for unjustified reductions of the category, but it also permits 
the critique and correction of those reductions. 
In order to challenge the univocality of ego-depletion within research on 
religion and self-regulation, I adopted the same interdisciplinary method used to 
dispute the sole importance of belief. From the work on social identity and social 
norms, we saw how socially endorsed standards, such as conventions, act as 
unreflective but deeply persuasive guides for behavior (e.g., Kashima, 2008). 
Research on sacralization and moral emotions helped to highlight the cases in 
which regulation may be motivated by goals that are socially-centered rather 
than purely self-interested (e.g., Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). As above, 
these theoretical arguments are not aimed at the evidence for the relationship 
between religiosity and restraint, they are targeted at the implicit claim that these 
are the most salient forms of regulation within the broader relationship. 
To humanities scholars this approach may not seem interdisciplinary. 
After all, I simply reviewed other psychological studies. From within 
psychology, however, it is evident that I drew from social psychology (e.g., Tajfel 
et al., 1971), cognitive anthropologists (Atran & Ginges, 2012), developmental 
psychologists (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008) primatologists (Yamada, 
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et al., 2013), and counseling psychologists (Skowron, Holmes, & Sabatelli, 2003) 
to name a few. By maintaining the vague category of self-regulation 
unconditioned by restraint and self-interest, the evidence and perspectives of 
these other research programs and sub-disciplines helpfully illuminated the 
broader range of behaviors that religious engagement might influence. 
6.2.3. The value of vagueness 
In the case of both religion and self-regulation, their vagueness permitted 
the process by which specific characteristics became emphasized at the expense 
of other features. The complex web of potential associations between the two 
phenomena was reduced to a single strand. While the vagueness of the concepts 
allowed this process to happen, the process itself was driven by background 
assumptions and the gradual entrenchment of theory. Within this dissertation, 
my method of correction was deeply interdisciplinary. The virtue of 
interdisciplinary inquiry lies within its capacity to bring novel perspectives and 
evidence to bear on phenomena that may currently be studied only through a 
narrow lens. This cross-pollination, however, depends on the vagueness of 
categories. Without that vagueness, researchers could retort that normative 
behavior is not controlled behavior or affiliative social processes are tangential to 
the essence of religion. By holding our concepts lightly and permitting their 
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vagueness to remain, we can consider a richer breadth of potentially relevant 
processes. The question, however, is whether these interdisciplinary analyses or 
the empirical evidence from chapter 5 can decisively confirm the plausibility of 
my theoretical account over and against the current explanation. In order to 
answer that question, below I will consider the challenges that the sociality and 
theory-ladenness of inquiry pose for choosing between competing theories. First, 
however, it is worth reviewing the details of my alternative explanation and its 
entailments. 
 
6.3 Reflective review 
My approach throughout this dissertation, following religious studies scholars 
such as McCutcheon (2012), has been to assume that:  
Religion—like all other aspects of human social life—may well turn out to 
be all too ordinary… It is only when we start out with the presumption 
that religious behaviors are ordinary social behaviors—and not 
extraordinary private experiences—that we will come to understand them 
in all their subtle yet impressive complexity.” (p. 14-15)  
Taking religious engagement to function in the same way as any other social 
behavior was the first step towards challenging the specification of religious 
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engagement as primarily a matter of propositional beliefs. Within chapter 2, I 
engaged the work of Durkheim (1912/2008) to offer a socially oriented account of 
religious engagement and self-regulation. First I argued that most of the 
standards relevant for self-regulation have social origins as part of a tacit moral 
order underwriting the norms of a group. By regulating in relation to these social 
standards, we signal our particular affiliations within these groups. This social 
perspective on self-regulatory behavior highlighted the ways that self-
monitoring and motivation will be highly attuned to situational cues and the 
quality of one’s attachment to the group. Adding to this perspective, I engaged 
potential critiques from post-modern theorists, which highlighted that this social 
context is not necessarily monolithic– instead it is mosaic of overlapping and 
contested entities. This insight motivated the hypothesis that individuals are 
likely to have internalized a diversity of social identities which may be integrated 
or conflicted to varying degrees. Since each of these social identities will carry a 
set of standards and motivations, the degree of integration or conflict will likely 
have direct consequences for the individual’s capacity to self-regulate. 
 Even though the arguments in chapter 2 were focused predominately on 
the social aspects of regulatory behavior, they were nevertheless motivated by 
theoretical trends within religious studies. Over the past two decades, lived 
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religion has emerged as a flourishing field (see Hall, 1997; McGuire, 2008) of 
research which turns the analytical gaze away from official religious institutions 
and instead looks for the more mundane practices that people consider religious 
or spiritual. This shift in focus is critical for understanding how religious 
engagement impacts people’s lives and behavior. For example, Ammerman’s 
(1997) research highlights the way that many US Christians see an ethical 
lifestyle as a more crucial component of their religiosity than any strict belief in 
doctrine. A central part of the lived religion approach is a skepticism about the 
central role of belief within what is pertinent about religiosity (Bender, Cadge, 
Levitt, & Smilde, 2012). While our inquiry should remain attuned to both the 
institutional and everyday aspects of religiosity (Ammerman, 2016), this research 
field argues that the latter have been largely ignored. This theoretical imperative 
is part of my motivation within this project for suggesting that religious beliefs 
may not be the most salient feature of religious engagement’s impact on self-
regulation. 
 While the perspectives from Durkheim (1912/2008) and the lived religion 
scholars helped to challenge the dominant explanation for religious engagement 
and self-regulation, they also carried tacit assumptions about social psychology. 
In order to examine those assumptions and construct a more explicit alternative 
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to the dominant explanation, in chapter 3, I turned directly to the relevant 
psychological research. Our attention was first drawn to social identity theory 
(Brewer, 1991; Hogg, 2016; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the way that people’s 
identity can become interwoven with their religious group. While this does not 
occur for everyone who is religious, when it does, these individuals likely 
internalize the norms of that group (Whitehouse & Lanman, 2014). Furthermore, 
some forms of religious engagement can lead these norms to become moralized 
and sacralized interpretations of expected behaviors (e.g., Atran & Ginges, 2012). 
Once moralized, norms extend well beyond injunctive dictates about ‘what I 
need to do in order to avoid punishment and get a reward.’ Instead they are 
engaged deontologically as ‘just the way the world is.’ Recognizing this 
psychological process of moralization—and the evidence that religious 
engagement tends to foster this relationship to social norms—I put forward the 
alternative explanation that moralization is a likely mediator within religious 
engagement’s impact on self-regulation.  
Attending to the social dimensions of this relationship between religion 
and self-regulation also surfaced the importance of emotions for understanding 
the motivational dynamics within this relationship. This was the primary topic of 
chapter 4. Following Tangney et al. (2007) and Tomasello (2016) I argued that the 
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motivational landscape that elicits moral behaviors is shaped by emotions in 
such a way that it often runs counter to the pull of self-interest. Instead, at the 
proximate level, moral emotions are socially-centered– abiding by and 
maintaining the group’s norms is an end unto itself, not a means towards selfish 
ends. This social-emotional perspective helped to explain the consistent evidence 
suggesting that it is intrinsic religiosity, not extrinsic forms, that positively 
impacts self-regulation. Future work should also consider how this association 
may shift depending on religious tradition; as Cohen and Hill (2007) have 
shown, the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction varies depending on how 
individualistic/collectivistic the tradition. Considering the emotional processes 
that motivate regulation therefore helped to challenge the account that focuses 
on self-interested restraint and further solidify my alternative explanation 
grounded in social processes.  
Within this section of my argument, I also suggested that if there were 
anything “extraordinary” about religious systems that would lead them to 
impact self-regulation over and above other forms of social engagement, then it 
would be the way that they include conceptions of supernatural beings within 
their relational networks. While this would distinguish religious engagement 
from belonging to a book-club, I nevertheless argued that these symbolic 
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relationships with supernatural others would still be formed through the same 
social processes that guide relationships with family, friends, and anyone else. 
Importantly, it is these very ordinary processes that determine who carries 
respect and authority. From this vantage point, I argued that it is therefore the 
way an individual relates to their religious group, inclusive of both actual and 
symbolic relationships, which will determine the extent to which their religious 
engagement influences their self-regulation.  
The theoretical analyses of chapters 2-4 do not definitively prove my 
alternative hypothesis. Instead, they challenge the current explanation’s specific 
focus on propositional beliefs and self-interested restraint by engaging neglected 
lines of interdisciplinary evidence that are relevant to the vague categories of 
religious engagement and self-regulation. And while these analyses do not prove 
my alternative specification, they do lend an empirical plausibility to my 
explanation. In order to test this explanation, in chapter 5 I presented new 
evidence that is pertinent to understanding the relationship between religion and 
self-regulation.  
A number of key findings emerged from those analyses. One of the more 
significant results was that conventional religiosity was associated with both 
emotional regulation and delayed discounting, a proxy for impulsivity, but 
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delayed discounting and emotional regulation were not associated with each 
other. This result challenges the monolithic portrayals of self-regulation as 
primarily a matter of exercising restraint (Baumeister, 2014). Though it also 
challenges accounts that suggest emotional regulation is a foundational 
determinant of discounting behaviors (e.g. Luerssen & Ayudek, 2014). Instead, 
self-regulation is likely a multifaceted capacity that varies by the type of goal 
pursued and the way in which it is pursued. For example, an individual may be 
very capable of avoiding the temptations of substance use, but struggle to 
regulate the emotional intensity of encountering conflicting worldviews. In my 
sample, conventional religiosity was associated with both types of regulation, 
but given the complexity of regulatory capacities, this is not necessarily the case. 
Returning to the example just given, fundamentalist forms of religiosity may 
offer a normative strictness that faithfully abides by authoritative rules (Ludeke, 
Johnson, & Bouchard, 2013) but cannot grapple with social differences 
(Hunsberger, Pratt, & Pancer, 1994; Sandage & Jankowski, 2013). In other words, 
different forms of religious engagement will likely impact different regulatory 
capacities, therefore it is critical to not restrict our analyses of either concept. 
Supporting this point, our study also showed that the relationship 
between conventional religiosity and emotional regulation was fully mediated by 
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social density. Social density was a rough index of how often participants saw 
their friends and family and how much support was given and received within 
these encounters (Figueredo et al., 2007). The relationship between social density 
and conventional religiosity suggests that religious institutions may play an 
important role in maintaining social networks. Given the complexity of our 
variable for social density, however, it is unclear whether this relationship varies 
depending on whether the network is one of friends or family. Regardless, the 
fact that social density mediated the connection between conventional religiosity 
and emotional regulation supports my claim that relational dynamics, not 
propositional beliefs, are salient features of the relationship between religious 
engagement and self-regulation. 
Given the complexity of self-regulation noted above, however, these 
relational dynamics may not be relevant across the board. Within my study, the 
connection between conventional religiosity and delayed discounting was not 
impacted by the other variables. Therefore, in order to understand that 
relationship, we are left in a similar place as Paglieri et al. (2013)– beliefs, the 
endorsement of which is likely embedded within my variable for conventional 
religiosity, may indeed be driving this relationship. But, given other studies that 
have found the opposite association between religiosity and delayed discounting 
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(e.g., Morgan et al., 2016; Shenhav et al., 2017), this relationship needs further 
differentiation.  
Contrary to my predictions, moralization processes did not influence 
these relationships between religiosity and emotional regulation or delayed 
discounting. While conventional religiosity was positively associated with the 
endorsement of binding moral intuitions, this association did not factor into the 
other relationships. Null results do not definitively show that there is not a 
relationship, but this does tentatively challenge the role of moralization within 
my proposed hypothesis. Granted the complex associations between religiosity 
and morality that depend on social context (Davis et al., 2016) and particularities 
of religiosity (Johnson et al., 2016), it is possible that my study did not deploy 
nuanced enough measures of these variables. Along the same lines, the 
endorsement of these binding moral intuitions may not accurately capture the 
sacralization or objectification processes (e.g., Sheikh et al., 2013) that I suggested 
would be crucial for the relationship between religious engagement and self-
regulation (Piazza, 2012). Therefore, this remains an area for future research. 
The importance of considering the various associations between religious 
engagement and self-regulation is reinforced by considering the behavioral 
outcomes of these self-regulatory capacities. For example, we found that 
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emotional regulation, but not delayed discounting, was significantly associated 
with fewer depressive symptoms. Conversely, delayed discounting, but not 
emotional regulation, predicted more cooperative behavior. This associations 
support previous work suggesting that self-regulation plays an essential 
mediating role in the relationship between religious engagement and well-being 
(e.g., McCullough & Willoughby, 2009) and that between religiosity and 
cooperation (Ainsworth & Baumeister, 2013). But, my results nuance these claims 
by showing that different regulatory capacities play different roles in these 
behavioral outcomes. This added detail is especially important for cultural 
evolutionary accounts of religious systems, which often depend on these 
proximate explanations for the capacity of religious engagement to foster either 
cooperation or health (Norenzayan et al., 2016). 
Beyond their specific entailments, these findings also broadly challenge 
the narrow specification of religious engagement and self-regulation within the 
dominant account of Zell and Baumeister (2013) and Laurin and Kay (2016). As I 
will argue below, these results are not a decisive blow against the dominant 
account, nor are they an unequivocal foundation for my own explanation– the 
theoretical terrain surrounding these explanations is too complex. But, these 
results do add to the accumulating body of evidence that can help us gradually 
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refine our understanding of the vague relationship between religious 
engagement and self-regulation. Furthermore, my analyses, at both the 
theoretical and empirical level, help to generate new hypotheses and questions, 
which, as I will argue below, is a crucial feature of progressive research. Before 
zooming out to the broader theoretical terrain of this project, it is worth briefly 
considering some of the fruitful directions for future research in this area. 
6.3.1 Future directions 
Throughout this dissertation I have emphasized the ways that religion 
functions as a normative force– reinforcing the social order and drawing 
individuals into abidance with this order. This emphasis helped to shift the 
current perspective away from its focus on propositional beliefs, but it also 
neglects forms of religious engagement that reimagine or directly challenge the 
social order. Whether made by the leaders of the civil rights movement in the US 
or within propaganda materials from the Islamic state, religious appeals and 
actions are regularly made to not uphold the prevailing social order. These are 
not isolated examples either, the Hebrew bible is full of prophets lamenting and 
questioning the common norms (Heschel, 1962/2001) and beyond the Abrahamic 
religions, Buddhist monks played a crucial role in the Saffron Revolution in 
Burma/Myanmar (Steinberg, 2008). If we are to understand the full breadth of 
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ways that religious engagement may impact regulatory behaviors, then we 
should also attend to those modes of engagement that explicitly rebel against the 
common order. 
Similarly, I have argued for a broader conceptualization of self-regulation, 
but it is likely that my own social account is not broad enough. Nearly fifty years 
ago, Kohlberg (1971) drew a distinction between conventional and post-
conventional forms of morality. While researchers have, rightly, moved away 
from stage-based theories of development and despite the fact that I argued that 
emotions play a more central role than rationality within morality, there is not 
strong evidence to contradict Kohlberg’s (1971) conceptual distinction between 
individuals who accept social norms and individuals who weigh those norms 
against their own conscience. While I would still posit a deeply social origin for 
the individual’s conscience, I nevertheless maintain that Kohlberg’s (1971) 
distinction helpfully illuminates the difference between the regulatory capacity 
to abide by a standard and the regulatory capacity to reflectively choose between 
standards. For example, Endicott and colleagues (2003) found that having deeper 
multicultural experiences tended to facilitate cognitive flexibility and more post-
conventional thinking about moral issues. The concept of differentiation of self 
(Skowron et al., 2003) comes close to capturing the regulatory capacity necessary 
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for post-conventional moral reasoning, and evidence already suggests that it is 
associated with various forms of religiosity (Jankowski & Vaughn, 2009; 
Sandage, Jensen, & Jass, 2008). But, just as recognizing subversive forms of 
religious engagement is crucial to maintaining the complexity of this concept, 
recognizing the broad range of behaviors involved in self-regulation will be 
necessary for articulating the complex dynamics of its relationship to religious 
engagement.  
In order to argue against the role of propositional beliefs within this 
relationship I have predominately emphasized religious behaviors and the 
dynamics of belonging. But, we cannot rule out the influence or importance of 
belief. Maintaining my skepticism of propositional beliefs, however, I would 
suggest that religious narratives likely play a significant role in the way 
individuals construct their religious identities and internalize the standards of 
their religious communities. For example, Blackburn (1999) analyzes the way 
monastic discipline was taught to Sri Lankan monks. Within Theravāda 
Buddhism, the Vinaya Pitaka is the set of formal rules and regulations that codify 
monastic discipline, but as Blackburn (1999) argues, few monks ever encountered 
the Vinaya. Instead monks primarily learned proper discipline as it was 
presented in narrative form through other texts within the Pāli canon 
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(specifically the Anumāna, Dasadhamma, and the (Karanīya)metta Suttas). One 
instance does not make the case, but various fruitful lines of research have 
suggested the inherently narrative form of our identities (McAdams, 1993) and 
the crucial role that religiosity can play within this narrative construction of 
ourselves (Alisat & Pratt 2012). Therefore, narratives emerge as a highly 
plausible avenue by through which religious engagement impact self-regulatory 
behaviors. 
A final promising and necessary route for future research is 
understanding the character of religious identities as they relate to other social 
identities. Ebstyne King (2003) suggested that religious identities may transcend 
other social identities. If this is true, then it would bear significant consequences 
for how we understand religious engagement and self-regulation. At the very 
least, understanding if and how religious identities differ from other social 
identities, and what factors contribute to integration or conflict between these 
intersecting aspects of identity (Kuhl, Quirin, & Koole, 2015) is a promising route 
for future work. Such research could provide a social background for related 
theories that are reinterpreting ego-depletion in terms of value-based choices 
(Berkman et al., 2017). If self-control and self-regulation are essentially the result 
of competing conceptual values, then understanding the various social identities 
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that might hold these conflicting values would be crucial to understanding 
regulation.  
 These are not the only promising routes for future research on religious 
engagement and self-regulation. Instead, they emerge as either conceptual lacuna 
within my analyses so far, in the case of narrative, or hypotheses that I surfaced 
but did not test, in the case of religious identity dynamics. As an 
interdisciplinary project, this dissertation could also motivate research in other 
fields. But, in order to understand the difficulties and promise of such 
interdisciplinary engagement, we need to zoom out to the broader theoretical 
context within which this project has been situated. That is the aim of this final 
section. 
 
6.4 Interdisciplinary reflections 
While I have freely moved between disciplines, collecting evidence and bringing 
it to bear on the relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation, 
this is not a straightforward method of inquiry. There are two interwoven 
obstacles to the method of inquiry that I have deployed in this dissertation. First, 
is the problem noted in the first section above– all inquiry is loaded with 
background assumptions, theoretical commitments, and methodological 
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expectations. This problem was first diagnosed by Duhem (1906/1954) and later 
elaborated by Kuhn (1962) as the “theory-ladenness” of inquiry. The second 
challenge to my interdisciplinary method is the fact that inquiry is a social 
process. While the social construction of knowledge may seem distinct from the 
way observation is theory-laden, the two are interconnected because the 
theoretical presuppositions and methodological norms that “load” observations 
are carried by a community of inquirers. Taken together, these two points can 
lead to the radical position that all theories are seriously underdetermined– they 
are not supported by or changed on the basis of evidence or rational thought 
(Bloor, 1976; 1999).  
If scientific theories are underdetermined by data in such a radical way, 
then that poses various problems for my project. For one, it challenges the 
possibility of translating perspectives and evidence across disciplinary lines– 
doing so depends on the assumption of a common referential base. The 
presumed difficulties of translation would undermine both my method, which 
looked to other disciplines for relevant evidence, and my conclusions, which 
seek to speak to both psychologists of religion and religious studies scholars. The 
radical underdetermination of theory by data would also subvert the possibility 
of deciding between the current explanation and my alternative hypothesis. No 
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accumulation of evidence or conceptual argument could shift the plausibility of 
either account– instead theory change depends on rhetoric and social persuasion.  
Resolving these issues has been a persistent concern within the 
philosophy of science,61 so I will not posit a novel solution here. Besides, given 
the very nature of my project, my opinion of this radical position on the 
underdetermination of theory is probably apparent. There are two reasons I 
nevertheless find it a valuable position to understand. First, it helpfully pinpoints 
the challenges facing my project. Translating evidence and theory between 
disciplines is not a straightforward endeavor and deciding between theories 
often cannot occur on the basis of single experiments or arguments. Second, there 
are many religious studies scholars who are committed to similar views of 
scientific research. If I want them as part of my audience, which I do, then I must 
understand the contours of their likely critique. Attempting to overcome their 
doubts may be quixotic, but at the very least, by appreciating their position we 
can uncover the root of disagreement and not be lost in peripheral arguments. 
                                                        
61 These issues extend well beyond the modern discipline of philosophy of science. Kant’s 
(1781/1999) framing of the problem still echoes throughout these debates: we can never truly 
know objects of the world, noumena, because all experience necessarily occurs through the 
transcendental structures of the mind. In other words, the only evidence we can gather is that 
which conforms to our categories of understanding– so the possibility of correcting those 
categories on the basis of new evidence vanishes. For a freeing discussion of how pragmatic 
philosophy offers an alternative account see Neville (1992). 
  
 
355 
 In contrast to this radical position, Lakatos (1978) offers a framework that 
acknowledges the way inquiry depends on a network of theoretical assumptions, 
yet also describes how evidence can meaningfully correct existing theories. For 
our purposes, the key insight from Lakatos’ (1978) theory is that within any 
research program different hypotheses are afforded different standing. There is a 
hard core that is, justifiably, resistant to change, but there is also a belt of 
auxiliary hypotheses surrounding this hard core. From this perspective, evidence 
is capable of refuting these auxiliary hypotheses, but in order to falsify the hard 
core, the accumulation of evidence must first penetrate through this auxiliary 
belt. Lakatos’ (1978) description of science, therefore, maintains the capacity of 
arguments and evidence to correct theory while also explaining why theories can 
be so resistant to change. This perspective helps to contextualize my empirical 
project within my efforts to shift inquiry away from the restricted sense of 
religion and self-regulation. By recognizing the different levels of theoretical 
commitments, this framework also helpfully describes why interdisciplinary 
work is easier in some spaces than others. 
 Lakatos’ (1978) theory of research programs primarily addresses the 
epistemic issues of theory-ladenness. In order to recognize the social 
embeddedness of inquiry, without undermining the possibility of this project, we 
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will turn to Longino’s (1990) work. Her primary project is to articulate how 
objectivity is possible given the pervasive role that contextual values have in 
shaping inquiry. As she is concerned with these values as background 
assumptions, Longino’s (1990) work is also relevant for understanding the 
theory-ladenness of observation; for our purposes, however, the value of her 
research comes from her account of the social practices within science. While 
proponents of the radical underdetermination of theory by data see these social 
practices as miring the possibility of objectivity, Longino (1990) argues that these 
practices are the fundamental ground of objectivity. The important question is 
not whether science is social—clearly it is—but how the social practices of 
science are organized. Criticism and diversity of perspectives emerge as the 
essential components of objective inquiry. Longino’s (1990) account of 
objectivity, therefore, helpfully demonstrates the value of interdisciplinary work 
while also highlighting the features of social organization that are necessary to 
make such diverse work fruitful. Taken together, Lakatos (1978) and Longino 
(1990) provide a way around the radical underdetermination of theory by data, 
while also offering a compelling appeal for the necessity of interdisciplinary 
work. 
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6.4.1 Kuhn and the heavy load 
 Above, when discussing the way theoretical assumptions guide research 
with the effect of restricting vague categories in the absence of evidence, I 
presented these processes as isolated incidents. In the Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (SSR), Kuhn (1962) takes a historical perspective to argue that the 
impact of theoretical assumptions on inquiry is actually the norm. SSR is a 
foundational text for philosophers of science and it advances many more 
arguments then I will be able to engage in this section. For our purposes, the 
essential part of SSR is Kuhn’s (1962) description of science as a thoroughly 
social process, in which certain theories or experiments become elevated as 
“model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” (p. x). These 
theories and experiments are part of what Kuhn describes as a scientific 
paradigm, which is simultaneously one of the most significant and sketchy 
contributions from his work. While the technical definition of paradigm was 
criticized for its imprecision (see Masterman, 1970; Shapere, 1964), it nevertheless 
serves as a valuable heuristic for understanding the way that tacit expectations, 
knowledge, and values inescapably shape the direction of inquiry. 
In the examples above, the assumptions that propositional beliefs are the 
salient feature of religiosity or that self-regulation depends on a limited resource, 
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function in the same way as paradigms. They pattern expectations about what 
sort of evidence researchers are likely to observe and then shape how that 
evidence is interpreted. Typically, paradigms are taken to be more pervasive and 
overarching than specific assumptions– in a postscript to SSR, Kuhn (1962/1996) 
described paradigms as “disciplinary matrices” which include symbolic 
definitions, metaphysical and epistemological commitments, values, and key 
experiments. Clearly, singular assumptions, such as those highlighted above, do 
not carry the same weight. While not as pervasive or influential throughout the 
discipline, these assumptions nevertheless function in the same manner as 
paradigms, a fact made apparent by Kuhn’s (1962) presentation of Bruner and 
Postman’s (1949) anomalous card experiment. 
This experiment consisted of showing participants cards from a deck very 
quickly and having them identify what card they saw (Bruner & Postman, 1949). 
This would be a mundane test of perceptual thresholds, but the deck also 
included trick cards, such as a red six of spades or a black four of hearts. By 
having participants work through the deck multiple times, Bruner and Postman 
(1949) were able to assess the thresholds at which people recognized the trick 
cards. It took people significantly longer to recognize these cards for what they 
were, and some people never did (Bruner & Postman, 1949, p. 218). The reason 
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Kuhn (1962) is interested in this experiment is because of Bruner and Postman’s 
(1949) interpretation: “[F]or as long as possible and by whatever means available, 
the organism will ward off the perception of the unexpected, those things which 
do not fit his prevailing set” (p. 208). Setting aside the irony of using 
psychological evidence to support a point about researchers’ resistance to 
evidence, Kuhn (1962) interprets these findings as illustrative of the pernicious 
effects of paradigms: 
Either as a metaphor or because it reflects the nature of the mind, that 
psychological experiment provides a wonderfully simple and cogent 
schema for the process of scientific discovery. In science as in the playing 
card experiment, novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by 
resistance, against a background provided by expectation. (p. 64) 
In other words, theoretical assumptions—such as that religious belief is the 
salient feature or self-regulation is self-interested restraint—are part of a 
researcher’s background expectations, which not only guide the selection and 
interpretation of evidence, but can also lead researchers to resist conflicting 
evidence. 
This suggestion about the pervasive ways in which theoretical 
assumptions influence the reception, selection, and interpretation of evidence 
  
 
360 
poses a radical challenge to theories that scientific change occurs in response to 
new evidence or rational argumentation. This challenge to traditional, 
progressive, views of scientific change, was the revolutionary contribution of 
SSR. As Kuhn (1962) puts it: “the competition between paradigms is not the sort 
of battle that can be resolved by proofs” (p. 148). Instead of being decided by 
evidence, theory change occurs through “techniques of persuasion” (1962, p. 152) 
or through the death of older generations who are committed to the prior theory. 
This perspective on the underdetermination of theories by data cuts both 
ways within the current project. On one hand it provides support for my earlier 
analysis about the way the vague categories of religious engagement and self-
regulation became specified without direct evidence. From Kuhn’s (1962) 
perspective, this is the natural solidification of a theoretical assumption. But at 
the same time, this perspective suggests that my alternative specification of the 
relationship between religious engagement and self-regulation is in no better 
position empirically. Instead, from this perspective, I have simply offered an 
alternative description grounded in a different set of background expectations. 
More troublingly, this account would suggest that the differences between my 
account and the current explanation cannot be decided on the basis of new 
evidence. 
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 In later essays, Kuhn (e.g., 1977) backs away from the stronger forms of 
his thesis, resisting charges that his account is anti-rational or anti-realist. By this 
point, however, his argument had taken on a life of its own. Joined by critical 
theory, Kuhn’s (1962) work became the foundation for more radical portrayals of 
scientific theories as social artifacts created by committee without meaningful 
input from the outside world. The most thorough proponent of this view is Bloor 
(1976) and what has become known as the Strong Program within the sociology 
of scientific knowledge (see also, Barnes, Bloor, & Henry, 1996; MacKenzie, 1981; 
Shapin, 1982). This program is committed to making the social practice of science 
and the beliefs produced by this practice, objects of study. In order to make this 
field of inquiry rigorous, Bloor (1976) presented four tenets that should guide the 
sociological study of science. While a full review of these methods is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, it is worth noting two of them: 
2. [The sociology of scientific knowledge] would be impartial with 
respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, success or 
failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will require explanation. 
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same 
types of cause would explain, say true and false beliefs. (Bloor, 
1976, p. 7) 
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In other words, if one is seeking to explain why scientists hold one theory 
rather than another, the Strong Program precludes any appeal to evidence 
and reasoning as a cause. Bloor’s (1976) reason for setting these 
boundaries is to continue Kuhn’s (1962) efforts countering historical 
accounts of science as the progressive march of reason and discovery. To 
be clear, this is a laudable and necessary correction to enlightenment 
narratives that oversell the possibility and progress of rational inquiry, but 
if one removes any distinction between true and false beliefs and instead 
sees both as fully explainable through social causes, then one has 
completely severed the connection between theory and evidence. As Bloor 
(1999) puts it elsewhere: “The important point is to separate the world 
from the actor’s description of the world” (1999, p. 93).  
 If theories about the world are severed from the world then there is no 
common ground for translating between the self-referential paradigms 
governing each discipline. Kuhn (1962) referred to this lack of a common ground 
or measure as the “incommensurability” of paradigms (p. 148-150). If this 
account of theories as so radically underdetermined is true, then my attempts to 
bring evidence from anthropological studies to bear on psychological theory or 
to surface psychological evidence as relevant for religious studies scholars are 
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intrinsically flawed. Each discipline and theoretical perspective becomes 
divorced from the rest.  
 My purpose in briefly reviewing these perspectives from Kuhn (1962) and 
the Strong Program is two-fold. First, as just noted, their perspective clarifies the 
challenge posed by the social embeddedness and theory-ladenness of scientific 
inquiry. Bringing evidence across disciplines is not a simple process of direct 
translation, it also involves sensitivity to the background theoretical 
commitments that have shaped that evidence within its original social context. 
From this perspective, even the evidence presented in chapter 5 is faced with the 
challenge of being interpreted in light of any recipient’s prevailing theoretical 
commitments. In short, the problems of specification on the basis of non-
empirically warranted theoretical expectations not only trouble the current 
explanation for the relationship between religion and self-regulation, they also 
plague my specification and radically undermine the possibility of deciding 
between the two on the basis of anything other than social persuasion. 
 My second reason for engaging these perspectives is that there are scholars 
within religious studies who hold similar positions on scientific inquiry as those 
proposed by the Strong Program of Bloor (1976) and colleagues. For example, 
recall McGuire’s (2008) work in chapter 2. I would wager that the lack of 
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biological and psychological citations was not simply carelessness as much as it 
was a result of the assumption that scientific descriptions of emotion, memory, 
and perception are just one set of descriptions among many equally valid 
descriptions. That being the case, citing Bourdieu (1977) as an authority on these 
processes is just as legitimate as citing a statistical meta-analysis on the 
neurology of perception. As I noted in chapter 2, my intention is not to deride 
McGuire (2008)– I believe her work is very important within religious studies. 
Nor am I suggesting that Bourdieu (1977) does not have helpful insights on 
perception, memory, and emotion. Instead I am acknowledging a large 
epistemological fault line that could preclude intellectual exchange between 
scholars in the psychology of religion and those that are committed to this 
perspective on science.  
 I lament this divide because I share many ethical and epistemological 
commitments with these scholars. As I noted above, these scholars within the 
discipline of lived religion (e.g., Bender, 2003; Hall, 1997; Orsi, 1985) are part of 
my motivation for arguing that the regular and seemingly inconsequential acts of 
religious engagement are likely a stronger determinant of self-regulation than 
officially professed beliefs . As Ammerman (2016) puts it “lived religion provides 
a way to make sense of religious life and spiritual practice without measuring 
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participants against a Protestant definition that begins with belief” (p. 8). In 
short, scholars of everyday religion have insights about the lived texture of 
religiosity than can help psychologists of religion provide thick and diverse 
contexts for their research. 
 I also lament this divide, because scholars of lived religion could enrich 
their inquiry with insights from the psychology of religion. For example, within 
chapter 3 I described the way that social norms come to have varying degrees of 
influence within people’s everyday actions– some norms are simply descriptive 
conventions about what people tend to do while others are moralized into 
injunctive oughts about the way the world should be. These dynamics provide a 
highly relevant psychological backdrop for understanding an individual’s 
everyday practices and whether those practices reinforce or rebel against 
particular norms. Similarly, throughout this dissertation I have described how 
being embedded in a group that shares normative practices and standards can 
have a strong impact on one’s regulatory strength. These groups are not 
necessarily the large institutional congregations of religion. The more persuasive 
group will be the small, but tight, group of peers. Recognizing the psychological 
impact that such social embeddedness can have on an individual’s self-
regulation can provide a helpful lens for understanding how small groups 
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perform tactical interventions amidst broader and seemingly more powerful 
regimes. While these interdisciplinary exchanges are not particularly easy, they 
are potentially very fruitful. The problem, however, is that philosophical 
commitments that severe descriptions of the world from the world itself tend to 
preclude such interdisciplinary dialogue by removing any common referent. 
 Fortunately, however, this philosophical perspective is not necessary. Nor 
is it particularly well-founded. Let us return briefly to the Bruner and Postman 
(1949) study. Their experiment and thesis, that people actively resist anomalies in 
their experience, was part of a broader school of thought within the psychology 
of perception– the New Look movement (see Bruner, 1957). These psychologists 
argued that values (Bruner & Goodman, 1947), desire (Lazarus, Yousem, & 
Arenberg, 1953), expectations (Bruner, Postman, & Rodrigues, 1951), and other 
cognitive processes all influence what we perceive. Theory-ladenness appeared 
to be written within our perception. The only problem is that this movement was 
evidently wrong. Further experiments failed to replicate these effects (see Carter 
& Schooler, 1949; Klein, Schlesinger, & Meister, 1951; Landis, Jones, & Reiter, 
1966), and the New Look movement faded.62 The loss of this metaphor does not 
                                                        
62 There is currently a new resurgence within perceptual psychology of studies that claim to show 
similar top-down effects to those posited within the New Look movement (e.g., Balcetis, 2016; 
  
 
367 
disprove Kuhn’s (1962) example of paradigms any more than it proved his 
argument in the first place, but it does cast doubt on this core tenet. At a meta-
level, the decline of this movement in the face of contradicting evidence also 
poses a puzzle for any theorist committed to the perspective that scientific 
theories are no more than social facts. 
 Suggesting that there is a common frame of reference is not to say that the 
theory-ladenness of data is not an issue for interdisciplinary inquiry. It also does 
not imply that deciding between competing theories can be done on the basis of a 
single experiment (notice that the failed replications of the New Look movement 
span more than fifteen years). But, preserving the common ground of evidence 
does leave the door open for fruitful exchanges across disciplinary lines. In the 
next two sections, I will argue that Lakatos (1978) and Longino (1990) preserve 
the best parts of Kuhn’s (1962) theory, while also offering a framework for 
understanding how to go about such fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue.  
6.4.2 Lakatos’ shifting load 
Lakatos’ (1978) work in the philosophy of science was most directly in 
dialogue with Popper (1962) and the demarcation problem: i.e., how to 
                                                        
Goldstone, de Leeuw, & Landy, 2015). But, once again, these experiments appear to be built on a 
shallow foundation (see Firestone & Scholl, 2016, for a meticulous critique). 
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distinguish science and pseudoscience. Popper’s (1962) famous resolution to this 
problem was to recognize that genuine scientific inquiry is characterized by 
falsification rather than the accumulation of confirming evidence. This was one 
of the rationalist theories of scientific change that Kuhn (1962) was arguing 
against: 
No process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development 
at all resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct 
comparison with nature… the act of judgment that leads scientists to reject 
a previously accepted theory is always based upon more than a 
comparison of that theory with the world. (p. 77) 
Lakatos’ (1978) framework bridges these two accounts– bringing Duhem’s 
(1906/1954) and Kuhn’s (1962) recognition of the complex network of theories 
surrounding any observation to bear on Popper’s (1962) insight about the logical 
necessity of falsification within inquiry. Within this section, I cannot fully engage 
this synthesis and its significance for the demarcation problem. But the 
theoretical structure that Lakatos (1978) develops to resolve these two 
perspectives will also help us more specifically articulate the challenges and 
possibilities available to interdisciplinary inquiry.  
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The key piece of Lakatos’ (1978) framework, for our purposes, is the 
difference between theories that constitute the hard core of a research program 
and those theories that form a protective, auxiliary belt around this hard core: 
All scientific research programs may be characterized by their ‘hard core’. 
The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the modus 
tollens at this ‘hard core’. Instead, we must use our ingenuity to articulate 
or even invent ‘auxiliary hypotheses’, which form a protective belt around 
this core, and we must redirect the modus tollens to these. It is this 
protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests 
and get adjusted and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend 
the thus-hardened core. (p. 48)  
The difference between the hard core and the auxiliary hypotheses is therefore 
defined in terms of what scientists do. In other words, it is a methodological 
distinction– the “negative heuristic” is a rule that “tell[s] us what paths of 
research to avoid” (p. 47). As such, the hard core is the set of theories that is 
practically protected from falsifying evidence (i.e., the “not-q” of the modus 
tollens). While previous theorists cast auxiliary hypotheses as a sign of science’s 
resistance to theory change, Lakatos (1978) recasts them as a vital feature of 
progressive research programs. 
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The function of auxiliary hypotheses is two-fold. Their first function is 
that described in the quote above– buffer the hard core of a research program 
from falsification. For example, consider the hypotheses ‘ego-depletion does not 
work for certain computerized tasks, such as Sripada et al.'s (2014) e-crossing 
procedure’ or ‘frustrating tasks do not deplete willpower, only fatiguing tasks 
do’, which were both given by Baumeister and Vohs (2016) in response to the 
failed replication (Hagger et al., 2016). These auxiliary hypotheses both serve to 
deflect the failed replication away from the core theory: self-control relies on a 
limited resource.  
 The second function of auxiliary hypotheses is to generate empirically 
testable predictions from the core theories. In this sense, the hypotheses I tested 
in chapter five are auxiliary hypotheses to make my core claim, about the 
relational dynamics of religion and self-regulation, empirically testable.63 
Similarly, hypotheses such as ‘belief in divine punishment promotes self-control’ 
(Johnson & Bering, 2006) or ‘belief in supernatural surveillance fosters socially 
desirable behaviors’ (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012) are auxiliary to the more 
central claim that the content of religious belief fosters self-regulation. Lakatos’ 
                                                        
63 Notice within my discussion (5.4), that I also offered a variety of auxiliary hypotheses to 
explain away those results that did not fit my core claim. 
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(1978) point is that, if taken alone, the theories that comprise the hard core often 
do not make direct predictions about the world.64 Instead they are surrounded by 
a set of more specific sub-hypotheses that can be tested. 
 By articulating the functions performed by the belt of auxiliary hypotheses 
in relation to the hard core, Lakatos (1978) is able to argue that there is a logical 
and practical structure to the network of theories within any research program. 
This framework is meant to synthesize Kuhn’s (1962) claims about science’s 
resistance to change with Popper’s (1962) insight about the logical importance of 
falsification. The result is an account of theory-change which is often 
conservative—because the hard core is resistant to change—but still rational and 
attuned to evidence, because the auxiliary hypotheses regularly change. In other 
words, it provides a way around Kuhn’s (1962) claims about the change between 
paradigms being an irrational, social process. Instead scientists adopt new 
theories for a variety of reasons: the new theory’s predictive capacity, its 
explanatory power, and/or the generative access to new empirical content. 
                                                        
64 This rough sketch is further complicated by the fact that each of these auxiliary hypotheses are 
dependent on a much wider set of other theories, such as those about the way beliefs “foster” 
behavior, or what constitutes a statistically significant effect. The existence of this wider set of 
theories, and the problem it poses for direct falsification was made famous by Duhem 
(1906/1954). Lakatos’ (1978) framework is developed partially in response to this problem. 
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I appreciate the realism preserved by Lakatos’ (1978) account, but this 
framework also helpfully contextualizes my project amidst my interlocutors. The 
image that emerges from Lakatos’ (1978) distinction between the hard core and 
the protective belt is of a research program as a dynamic cluster of auxiliary 
hypotheses surrounding a set of core hypotheses. In the examples above, I 
described my project as a nested cluster of theories and the dominant account as 
a different cluster. That is locally true, but if we zoom out then it becomes clear 
that both of our hard cores are auxiliary hypotheses to a more central theory 
about religion and self-regulation. Zoom out again, and that theory is part of a 
more encompassing research program within the psychology of religion, which 
is committed to core theories about religion as a bio-cultural phenomenon.65 This 
picture describes research programs as internally complex networks of 
hypotheses, with local clusters of auxiliary hypotheses protecting core theories, 
and these theories themselves acting as a protective belt surrounding even more 
central theories.66 My point in reviewing this model of research programs is that 
                                                        
65  How far can we zoom out? Lakatos (1978) said: “What I have primarily in mind is not science 
as a whole, but rather particular research programmes, such as the one known as 'Cartesian 
metaphysics’” (p. 47). So, we cannot include all inquiry as one big research program, but 
Cartesian metaphysics is a pretty big project.  
66 As another point in favor of Lakatos, this presents a more accurate picture of any scientific 
discipline as fairly contentious and heterogenous. Kuhn’s (1962) account of paradigms is a rather 
homogenous and happy affair of solving puzzles. 
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it provides a framework for understanding the various tensions within 
interdisciplinary projects like this one. 
For example, my account of the relationship between religion and self-
regulation and the current explanation share a large amount of theoretical 
content. We are both committed to the core theory that religion impacts self-
regulation. We also share commitments to empirical methods that are central to 
psychology as a research program. Also at the deeper level, both accounts of 
religious engagement and self-regulation have shared commitments to the theory 
that social phenomena have psychological dimensions. In short, my explanation 
and the dominant theory are different branches of the same research program. 
The process of unjustified conceptual specification that I articulated above does 
not change this fact– instead, it is more fruitfully framed as a pair of auxiliary 
hypotheses on which we disagree–‘religious belief is the salient aspect of religion 
that impacts self-regulation’ and ‘self-regulation relies on some strength of will.’ 
Therefore, my competing explanation is primarily directed at those auxiliary 
hypothesis, not the relationship between belief and restraint, which may persist.  
Beyond providing a framework for organizing these hypotheses, Lakatos’ 
(1978) account also helps to articulate where interdisciplinary exchanges are 
likely to be fruitful or not. For example, because both the current explanation and 
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my account are part of the same research program, there is enough common 
ground for disagreement that can still generate new empirical content, new 
predictions, and better explanations. Considering the interdisciplinary evidence 
that I surfaced in chapters 2-4, this framework helpfully explains why some of it 
will be more readily received than others. For example, work on social norms 
from cross-cultural psychologists (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2011; Kashima, 2015) or 
developmental psychologists (e.g., Rakoczy et al., 2008) will be more readily 
received by psychologists of religion than work from social theorists such as 
Berger (1967), Douglas (1970), Bourdieu (1977), or Collins (2004). Returning to the 
example above, about the possibility of exchange with scholars of lived religion, 
we can now see how far the distance is to be covered. If part of their hard core is 
a commitment to the view that scientific descriptions of the world are separate 
from the world itself, then it will be a long way from there to the hypotheses I 
generated, which aim to describe actual psychological processes. While this 
point, that disciplines have different theoretical commitments, is so common as 
to barely be worth mentioning, it is nevertheless puzzling given many of the 
shared interests in how cultural processes shape behavior. Shared interest may 
be sufficient to begin an interdisciplinary dialogue, but in order for that 
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conversation to generate novel insights, differences in core commitments must be 
navigated.  
This is the part of Kuhn (1962) that Lakatos (1978) preserves– inquiry or 
evidence that threatens the hard core will be redirected towards auxiliary 
hypotheses. Lakatos’ (1978) addendum, however, is that this process is not 
necessarily a detrimental process for the research program. Sometimes this 
process of deflection generates new predictions and insights, in which case, 
Lakatos’ (1978) describes them as progressive problem-shifts. Other times 
though, the process of deflection becomes increasingly ad-hoc, no longer 
generating new predictions or surfacing novel empirical content. At this point 
the research program is degenerating and inquirers will rationally defect. Until 
that point, however, researchers are justified in their commitment to their hard 
core and their resistance to conflicting accounts. 
 Finally, Lakatos’ (1978) framework also provides a way to more clearly 
articulate the impact of my empirical results from chapter 5. These results target 
two auxiliary hypotheses: ‘belief is the primary driver of religion’s impact on 
self-regulation’ and ‘self-regulation is primarily about restraint.’ The fact that 
emotional regulation and delayed discounting were not related poses a 
challenge, though not a direct falsification, to the second hypotheses. If 
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emotional regulation and delayed discounting are distinct capacities, as this 
evidence suggests, then it lends support to a new auxiliary hypothesis that self-
regulation is a mix of different processes that vary depending on the type of 
standard involved and the amount of effort exercised. Deciding between these 
views will take more time and evidence, but the study from chapter 5 is now part 
of the larger body of evidence tilting the scales. Within our evidence, the finding 
that conventional religiosity was associated with both types of regulation and 
that these relationships depended on different variables, social density in the 
case of emotional regulation, also challenges the auxiliary hypothesis about belief 
as the salient feature of religious engagement. This empirical challenge could be 
deflected, because it is possible that my measure of conventional religiosity was 
conflated with belief. But, explaining the connection between particular beliefs, 
social density, and emotional regulation, begins to appear more ad hoc than 
generative. In short, other explanations—i.e., auxiliary hypotheses—can account 
for these results without too much cost to the research program, so it is unlikely 
that my project will foster a decisive change of theory. But, these new hypotheses 
are fruitful; they open new aspects of the relationship between religious 
engagement and self-regulation for inquiry. So, from Lakatos’ (1978) perspective, 
this project is a crucial component of theory change.  
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 From the perspective of Lakatos’ (1978) framework, it is unreasonable to 
expect theory-change to happen on the basis of single experiments. The 
scientist’s responsibility is conservative– to protect the central theories of her 
research program until a more fecund alternative is available. While I have been 
critiquing Baumeister et al. (2001; 2010; etc.), their reluctance to abandon the 
strength-based model of self-regulation is not only understandable from this 
perspective, it is rational. Until there is an alternative theory that is generating 
novel predictions, incorporating more empirical content, and providing more 
robust explanations, they have no reason to change their position, even in the 
face of contradicting evidence. These theories are emerging (e.g., Berkman et al., 
2017), but are still too young to be fully viable alternative research programs. 
From outside of Baumeister’s research program, however, the contradicting 
evidence from Carter and McCullough (2013) and Hagger et al. (2016) is 
sufficient to abandon the auxiliary hypothesis that self-regulation is primarily 
self-interested restraint. In its place, my alternative hypotheses, that religion 
impacts conventional behaviors, moralized norms, and emotional regulation 
provide the seeds for new auxiliary hypotheses to surround the core theory that 
religious engagement impacts self-regulation. 
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While Lakatos’ (1978) framework provides a helpful epistemological 
correction to Kuhn’s (1962) theory, it mostly neglects the social processes that are 
clearly involved in the dynamics of theory choice. In order to briefly unpack 
those processes, we will now turn to the work of Longino (1990), who argues that 
the social character of inquiry is actually the grounds of its objectivity, not a 
reason to reject its empirical content. Longino’s (1990) argument articulates the 
features of dialogue that are necessary for healthy inquiry to proceed. 
6.4.3 Social inquiry 
Just as Lakatos (1978) was concerned with the demarcation problem, and 
Kuhn (1962) with the historical question of science as progressive, Longino’s 
(1990) project was not primarily about the social character of inquiry. Her deeply 
social perspective served as a way to ground objectivity in something other than 
the logical positivists’ formal view. For the positivists, objectivity depends on a 
logically (both syntactically and deductively) secured relationship between 
hypotheses and stable sets of data. The importance of this re-evaluation of 
objectivity should not be understated– those theorists like Kuhn (1962) or 
Feyerabend (1975) who reject the possibility of scientific objectivity, are rejecting 
the positivists’ model. Longino (1990) also rejects their model, but she does not 
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also reject objectivity as a possible result of inquiry. Instead she grounds 
objectivity in the social processes of inquiry.  
 Longino’s (1990) account of the social character of inquiry builds upon that 
given by Grene (1985). Grene (1985) highlights three primary ways in which 
science is not the endeavor of any sole individual: scientists, organized within 
disciplines, are dependent on each other for the ideas, instruments, methods, etc. 
with which they carry out the practice of science; becoming a ‘scientist’ requires 
initiation via educational institutions; and finally, any community of scientists is 
also embedded within and beholden to the larger society within which it exists. 
Longino (1990) elaborates on each of these facets, but the central point is that 
scientific knowledge is not an aggregation of individual contributions– it is 
produced by a community through processes of revision and elaboration.  
The social character of inquiry is ambiguous. Consider the issue of 
publication bias mentioned above. I discussed this solely as the tendency of 
journals to preferentially publish statistically significant results. But Longino 
(1990) highlights other ways in which the process of bringing research to 
publication is influenced by factors other than the empirical importance of the 
findings: “The production of knowledge is crucially determined by the 
gatekeeping of peer review. Peer review determines what research gets funded 
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and what research gets published in the journals, that is, what gets to count as 
knowledge” (p. 68). By itself this is not necessarily a problem, in fact, peer review 
can provide a crucial role of quality control. But, she continues, “the most 
startling study of peer review suggested that scientific papers in at least one 
discipline were accepted on the basis of the institutional affiliation of the authors 
rather than the intrinsic worth of the paper” (p. 68).67 These are the sorts of 
concerns that undergird critics’ arguments about the way in which all scientific 
knowledge is fatally underdetermined– if prestige is the sole determinant of 
what counts as knowledge, then scientific facts may be nothing more than social 
facts.  
The primary point of Longino (1990) and others, however, is that these 
social factors can also act as a way to facilitate and arrive at more accurate and 
objective knowledge. Longino (1990) makes this argument by pointing out that 
scientific knowledge is a public resource– it is available to anyone with the 
appropriate training, background, and interest.68 While this first sense of public 
may be idealistic, Longino (1990) continues by noting that science is also public 
                                                        
67 The study Longino references is Peters and Ceci (1982) and the discipline, sadly, is psychology. 
68 This may be an overly optimistic picture of access since many barriers, such as structural 
inequalities built around race, income, or nationality, impede the wide availability of scientific 
knowledge. 
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because it depends on evidence that is intersubjectively ascertainable. In other 
words, if you wanted to replicate my study, the evidence I surfaced in chapter 5 
is also available for you to examine and analyze, both as the database itself and 
as the possibility of re-running the same surveys on a similar group. Clearly 
there are also structural barriers to the intersubjective availability of some types 
of evidence–research requires funding and time—but in principle there is no 
impediment to scientific evidence being available to anyone else who cares to 
look into the same corner of the universe.  
The publicity of knowledge and evidence is what makes criticism possible 
and this criticism is the foundation for any claim to objectivity. Importantly, 
Longino (1990) is not arguing that all scientific disciplines or programs are 
perfectly objective. Instead she suggests that they can be objective to the degree 
that they facilitate and incorporate criticism. Within her argument, there are four 
criteria for achieving the sort of critical discourse that helps to ensure objectivity. 
First, there must be recognized avenues through which criticism occurs– this not 
only refers to the need for debates to occur in refereed journals or conferences, 
but also to the rhetorical avenues of criticizing method, evidence, assumptions, 
or reasoning. Second, fruitful criticism relies on some shared standards within 
the community. These standards, such as empirical adequacy, truth, consistency, 
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reliability (Longino, 1990, p. 77), have been discussed by previous theorists as the 
social values of inquiry (e.g., Kuhn, 1977). Longino (1990) acknowledges that 
they are utterly social, but nevertheless notes that this does not make them 
wholly arbitrary: “Standards do not provide a deterministic theory of theory 
choice. Nevertheless, it is the existence of standards that makes the individual 
members of a scientific community responsible to something besides 
themselves” (p. 77). This is a more tempered view than Lakatos’ (1978) 
perspective of theory change, but it nevertheless avoids sliding into a view of 
theory change as completely underdetermined. 
Third, even though the scientific community can be justifiably 
conservative in its reception to new evidence and theories, in order for criticism 
to work it must ultimately be responsive. In short, valid criticism must produce 
change. Longino’s final criterion for achieving transformative criticism within 
inquiry is that authority must be shared by qualified practitioners. This 
democratic point draws from Habermas (1971), and helpfully points our 
attention to the way that a scientific program, or inquiry being driven by a single 
group, can produce a narrowly hegemonic form of knowledge. In other words, 
diversity among inquirers can be a fruitful value for ensuring this shared 
authority is not unduly narrow-minded.  
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This final point helps illuminate the social dimensions of the conceptual 
condensation I mentioned above– for example, various studies had found 
significant relationships between religiosity and emotional regulation (e.g., 
Jankowski & Vaugh, 2009; Sandage & Jankowski, 2010; 2013) but these studies 
were not included in the theoretical reviews of Zell and Baumeister (2013) or 
Laurin and Kay (2016). This is likely due to disciplinary boundaries—which exist 
socially in the form of separate conferences, journals, and training programs—
that separate counseling psychological research, such as those mentioned above, 
from cognitive psychological research, which comprised most of the reviews. My 
interdisciplinary methods are an attempt at creating the more representative 
group of qualified and interested researchers that Longino (1990) suggests is 
crucial for objectivity.  
 Longino’s (1990) account of objectivity being grounded in the social 
processes of criticism helpfully balances Kuhn (1962) and the Strong Program’s 
(Bloor, 1976) perspective that the social dimensions of inquiry pose a radical 
challenge to the possibility of accurate knowledge about the world. Her account 
also helps to contextualize the contours of this project within the broader 
discipline and field of inquiry. For example, my alternative explanation is 
roughly organized around her four features of objectivity: my criticism, which 
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will ultimately occur through peer-reviewed venues, is based on methodological, 
theoretical, and evidential concerns; the shared standards I am appealing to are 
the values of comprehensiveness, consistency, and explanatory power; whether 
or not the community is responsive is yet to be seen; but, within my 
interdisciplinary approach I sought to bring the voices of various stakeholders to 
the inquiry, granting authoritative weight to each. My point is not to suggest that 
I am faithfully adhering to the norms of criticism, but to use Longino’s (1990) 
framework to add social richness to the epistemological account given by 
Lakatos. The combination of Lakatos (1978) and Longino (1990) provide a 
perspective that moves beyond concerns that the social embeddedness of inquiry 
implies its bias and subjectivity. Instead, the image emerges of a thoroughly 
social process that over time, through normative structures, and despite the 
rigidity of authority, nevertheless is capable of understanding reality.  
 Beyond the theoretical importance of Lakatos (1978) and Longino’s (1990) 
work for maintaining the possibility of social inquiry as a process that provides 
knowledge of the world, their framework also provides a means for theoretical 
self-reflection among scientists. One of the consistent charges made by the 
sociological study of science, is that science should be receptive towards being an 
object of inquiry. As Bloor (1976) puts it:  
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There was a most striking oddity and irony at the very heart of our 
culture… Whilst the knowledge of other cultures, and the non-scientific 
elements of our own culture can be known via science, science itself, of all 
things, cannot be afforded the same treatment. This would make it a 
special case, a standing exception to the generality of its own procedures 
(p. 46).  
I agree that science should be studied, but to insist a priori that there is no 
distinction between true and false claims is to contradict one of the shared core 
theories of all scientific research programs and violate the norms or standards by 
which scientists judge inquiry. In other words, at an epistemic and social level 
the critical perspectives of the Strong Program are unacceptable as a tool for self-
reflection among scientific practitioners. 
 In contrast, Lakatos (1978) and Longino (1990) provide a framework for 
reflection that scientists would recognize as an accurate representation of their 
practice. This framework provides a way to organize hypotheses such that 
researchers are aware of how their claims fit within their disciplines and across 
other fields of inquiry. By bringing attention to the social dynamics that facilitate 
this process, Longino’s (1990) work can also help to organize norms within a 
group of inquirers to effectively foster fruitful criticism and dialogue. My 
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idealistic hope is that such self-reflection could foster humility among inquirers, 
nurturing fruitful collaborations and critiques, while also breaking new empirical 
ground. At the very least such self-reflection has helped to contextualize the 
methods and potential consequences of my work. 
 
6.5 Final reflections 
The preceding section has been a highly abstract way to summarize a project. 
Part of my purpose in adopting such an approach is to highlight some of the 
impediments to interdisciplinary inquiry. As I noted above, one of the primary 
problems I identified within research on religion and self-regulation is the 
unjustified specification of the vague categories, such that the theory became 
primarily about the ways in which the content of religious belief fosters self-
interested restraint. A significant component of my argument in response to this 
reduction has been to incorporate evidence from other disciplines that is relevant 
to the establishment, maintenance, and efficacy of moralized norms. What the 
immediately preceding review helps to show is that bringing evidence and 
theory across disciplines is not a straightforward process. These forms of 
knowledge are created within groups, through particular norms and values, and 
in conversation with the concerns and interests of the group.  
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Even if we follow Lakatos (1978)—affirming the capacity of this process to 
produce accurate representations of the world—and Longino (1990)—supporting 
the way these communal norms can foster the process of criticism that, in the 
long run, helps align theory with evidence—we are still left with the difficult task 
of translating knowledge across disciplinary bounds. Given the publicity of 
knowledge and the intersubjective accessibility of evidence, this translation 
process is not mired by incommensurability, but, this is not to say the process is 
easy or straightforward. But, when we are seeking to answer questions that are 
inherently interdisciplinary, such as how religious engagement impacts self-
regulation, learning to translate between disciplines is necessary. 
I began chapter 1 with a question: how does culture change our behavior? 
This question was deliberately broad so that it could be recognized by scholars 
across social scientific disciplines. I am not the only one to frame up this 
question– Strauss (1992) places it as an essential problem of anthropology: 
Knowing the dominant ideologies, discourses, and symbols of a society is 
only the beginning — there remains the hard work of understanding why 
some of those ideologies, discourses, and symbols become compelling to 
social actors, while others are only the hollow shell of a morality that may 
be repeated in official pronouncements but ignored in private lives. Our 
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key question thus becomes: How do cultural messages get under people’s 
skin. (D’Andrade & Strauss, 1992, p. 1) 
Anthropologists are not the only ones interested in this question. Throughout 
this project I have reviewed the way that developmental, cognitive, cross-
cultural, and counseling psychologists each deploy their unique methods and 
perspectives to address relevant variants of the same question. I have also 
included theories and evidence from sociologists and religious studies scholars 
who have their own , tacit or explicit, perspectives on the way culture “gets 
under people’s skin.” Each of these researchers is addressing a similar question, 
but they are doing so from within research programs that have established 
norms and methods for how such an answer might look. Comparing their 
answers requires being sensitive to the ways those answers are shaped by their 
social and theoretical embeddedness. This is the difficulty of interdisciplinary 
inquiry. 
But, if we do not require that such exchanges across disciplines produce 
definitive answers, then this problem diminishes significantly. Translation is 
never perfect, but even with a rudimentary shared vocabulary people working 
together can develop a set of shared meanings that foster new insights for each of 
them about the world. This is why I have not argued for any definitive proof that 
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the current theory is wrong. Instead, such exchanges must be approached with a 
humble and open disposition. 
 The dynamic interplay between the social and the personal is deeply 
complex and wild. Articulating the ways that culture “gets under our skin” and 
that our psychological tendencies shape the social construction of reality is 
difficult enough. Add to this complexity the fact that moments of creativity 
continually spring forth and begin to carve new valleys in the psychological and 
social landscape. The only possibility for gaining a coherent picture of this 
landscape is to incorporate the perspectives of whoever has something to say 
about the bio-cultural topography. The exchange and comparison of such 
perspectives is a difficult task, but it is unavoidable if we hope to have anything 
to say about what we are and what we might be.  
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